Deck 8: Security Dilemma: Armament and Disarmament

Question 1

States acquire arms

A) when technological developments permit.
B) when economic capacity permits.
C) in response to public pressure.
D) in response to the arms acquisitions of their adversaries.

Answer 1

D

Question 2

The benefits foregone by investing in the military as opposed to more economically productive or socially beneficial pursuits is known as

A) opportunity costs.
B) military Keynesianism.
C) defense-welfare tradeoff.
D) arms races.

Answer 2

A

Question 3

An extensive body of social science research into the relationship between defense spending and aggregate economic performance has suggested there is

A) a weak positive relationship between the two.
B) a strong positive relationship between the two.
C) a strong negative relationship between the two.
D) no relationship between the two.

Answer 3

D

Question 4

In the United States,the Department of Defense employs more than

A) 500,000 civilians.
B) 700,000 civilians.
C) 900,000 civilians.
D) 1,200,000 civilians.

Question 5

The prisoner's dilemma game theoretic approach to world politics emphasizes

A) the independence of each side's choices.
B) zero-sum solutions to group conflict.
C) that what one side gains,the other side loses.
D) how leaders of states can become trapped in self-defeating actions.

Question 6

The action-reaction hypothesis

A) refers to arms build-up by one state in response to arms acquisitions by adversaries.
B) is derived from the radical perspective.
C) refers to the continual economic competition between states.
D) is a result of relative deprivation.

Question 7

The U.S.-Soviet strategic rivalry from the end of the cold war to the present is characterized by

A) U.S.nuclear monopoly.
B) U.S.nuclear preponderance.
C) essential equivalence between the two states.
D) rivalry collapse.

Question 8

What is the main reason why nuclear arsenals were not used during the Cold War?

A) Fear of isolation
B) Mutual assured destruction
C) Fear of communism
D) International law

Question 9

The deployment and proliferation of nuclear weapons prompted

A) widespread desire for arms control and disarmament.
B) widespread desire to establish spheres of influence to combat the spread of communism.
C) an increase in the number of military alliances globally.
D) a decrease in communication between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Question 10

Radical scholars and others have argued that politicians use peacetime defense spending to

A) stimulate the national economy during periods of slow growth.
B) start wars in underdeveloped nations.
C) bolster defense against unknown threats.
D) appease an active and potential aggressive military.

Question 11

Which of the following made mutual assured destruction (MAD)possible?

A) First-strike capability
B) Second-strike capability
C) Fission weapons
D) Fusion weapons

Question 12

In 2010,the U.S.government spent more than __________ on national defense.

A) $900 million
B) $200 billion
C) $700 billion
D) $1.2 trillion

Question 13

Which of the following is NOT classified as a weapon of mass destruction?

A) Nuclear weapons
B) National missile defense weapons
C) Chemical weapons
D) Biological weapons

Question 14

Second-strike capability

A) is the capacity to absorb attacks and inflict unacceptable damage on the opponent.
B) can create a stable situation of mutual assured destruction.
C) was achieved by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
D) All of the above are true.

Question 15

Before World War II,military aircraft had a combat radius of

A) about one hundred miles.
B) few hundred miles.
C) one thousand miles.
D) fifteen hundred miles.

Question 16

In the 1930s,British economist _______________ believed that government spending could be used to compensate for downswings in the business cycle.

A) Lewis F.Richardson
B) Winston Churchill
C) Kenneth Waltz
D) John Maynard Keynes

Question 17

"Minimum deterrence" requires

A) first strike capabilities.
B) second strike capabilities.
C) nuclear monopoly.
D) nuclear preponderance.

Question 18

Over the period from 1967 to the end of the Cold War,the United States and the Soviet Union were deemed to have essentially equivalent nuclear power,

A) owing to the buildup of U.S.military forces during the Reagan administration.
B) although in the later part of this period the United States had quantitative superiority while the Soviet Union had quantitative superiority earlier.
C) with the Soviet Union having greatly enhanced its quantitative and qualitative positions during the 1970s.
D) although the Soviet Union never had as many missiles as the United States.

Question 19

The United States currently pursues a strategy of

A) minimum deterrence.
B) mutual assured destruction.
C) second strike capability.
D) national missile defense.

Question 20

A policy of military spending,used as a counter-cyclical tool for a slumping economy,is known as

A) defensive strategy.
B) military Keynesianism.
C) imperialism.
D) market-based militarism.

Question 21

During most of the cold war years,the United States possessed

A) a nuclear monopoly vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
B) a nuclear force equal to or stronger than the Soviet Union.
C) fewer nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union,thus leading to the term "missile gap."
D) about the same number of nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union.

Question 22

Psychological experiments have shown that repeated plays of a game,like the prisoner's dilemma,lead to

A) greater distrust of other players.
B) greater likelihood to defect from other players.
C) greater commitment to relative gains from other players.
D) greater cooperation with other players.

Question 23

How does the Prisoner's Dilemma model help us to understand the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Question 24

If we use prisoner's dilemma to model an arms race between competing powers,which of the following best represents a player's choices,from most-preferred to least-preferred?

A) Unilateral disarmament,unilateral armament,mutual restraint,mutual armament
B) Unilateral armament,unilateral disarmament,mutual restraint,mutual armament
C) Mutual restraint,unilateral disarmament,unilateral armament,mutual armament
D) Unilateral armament,mutual restraint,mutual armament,unilateral disarmament

Question 25

The game of nuclear "chicken" is also known as

A) massive retaliation.
B) rollback.
C) détente.
D) brinksmanship.

Question 26

At the end of the Cold War period,the prisoner's dilemma model was no longer the best way to describe the superpower arms race because

A) the entire nuclear arsenals in both countries were under the control of disarmament agreements.
B) both countries realized that China's nuclear arsenal was a bigger threat.
C) the United States' preference ordering changed,and its preferred choice was something other than unilateral armament.
D) hydrogen bombs made all other weapons obsolete.

Question 27

In the prisoner's dilemma situation,it is always rational to

A) confess (defect),since by confessing you are better off no matter what your opponent does.
B) not confess (not defect),since by cooperating with the other player you will get off without a penalty.
C) confess,in order to get the sucker (saint)payment.
D) not confess (not defect),since you know the other player will never defect.

Question 28

Which of the following is NOT a goal of arms control treaties between nuclear states?

A) Minimize the risk of an accidental nuclear attack.
B) Set limits on the characteristics of weapons.
C) Build confidence and trust in each other's arsenal.
D) Promote the expansion of new states with nuclear weapons.

Question 29

The underlying basis for establishing a nuclear triad is to

A) make the United Kingdom and Germany feel safe through nuclear bases on their territories.
B) build redundancy into retaliatory capability.
C) avoid the conflict between the Army,the Navy,and the Air Force,each of which wants control over nuclear weapons.
D) make nuclear forces more vulnerable,thus establishing stable deterrence.

Question 30

How do we account for the end of the arms race between the superpowers?

Question 31

Which of the following is not part of the nuclear triad?

A) Land-based intercontinental missiles
B) Space-based weapons
C) Manned bombers
D) Nuclear submarines

Question 32

Briefly describe the goals and objectives of nuclear arms control treaties.

Question 33

An increase in the nuclear arsenals of existing nuclear states is known as

A) vertical proliferation.
B) horizontal proliferation.
C) vertical integration.
D) horizontal integration.

Question 34

Why do states acquire arms? Describe and explain the domestic and international factors contributing to arms acquisitions.

Question 35

What impact do repeated encounters between two states have on the stability of the world? Justify your answer.

Question 36

The spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear states is known as

A) vertical proliferation.
B) horizontal proliferation.
C) vertical integration.
D) horizontal integration.

Question 37

Which treaty committed states that did not already have nuclear weapons not to acquire them,and states that did have nuclear weapons to not to transfer them to nonnuclear states?

A) Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)of 1968
B) Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty (ABM)of 1972
C) Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)of 1987
D) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)of 2010

Question 38

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

A) succeeded in slowing the growth of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals.
B) were unsuccessful in restraining both the quantitative and qualitative arms race.
C) were successful in restraining the quantitative and qualitative arms race.
D) were successful in restraining the qualitative arms race but not the quantitative arms race.

Question 39

By 1987,U.S.President__________ and Soviet Premier________ had set the arms race on a downward spiral

A) Carter;Yeltsin
B) Reagan;Gorbachev
C) Reagan;Yeltsin
D) Carter;Gorbachev