Deck 51: Employment Law

Question 1

Jill Beaver was an employee at RGIS Inventory Specialists, Inc. She became ill while on vacation with acute sinusitis, bronchitis, and an ear infection. She was prescribed an antibiotic by a physician, who indicated that she should not fly on a airplane due to the danger it pose to her eardrum. Beaver did not advise her company of the situation until the day before her planned return date and did not give them the details of her diagnosis. Due to complications rescheduling her flight, Beaver could not return to work until almost a week after she was scheduled. She was fired upon her return. She filed a lawsuit against RGIS alleging that the termination of her employment violated the FMLA. Did it?

Answer 1

As per the Family and medical Leave Act (FMLA) 1993, an employee can opt for maximum 12 weeks of leave in a period of 12 month for any of the following reasons: to take of his own health, to take care of children, family, spouse or to adopt a child or raise a child.
As per the mentioned case it is stated that Jill Beaver who was an employee of RGIS inventory filed a case against the company for wrongful discharge under FMLA 1993. As per her allegations she went on a holiday out of station and suffered from acute sinusitis and ear infection and bronchitis. Doctor gave her antibiotics and asked to her to not to travel in plane as it can affect her ear drums. She did not intimate her health condition at the office and was able to rejoin her duties only after a week of her scheduled joining. She was fired from her job at once.
Now to answer the question given in the case it could be said that Jill cannot bring a case against RGIS under FMLA Act 1993, because firstly she had not informed back in her office about her health conditions and the resulting delay in the joining of the work until the last day of her holiday. Secondly, FMLA Act does not cover medical leaves for common cold, ear aches and mild cases of influenza. Thus she is not liable to get any benefit from alleging a case against RGIS in court because she is at a fault.

Question 2

Edwin Graning is an ordained Christian minister, who is opposed to abortion on religious grounds. He also worked for the Capital Area Rural Transportation System as a bus driver. He did not drive a fixed route; instead, Graning's bus acted more like a taxi, picking up riders in the nonurban areas around Austin, Texas, at the instruction of a central dispatcher, and delivering them to specified locations. In January 2010, Graning was dispatched to pick up several women and take them to a Planned Parenthood clinic. Graning called his supervisor to inform her that "in good conscience, [I can] not take someone to have an abortion" and that, in taking women to Planned Parenthood, he was concerned that he might be transporting a client to undergo an abortion. His supervisor responded that either he could pick up the women and take them to Planned Parenthood or he could resign. Graning did not want to quit his job, but he refused to drive the women to the clinic. As a result, he was told to drive his bus back to the office. When he arrived there, he was fired. Did the Capital Area Rural Transportation System violate Title VII by refusing to accommodate Graning's religion? What additional facts might help you in making a determination?

Answer 2

Employers provide employment opportunities. While selecting any employee by the employer then the employer has full right to reject his appointment. But the rejection of appointment based on color, religion, sex, race, nationality prohibited. When there is discrimination in the appointment of an employee by the employer on the ground of the above criteria, then it called employment discrimination.
In case of employment discrimination employer is liable to penalize under this act. There are many penalties imposed under this act as employment discrimination is equal to an offense.
There are various provisions in the law regarding employment discrimination. Title VII specifically deals with employment discrimination. Rule of Title VII applies where over 15 employees are employed during the financial year.
This rule contains two types of theories. In the first's case theory, it contains provisions regarding discrimination based on race, sex, nationality, religion, etc. whereas in the second's case theory, it conation employment discrimination because of natural reasons. With natural reasons, an employer should have evidence to prove the same.
The rule of Title VII equally applies to employees also. When the employer gives instruction to work, the employees required to complete that work on priority. If employees refuse to do that work due to Customer religion, sex, color, etc. then employees are also liable for Discrimination offense.
In the case, the G refuses to drop women who undergo an abortion. As a result, CART fired him from employment. As per the concept explained above, the employee cannot reject his duty on discrimination on the ground of the above criteria. But the above criteria do not include this case. Therefore, the CART is not correct.
Therefore, the CART is not correct.

Question 3

The Pillsbury Company maintained an electronic mail communication system. The company repeatedly assured its employees that all e-mail communications on the system would remain confidential. Pillsbury further assured its employees that it would not intercept e-mail communications and use them as grounds for terminating or reprimanding employees. Smyth, a Pillsbury employee, received e-mails from his supervisor over Pillsbury's e-mail system on his home computer. Relying on Pillsbury's assurances, Smyth exchanged some blunt e-mails with his supervisor. One of them apparently contained a threat to "kill the back-stabbing bastards," and another seemingly referred to a firm holiday party as the "Jim Jones Kool-aid affair." Later, Pillsbury retrieved or intercepted these messages, and fired Smyth for what it deemed inappropriate and unprofessional comments over the e-mail system. Smyth sued Pillsbury for wrongful discharge under the public policy theory, alleging that public policy precludes an employer from firing an employee in violation of his privacy. Will Smyth win?

Answer 3

Employers provide employment opportunities. While selecting any employee by the employer then the employer has full right to reject his appointment. But the rejection of appointment based on color, religion, sex, race, nationality prohibited. When there is discrimination in the appointment of an employee by the employer on the ground of the above criteria, then it called employment discrimination.
There are various duties and responsibilities imposed by an employer on the employee while entering the employment contract. In these duties, one of the most important duties is to take care of employer private data. It is the primary duty of the employee to maintain the confidentiality of data. As data is the most critical information of an organization. Therefore, the employee required to maintain integrity and confidentiality while working in an employee organization.
The rule of Title VII equally applies to employees also. When the employer gives instruction to work, the employees required to complete that work on priority. If employees refuse to do that work due to Customer religion, sex, color, etc. then employees are also liable for Discrimination offense.
In the given case, the S intercepted information about the future affairs of the organization. As per the concept explained above, the primary responsibility of employees includes maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of data. Therefore, the removal of the S by Company P is correct as per the above provisions.
Therefore, the S will not win in this case.

Question 4

Brian Petty was both a police office in Nashville, Tennessee, and an officer in the Army Reserve. In October, he informed the department that he would be deployed to Iraq at the end of the year. While in Iraq, Petty was charged with a violation of the Military Code of Justice. He resigned his commission and received an honorable discharge in lieu of a court martial. Upon his return to the United States a little over a year after his deployment, he requested reinstatement to his position as patrol sergeant. The police department commenced its customary return-to-work process for all officers who have been away from the department for extended periods of time. The process required Petty to complete a personal history update questionnaire, a medical examination, a computer voice stress analysis, a drug screening, and a debriefing with a psychologist. Petty received no pay or benefits for three weeks while the return-to-work process ran its course. At that point, Petty was reinstated to a "desk" job and not his former position as patrol sergeant, due to an ongoing investigation into his military discharge and his alleged untruthful answers on the return-to-work questionnaire about the discharge. Has the police department complied with its responsibilities under USERRA in its interactions with Petty?

Question 5

Adam Childers worked as a cook at Boston's Gourmet Pizza. While on duty, he was struck in the back by a heavy freezer door, seriously injuring his lower back. As a result of the injury, Childers suffered from severe lower back, hip, and leg pain. He was treated with pain medication and physical therapy, but his condition worsened over several months. He wanted to have spinal fusion surgery, but the doctors recommended against it. At the time of the injury, Childers was twenty-five years old, six feet tall, and weighed approximately 340 pounds. Due to his age and weight, the surgery was extremely risky. Furthermore, Childers's weight ballooned to 380 pounds in the months after his injury, because he was depressed and inactive. Though he tried to lose weight by adjusting his diet, he failed. A doctor ultimately recommended that Childers undergo lap band or other weight reduction surgery so that either his resulting weight loss would alleviate his pain symptoms or his lowered body weight would allow him safely to have back fusion surgery. Boston's Gourmet Pizza admitted that Childers's back injury was workrelated and did not dispute that treatment for the injury was covered under the applicable workers' compensation law. It argued, though, that it was not obligated to provide the precursor surgery (i.e., lap band for weight reduction) that would allow Childers to undergo the treatment for his work-related injury. Rather, the employer asserted that Childers's weight problem was a preexisting condition that relieved it of responsibility for Childers's treatment under the workers' compensation law. Is the employer's argument correct?

Question 6

In 1972, Randy Counts began his employment with Shell at its Belpre, Ohio, plant. Counts was laid off within a month of starting work but was rehired in 1974. Counts states that upon returning to Shell in 1974, he was promised by three individuals during the interview process that his term of employment would continue for life or until he accrued retirement benefits. In 2000, Kraton Polymers, LLC, purchased the assets of Shell and offered jobs to all Shell employees, including Counts. As part of the employment relationship, Kraton agreed to provide all employees in the Belpre plant with a three-step procedure for resolving disagreements and disputes. The Dispute Resolution Procedure was intended to provide "all employees of the Belpre Plant with a means of obtaining a definitive response to questions, complaints, misunderstandings, or disagreements involving personnel policies and procedures and create a forum for the employee to resolve a dispute." On October 30, 2000, Kraton provided Counts with a written "Offer of Employment" stating in part:
I wish to welcome you to Kraton Polymers under the terms set out in this letter.... Although we hope you choose to have a long career with Kraton Polymers, any employment relationship by law is one that requires the mutual consent of both employee and employer. This offer is not to be, and may not be considered, a contract of employment for a specific period of duration. Employment is "at will" and either the company or the employee may terminate the employment relationship at any time.
Counts signed the Offer of Employment, thereby agreeing to its terms.
Counts worked in safety and environmentally sensitive positions. Therefore, he was required to undergo random substance abuse testing. In May 2000, prior to Kraton's takeover, Counts underwent a drug test and tested positive for cocaine, which he admitted having used. He was instructed by Shell to contact one of its drug counselors. The counselor informed Counts that in order to continue his employment, he had to satisfy certain conditions. Counts signed a return to work agreement on May 24, 2000, which required him to submit to periodic substance abuse testing for 48 months following his return to work. The agreement provided that "[t]he results of these tests must be negative," and that termination could result from a failed test. On December 6, 2002, Counts's direct supervisor told him to report to the plant nurse's office for a substance abuse test. Counts reported there, went into the office's private bathroom, and thereafter handed the nurse a purported urine sample, which she split into separate sealed containers for submission to an independent, third-party drug testing lab. Approximately one week later the lab, Quest Diagnostics, reported that Counts's sample was "Substituted." Pursuant to Kraton's drug testing policy, the still-sealed second sample container was sent to another independent drug analysis company, LabOne, which also found that Counts's sample was "Substituted" and was "[n]ot consistent with normal human urine." When confronted, Counts denied having tampered with the sample. He was sent home from work, and later his employment was officially terminated. Kraton's Substance Abuse Policy stated that "[t]ermination of employment will normally occur" after "[a] second positive test following a prior Company initiated positive test where employment has been continued." Did Kraton violate its (or Shell's) contractual obligations to Counts?

Question 7

In March 2006, Lindsay Fleck suffered a chronic ankle injury, resulting in her inability to stand for prolonged periods of time or walk significant distances. In August 2007, she began working at the Attleboro Nursing and Rehabilitation Center as a part-time employee. At the time she was able to meet her job requirements with the use of a walking cast on her leg. In November 2008, Fleck had surgery on her leg and utilized FMLA leave until it ran out in February 2009. Prior to her scheduled return to work, Fleck obtained a doctor's note indicating that she could work four hours each day as opposed to her previous eight-hour day. The note further explained that she could gradually increase her hours to a full eight-hour day over the course of six weeks. Fleck's supervisor informed her that she would be terminated if she could not work eight hours each day she was scheduled to work immediately upon her return. Fleck then submitted an alternative suggestion from her doctor that indicated she could work for eight hours if she took a break every hour. In the absence of either of the previous two accommodations, Fleck requested to take unpaid leave until she was able to return for her full eight-hour shifts. Attleboro refused to consider any alternative to a full return to work, and Fleck was fired. Fleck sued Attleboro for failure to accommodate and discriminatory discharge under the ADA. Attleboro defended by arguing that Fleck was not a qualified individual with a disability. Should Fleck prevail on her claim?

Question 8

Johnson Controls, Inc., manufactures batteries. Lead is a primary ingredient in that manufacturing process. A pregnant female employee's occupational exposure to lead involves a risk of harm to a fetus that she is carrying. For this reason, Johnson Controls excluded women who are pregnant or who are capable of bearing children from jobs that involve exposure to lead. Numerous plaintiffs, including a woman who had chosen to be sterilized to avoid losing her job, filed a class action against Johnson Controls under Title VII. Is Johnson Controls entitled to use the BFOQ defense?

Question 9

KellyMarie Griffin works for the City of Portland, Oregon, as a clerical employee in the Parks and Recreation Department. She complains of conflict with her coworkers. In particular, Therea Lareau, the "lead" clerical employee at the same location, has made comments that are derogatory about or offensive to Griffin's Christian faith. Ms. Lareau has referred to Griffin as "a wacko" because of her beliefs and, on at least one occasion, told Griffin that God was "a figment of [her] imagin[ation]" and that Griffin was "praying to something that didn't exist." Griffin also complains that many of her coworkers frequently use "God" and "Jesus Christ" as swear words, which she finds offensive due to her religious beliefs. Griffin, however, admits that when she has informed her coworkers about how the swearing offends her, they have made efforts to avoid doing so in her presence-even Lareau. Despite that, things have deteriorated. Recently, Griffin and Lareau found themselves in a particularly tense encounter. While another coworker was gathering her things to leave for lunch, Griffin sneezed loudly. This apparently startled the coworker, because she exclaimed, "Jesus Christ!" The coworker then left for lunch. The exclamation offended Griffin, so she commented to Lareau, the only other clerical worker in the office at the time, "I said that I objected to profanity of God's name. I said that this type of language is not professional, I find it personally distasteful, and it is in violation of my religious convictions. I said if it didn't stop, I would make a complaint with management." Lareau responded in a loud, angry voice, "I'm sick of your Christian attitude, your Christian [expletive] all over your desk, and your Christian [expletive] all over the place." She further accused Griffin of using her Christian religion to get "attention." If Griffin files a complaint with the City claiming a violation of her rights under Title VII, how should the City respond to this complaint? Can it avoid liability under Title VII at this point?

Question 10

At approximately 4:00 a.m. on July 14, 2000, a woman wearing a mask and pointing a firearm demanded that 7-Eleven employees at a store in Berkeley County, West Virginia, give her the store's money. Antonio Feliciano was working that morning as a sales clerk. While other employees emptied the cash register and the woman was focused on them, Feliciano grabbed and disarmed her. He continued to restrain the would-be robber until local law enforcement authorities arrived on the scene and apprehended her. No one was physically injured in the incident. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, 7-Eleven terminated Feliciano's at-will employment. 7-Eleven explained to Feliciano that he was being fired because he violated a company policy that prohibits employees from subduing a robber or otherwise interfering with a store robbery. Feliciano subsequently filed a lawsuit against 7-Eleven alleging that he had been wrongfully discharged in contravention of the West Virginia public policy favoring an individual's right to selfdefense. Is Feliciano's correct that the public policy exception to employment-at-will renders his termination wrongful?

Question 11

Maetta Vance, an African-American woman, worked at Ball State University as a catering assistant in the University Banquet and Catering Division of Dining Services. Over the course of her employment with Ball State, she lodged numerous complaints of racial discrimination and retaliation. She had a particularly acrimonious relationship with Saundra Davis, a white woman who was employed as a catering specialist in the Banquet and Catering Division. Vance complained that Davis "gave her a hard time at work by glaring at her, slamming pots and pans around her, and intimidating her." She alleged that she was "left alone in the kitchen with Davis, who smiled at her"; that Davis "blocked" her on an elevator and "stood there with her cart smiling"; and that Davis often gave Vance "weird" looks. Vance filed an EEOC charge and, ultimately, a lawsuit in federal court against Ball State, claiming violations of Title VII for racial harassment. Davis, as a catering specialist, had some leadership responsibilities in the Division. She would give instructions and assign tasks to others, including Vance, in the kitchen. As a result, Davis wielded some significant control over various aspects of Vance's day-to-day tasks and experiences as an employee of Ball State. Davis did not, however, have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance. If Vance were to prove that the environment in which she worked was racially hostile, would Ball State face the possibility of vicarious liability?

Question 12

Mary Delaney worked as a data entry clerk at Signature Health Care Foundation, a nonprofit organization that provides physical therapy services to its clients. Shortly after she began her employment, she learned that her brother needed a kidney transplant in order to survive a condition that was causing his kidneys to fail. Delaney underwent testing and learned that she was a match to donate her kidney to her brother. She informed Signature that she was going to proceed with the donation and that she would require four weeks of leave from work for the surgery and recovery. Signature initially approved the request; however, three days before the scheduled surgery, Signature changed course and notified Delaney that it could not hold open her position for four weeks. It then discharged Delaney. Does Delaney have a viable claim for wrongful discharge?