Deck 41: Getting Animals in View Christine Korsgaard

Question 1

When Kant encourages us to regard nonhuman animals as "the ultimate and final Other," this involves regarding them as

A) fellow creatures who suffer.
B) mere means for the attainment of human ends.
C) fellow members of the moral community.
D) existential enemies.

Answer 1

B

Question 2

The phrase "treated like an animal" seems to highlight the curious assumption that

A) animals are beings that it is all right to treat badly.
B) animals deserve special protection.
C) humans have selective concern for nonhumans.
D) different moral standards apply to different nonhuman species.

Answer 2

A

Question 3

Kant held the view that nonhuman animals

A) are suitable for use by humans as "mere means" to our ends.
B) are beneath the dignity of human beings.
C) were formerly regarded by humans as fellow creatures, but no more.
D) All of the above

Answer 3

D

Question 4

To be an "end in yourself" is to be

A) always worthy of having your rights respected.
B) worthy of having your rights respected provided you respect others' rights.
C) a creature whose suffering matters morally.
D) a creature of God's creation.

Question 5

For Korsgaard, the concept of "center of self" from George Eliot's Middlemarch refers to

A) the list of passionate desires that constitutes a person's primary goals in life.
B) any being capable of experiencing pleasure or pain.
C) a being's existence and value as an independent being.
D) a subconscious layer of the human psyche.

Question 6

Korsgaard suggests the possibility that animals' having "lesser 'centers of self'" might explain why

A) some regard them as biological machines lacking consciousness.
B) some regard them as more in touch with nature or God.
C) people commonly deny that their suffering matters as much as human suffering.
D) people commonly deny that they are ends in themselves.

Question 7

What is Korsgaard's take on the argument on nonhuman animals' standing as ends in themselves?

A) She believes it has the same foundation as ours.
B) She is doubtful but thinks the evidence is inconclusive.
C) She argues that nonhumans cannot share this status.
D) She regards the concept of "ends in themselves" as irrelevant in this case.

Question 8

Korsgaard believes _______ structure gives human lives an "extra dimension."

A) narrative
B) normative
C) causal
D) emotional

Question 9

Korsgaard believes we cannot get animals properly in view when

A) we try to judge their worth by the lights of morality.
B) we use human standards to try to understand them.
C) our perspective is colored by emotional attachments to particular animals.
D) we try to imagine what it is like to be a nonhuman animal.

Question 10

Poetry, in Korsgaard's view, is not a "higher pleasure" for a pig because

A) pigs are only capable of "lower pleasures."
B) there is no difference between higher and lower pleasures.
C) poetry is not a higher pleasure.
D) the pig is not a lesser being than a human, but simply a being of a different kind.

Question 11

Korsgaard believes that the existence of nonhuman animals challenges how humans conceive the world.

Question 12

According to Korsgaard, animals exist to provide humans with all-purpose means to our ends.

Question 13

Korsgaard argues that whereas humans pursue their ends as though they are absolutely important, nonhumans do not.

Question 14

Korsgaard claims that keeping a nonhuman for affection and companionship is a way of using that being for one's own purposes.

Question 15

Korsgaard rejects Jeff McMahan's view that there is something special about the way human lives are structured over time.

Question 16

Some philosophers argue that the death of nonhuman animals is less regrettable because they are destined to live their lives from moment to moment.

Question 17

Korsgaard believes some animals' lives have a narrative structure that humans, if not the animals themselves, can recognize and describe.

Question 18

By Korsgaard's lights, there is nothing missing from the lives of nonhuman animals.

Question 19

Korsgaard's view is that human lives have a kind of importance that other animal lives lack.

Question 20

Korsgaard admits that nonhuman suffering matters morally but denies that they share with humans the status of "ends in themselves."

Question 21

What view of the moral status and value of nonhuman animals does Korsgaard endorse at the conclusion of her discussion? What are the implications of that view of the value of nonhuman life for our practices of animal use for food, entertainment, clothing, and so on?

Question 22

Describe Immanuel Kant's view of the moral status of nonhuman animal life, as Korsgaard presents it. Contrast it with the view defended by Korsgaard. Whose position is more sensible? Why?

Question 23

What does Jeff MacMahan mean by the "complex narrative unity" of a normal human life? Why is this supposedly morally relevant? How does Korsgaard respond to MacMahan's view of how this makes human life especially valuable? Is she right? Explain.