Deck 3: The Nature of Mind

Question 1

Behaviorism is supposed to be an analysis of how we use mental terms.

Answer 1

True

Question 2

The identity claimed by the identity theory is identity of meaning rather than factual identity.

Answer 2

False

Question 3

Critics of the identity theory claim that the mind and the brain have different characteristics.

Answer 3

True

Question 4

Property dualists say that mental events do not cause physical events.

Question 5

Behaviorism claims that the mind does not exist.

Question 6

Dualism is the view that there are

A) physical bodies and physical minds.
B) nonphysical bodies and physical minds.
C) physical bodies and nonphysical minds.
D) None of the above

Question 7

G. W. F. Leibniz argued for a view of mind and body we call

A) epiphenomenalism.
B) occasionalism.
C) property dualism.
D) preestablished harmony.

Question 8

"How will that which is corporeal seize upon that which is incorporeal, so to hold it conjoined with itself." This quote from Gassendi is part of a critique of

A) substance dualism.
B) occasionalism.
C) interactionism.
D) parallelism.

Question 9

The identity theory claims that the mind is identical to

A) the behavior of the body.
B) the brain.
C) the way we function in society.
D) None of the above

Question 10

Critics of the identity theory say that the mind and the brain

A) are numerically identical.
B) do not have all the same characteristics.
C) do not causally interact.
D) None of the above

Question 11

To say that mental states are multiply realizable is to say that they

A) could take different forms in different creatures.
B) can be viewed from multiple perspectives.
C) are very real.
D) None of the above

Question 12

Functionalism says that another creature could not have mind if it

A) wasn't made of flesh and blood like we are.
B) didn't have phenomenal consciousness.
C) didn't have a functional liver.
D) None of the above

Question 13

The "Turing test" is a test of

A) machine intelligence.
B) whether certain sounds are a secret German code.
C) whether an "interrogator" could come up with questions that no one can answer.
D) None of the above

Question 14

The "Chinese room" thought experiment is designed to show that

A) Chinese is a very difficult language.
B) manipulating Chinese symbols isn't the same as understanding Chinese.
C) a Chinese speaker in a closed room would have a difficult time determining what's said outside the room.
D) None of the above

Question 15

The "hard problem of consciousness" is the problem of how a physical system like the brain could

A) discriminate stimuli or report information.
B) give rise to phenomenal experience.
C) control so much bodily behavior.
D) None of the above

Question 16

A "philosophical zombie" is an imaginary creature who

A) ate the flesh of philosophers in the horror novel "A Taste of Truth."
B) is just like us with an animated dead body.
C) is just like us but without phenomenal consciousness.
D) rejects philosophical behaviorism.

Question 17

Which of the following theories does not believe in the existence of physical bodies?

A) The identity theory.
B) Functionalism.
C) Parallelism.
D) None of the above

Question 18

Which of the following theories does not believe in the existence of a nonphysical substance mind?

A) Occasionalism
B) Preestablished harmony
C) Property dualism
D) Interactionism

Question 19

Which of the following theorists would be most likely to see the mind as analogous to shadow of a traveler walking by?

A) Parallellist
B) Property dualist
C) Epiphenomenalism
D) Interactionist

Question 20

Property dualism claims that nonphysical mental properties are

A) emergent properties.
B) reductive properties.
C) properties the soul.
D) None of the above

Question 21

Which of the following theorists could consistently believe in the existence of a soul?

A) Behaviorist
B) Parallelist
C) Epiphenomenalist
D) Property dualist

Question 22

Which theorists could not consistently believe in the resurrection of the dead?

A) Behaviorist.
B) Identity theorist.
C) Interactionist.
D) None of the above

Question 23

If you believed there was a soul that could move physical objects, you'd likely be a(n)

A) epiphenomenalist.
B) parallelist.
C) property dualist.
D) None of the above

Question 24

The concept of "anatman" indicates

A) there is an underlying soul.
B) there is no underlying soul.
C) there is no continuing physical body.
D) None of the above

Question 25

Continuity of soul with psychological continuity would be sufficient but not necessary for sameness of person because

A) continuity of soul requires a belief in an afterlife.
B) continuity of body brain with psychological continuity would also be sufficient.
C) psychological continuity is difficult to determine.
D) None of the above

Question 26

Do believe in life after death. If not, why not|? If you do, what form do you think it would take? Has our discussion challenged or changed your views on this at all?

Question 27

What are your views on whether or not a machine could ever be said to have a mind in the same sense that humans have minds? Answer with some references to our discussion of mind.

Question 28

Answer the questions that concluded the chapter:
Ask yourself this: On your death bed, what would you have to believe is going to happen for you to feel that you will continue after death as you? Let's grant that if your soul with the same personality continues after death, that would be you. But assume for a moment that there is no soul and consider the following possibilities:
1. In the afterlife, God creates a body/mind out of your original matter, resulting in someone who looks, acts and thinks like you.
2. In the afterlife, God creates a body/mind out of different, heavenly matter, resulting in someone who looks, acts and thinks like you.
3. After your death, scientists recreate a previously made copy of your personality in a clone of your body/brain.
4. After your death, scientists recreate a previously made copy of your personality in a human-like robot.

Question 29

In "Life After Life" Charlie says, "I wasn't able to move objects in any way, which is kind of puzzling when you think of it. Of course, my soul didn't have a body anymore. But if a soul can't move objects, how does it ever move a body?" Explain in a bit of detail what philosophical problem Charlie's remarks are bringing up.

Question 30

What is John Searle's "Chinese Room" thought experiment, and how is it an attack on functionalism?