Deck 16: G.E.Moore

Question 1

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-According to Moore, what is the difference between "good" and "the good"? Which of these does Moore think can be defined, and why?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Explain Moore's argument against the view that goodness is the same thing as pleasure. Do you find the argument compelling? Why or why not?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-According to Moore, what do "good" and "yellow" have in common? How do they differ from other concepts, like "horse"? Do you agree with Moore about this?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-What is the naturalistic fallacy? Why does Moore think it is important? Do you agree that the naturalistic fallacy is really a fallacy? Defend your answer.

Question 5

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-What does Moore claim is "the most fundamental question in all Ethics"? What is his answer to this question and how does he argue for it? Do you find his position to be plausible? Why or why not?

Question 6

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-What are the different senses of "definition" that Moore distinguishes? Which kind of definition does Moore think is most important? Can every concept be given a definition of this sort? Why or why not?

Question 7

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Suppose someone were to define "good" as "that which we desire to desire." How would Moore argue against such a proposed definition? Do you find his argument to be compelling?

Question 8

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-According to Moore, the most fundamental question in all of ethics is:

A) whether life is worth living.
B) whether God exists.
C) how "good" is to be defined.
D) whether morality is objective.

Question 9

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-In Moore's view, the most important kind of definition states:

A) what parts compose a whole.
B) how most people use a word.
C) how one intends to use a word in one's own writing.
D) which things have the property being defined.

Question 10

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore argues that until a definition of "good" is known it will be impossible to:

A) make true ethical judgments.
B) know what the evidence is for any ethical judgment.
C) lead an ethically good life.
D) all of the above.

Question 11

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-According to Moore, all propositions about the good are:

A) analytic.
B) synthetic.
C) obvious.
D) indefinable.

Question 12

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Which of the following concepts can be defined, according to Moore?

A) good
B) yellow
C) horse
D) all of the above

Question 13

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore claims that good is:

A) simple.
B) complex.
C) meaningless.
D) a natural property.

Question 14

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-When it comes to defining good, Moore claims that many past philosophers are guilty of:

A) begging the question.
B) circular reasoning.
C) the naturalistic fallacy.
D) the ad hominem fallacy.

Question 15

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore claims that if one were to define good as something else, then:

A) one would be guilty of committing the naturalistic fallacy.
B) it would be impossible to prove that any other definition is wrong.
C) one will have clarified the true meaning of good, allowing us to make moral progress.
D) both a and b.

Question 16

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore claims that there is no meaning in saying that pleasure is good, unless:

A) goodness and pleasure are the same thing.
B) good is something different than pleasure.
C) all good things are pleasant.
D) all pleasant things are good.

Question 17

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-According to Moore, any analysis, when it is carried as far as it will go, refers us to:

A) self-evident axioms.
B) indefinable concepts.
C) paradoxes.
D) God.

Question 18

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-When asked "what is good?" Moore answers:

A) good is desire.
B) good is pleasure.
C) good is beauty
D) good is good.

Question 19

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-When Moore talks about "the good," he is talking about:

A) the concept of goodness.
B) the indefinable property of being good.
C) the set of all and only those things that are good.
D) the person, place, or thing that possesses more good than anything else.

Question 20

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore defines the naturalistic fallacy as the view that:

A) everything that is natural is good.
B) everything that is good is natural.
C) good is identical to a natural property.
D) all of the above.

Question 21

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore holds that 'pleasure' is:

A) definable
B) indefinable.
C) complex.
D) a desire.

Question 22

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-According to Moore, we are thinking about good whenever we think about:

A) pleasure.
B) things that we desire.
C) intrinsic value.
D) none of the above.

Question 23

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore wants to discover the nature of the object or idea that the word 'good' usually stands for.

Question 24

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-According to Moore, the good is indefinable.

Question 25

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-In seeking a definition, Moore is seeking to discover how most competent speakers use the word in question.

Question 26

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-According to Moore, "good" is the only object of thought that is incapable of definition.

Question 27

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore argues that until the definition of "good" is known it will be impossible to lead an ethically good life.

Question 28

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore would agree that "Pleasure is good" means the same thing as "Pleasure is pleasure."

Question 29

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore claims that for any complex definition of good, we can always be ask with significance whether it is itself good.

Question 30

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-According to Moore, the most important sense of "definition" is that in which a definition states what parts invariably compose a certain whole.

Question 31

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-Moore claims that all definitions will ultimately make reference to things that are themselves indefinable.

Question 32

G. E. Moore: Principia Ethica
According to G. E. Moore, the fundamental task of moral philosophy is to provide a definition of goodness. In seeking a definition, Moore is not simply trying to discover what it is that most people mean when they say the word good, nor does he aim to stipulate his own novel definition. Rather, he seeks to give an account of the nature of goodness by analyzing the concept in terms of its component parts, much as one might define bachelor as an unmarried man. According to Moore, however, "good" cannot be defined in this sense. This is because the concept of goodness is simple-it has no parts. Moore claims that in this respect "good" is like "yellow": You cannot explain what the concept is to someone who does not already know it.
Moore argues that many previous philosophers have failed to recognize this point, and in doing so have committed what he calls the naturalistic fallacy, the mistake of believing that goodness is identical to some natural property, such as happiness or that which we desire. (Elsewhere, Moore uses a discipline definition of "natural" as a property that is appropriately studied by those working on the natural sciences.) Against any such identity claim, Moore deploys what has become known as the open question argument. For any proposed definition of good, Moore claims, it is always sensible to ask whether things of that sort are good. For instance, the question "Is pleasure good?" appears to be a perfectly sensible question to ask - it is an open question. In contrast, the question "Is pleasure pleasant?" is trivial - it is a closed question. According to Moore, this proves that goodness and pleasure cannot be the same thing. Moore holds that this test can be used to disqualify any proposed definition of goodness, and thus goodness cannot be identical with any natural property.
-According to Moore, to claim that goodness is identical to any other observable property is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.