Deck 30: Christine Korsgaard

Question 1

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Explain Korsgaard's internalist requirement. Do you think it identifies a plausible constraint on practical reasons? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-What objections does Korsgaard raise to Hume's account of practical reason? Do you think she succeeds in refuting Hume's theory? Defend your answer.

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Explain Williams's distinction between internal and external reasons. Does Korsgaard think that practical reasons are internal or external? Do you agree with her?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-According to Korsgaard, what is the relationship between content skepticism and motivational skepticism? Which of these theses does she argue against? Do you think she succeeds?

Question 5

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-What two types of skepticism about practical reason does Korsgaard distinguish? What does she aim to show about these two types of skepticism? Do you think she succeeds?

Question 6

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-What is the difference between internalist and externalist moral theories? Which does Korsgaard endorse, and why? Which do you think is preferable?

Question 7

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-What is true irrationality? Do you think that people are ever truly irrational, in Korsgaard's sense? If so, give an example. If not, why not?

Question 8

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-According to Kant's approach to moral philosophy, ethics is based on:

A) the consequences of one's action.
B) sympathy.
C) a social contract.
D) practical reason.

Question 9

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-As Korsgaard defines it, content skepticism involves doubts about:

A) whether formal principles can give substantive guidance to choice and action.
B) whether practical reason can motivate us.
C) whether moral claims are literally significant.
D) whether claims about practical reason are literally significant.

Question 10

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard argues that:

A) motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism.
B) content skepticism is always based on motivational skepticism.
C) motivational skepticism and content skepticism are inconsistent with one another.
D) motivational skepticism and content skepticism are in fact identical positions.

Question 11

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-According to Korsgaard, Hume believed that the role of reason in human action was limited to:

A) determining our ends.
B) discerning the means to our ends.
C) ranking our ends.
D) none of the above.

Question 12

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-According to externalist theories of ethics:

A) moral judgment implies the existence of a motive.
B) it is possible to have a moral judgment without being motivated to act on it.
C) moral authority derives from rules imposed by others, rather than from one's own feelings.
D) our primary moral obligation is to improve the lives of others.

Question 13

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard claims that ethical intuitionists such as Ross and Prichard were:

A) internalists.
B) externalists.
C) consequentialists.
D) contractarians.

Question 14

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard's "internalist requirement" states that:

A) practical reasons necessarily motivate anyone who accepts them.
B) practical reasons must be capable of motivating rational persons.
C) our motivations always supply us with practical reasons for action.
D) practical reasons bear no necessary relation to motivation.

Question 15

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard defines irrationality as:

A) acting on a desire that is based on an object that does not exist.
B) acting on a false belief about the consequences of one's action.
C) failure to respond to an available reason.
D) failure to act in one's own self-interest.

Question 16

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-According to Korsgaard, being practically rational requires the ability to:

A) perform rational mental operations about the means to your ends.
B) transmit motivations via reasoning.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 17

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard claims that motivational skepticism involves doubts about:

A) whether we can ever have truth thoughts about morality.
B) doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive.
C) whether we can justify our beliefs that certain actions are right and others wrong.
D) whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance.

Question 18

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Williams defines internal reasons as:

A) reasons that are grounded in one's subjective motivational set.
B) reasons that are grounded in self-interest.
C) reasons that are grounded in objective moral requirements.
D) reasons that are grounded in the norms of institutions.

Question 19

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-According to Korsgaard, intuitionists do not believe in:

A) theoretical reason only practical reason.
B) practical reason only theoretical reason.
C) means/ends reasoning.
D) none of the above.

Question 20

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard claims that the internalism requirement:

A) refutes some ethical theories.
B) refutes content skepticism.
C) makes a psychological demand on ethical theories.
D) all of the above.

Question 21

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard claims to have shown:

A) that there is such a thing as pure practical reason.
B) that content skepticism is false.
C) that motivational considerations do not provide reason for skepticism about practical reason.
D) all of the above.

Question 22

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard maintains that the appeal of Kant's approach to ethics comes from:

A) not having to postulate special ethical properties in the world to provide ethics with a foundation.
B) not having to postulate special faculties in the mind to provide ethics with a foundation.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b

Question 23

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard's main aim is to show that motivational skepticism has no independent force apart from content skepticism.

Question 24

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-On Hume's view, reason cannot determine our ends, it can only rank them.

Question 25

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-According to Korsgaard, Hume's motivational skepticism is entirely dependent on his content skepticism.

Question 26

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-In Mill's view, the "ultimate sanction" of the principle of utility is that it is in accordance with our natural social feelings.

Question 27

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-According to externalist theories of ethics, it is impossible to make a moral judgment without being motivated to act on it.

Question 28

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard claims that there exist some reasons for action that are not capable of motivating rational persons.

Question 29

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-Korsgaard claims that on Hume's view, true irrationality is impossible.

Question 30

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-According to Korsgaard, one possible way of being irrational involves being indifferent to rational considerations when they are pointed out.

Question 31

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-The internalism requirement requires that rational considerations always succeed in motivating people.

Question 32

Christine Korsgaard: Skepticism About Practical Reason
Kant's ethical theory attempts to base morality on practical reason, but many thinkers have been skeptical about the extent to which human action is or could be directed by reason. Korsgaard distinguishes between content skepticism, which involves doubts about whether formal principles of rationality can provide any substantive moral guidance, and motivational skepticism, which involves doubts about the ability of reason to serve as a motive. Korsgaard argues that motivational skepticism is always based on content skepticism, and hence cannot provide an independent argument against a moral theory based on practical reason.
Korsgaard begins by discussing Hume's skeptical view of practical reason, according to which "reason is, and ought to be only the slave of the passions." On Hume's view, reason neither selects nor ranks our ends, but merely allows us to determine the most efficient means to our ends, which are themselves set by our desires. Practical irrationality occurs, on Hume's view, only when our desires are somehow based on false beliefs. Korsgaard argues, however, for the possibility of pure irrationality-cases in which we fail to respond appropriately to an available reason, as when one sees that one's ends can only be achieved by certain means, but fails to take those means. Despite the fact that reason and motivation can come apart, however, Korsgaard holds that the two are tightly linked. She endorses the internalist requirement, according to which one can only have a reason for action if that reason is capable of motivating a rational person. Because we sometimes fail to be rational, we can sometimes fail to be motivated by our reasons. But Korsgaard insists that human beings are capable of being rational, especially given the right sort of training. Accordingly, Korsgaard claims that if there are any unconditional requirements of reason (as Kant claimed), then humans are capable of responding to them, even if they sometimes fail to do so. If so, motivational skepticism is correct only if content skepticism is correct. The former cannot float free from the latter.
-External reasons are reasons that exist regardless of what is in one's subjective motivational set.