Deck 44: John Searle: Minds, Brains, and Computers

Question 1

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Searle says that an automatic door understands instructions in basically the same way that a human does.

Answer 1

False

Question 2

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Searle thinks that the Chinese room thought experiment does not apply to computers using parallel processing.

Answer 2

False

Question 3

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Searle believes that an artificial, human-made machine can think.

Answer 3

True

Question 4

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Searle thinks that humans are machines that can think.

Question 5

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Searle strongly objects to the claims of weak AI.

Question 6

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-In the Chinese room thought experiment, Searle does not understand a word of Chinese.

Question 7

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Searle thinks that something can think and understand solely by virtue of being a computer with the right sort of program.

Question 8

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Searle claims that computers do not have intentionality.

Question 9

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-For Searle, it is reasonable to postulate human-like mental states in a computer.

Question 10

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Searle says that believing in strong AI implies a belief in some form of dualism.

Question 11

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Searle believes that at least some computers have intentionality.