Deck 45: Ned Block: Troubles With Functionalism

Question 1

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Block thinks that physicalism is a "chauvinist" theory.

Answer 1

True

Question 2

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-According to Block, no versions of functionalism are guilty of "liberalism."

Answer 2

False

Question 3

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Qualia are the qualitative feel of conscious experience.

Answer 3

True

Question 4

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-According to Block, physicalism is the doctrine that pain, for example, is identical to a physical state.

Question 5

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Block tries to show that functionalism must be false because it is possible to introduce an appropriate functional organization into some system and yet no mental states are brought into existence.

Question 6

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Block says that functionalism is guilty of classifying systems that lack mentality as having mentality.

Question 7

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Block says that it is logically possible that the Chinese brain has no qualitative mental states at all.

Question 8

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Block concedes that the argument based on the Chinese brain thought experiment is incoherent.

Question 9

Chalmers argues for a theory of mind known as "property dualism" (also "nonreductive materialism" and "naturalistic dualism"). In this view, mental states, or properties, are distinct from physical properties, and arise from the physical properties without being reducible to, or identical to, them (and without being some kind of Cartesian substance). Philosophers like to say that this relationship between the mental and physical is one of supervenience-that is, mental properties supervene on the physical ones. This means that something possesses a mental property in virtue of having a physical property. The mental property depends on the physical one, arises from it, but is not identical to it. If true, reductive materialism must be false. "This failure of materialism," says Chalmers, "leads to a kind of dualism: there are both physical and nonphysical features of the world." Mental properties are features of the world that are "over and above the physical features of the world."
-Block's Chinese brain thought experiment is an example of an inverted qualia argument.