Deck 10: Why Death Is Not Bad for the One Who Dies

Question 1

Which view does Epicurus NOT accept?

A) Dying could be bad for the one who dies.
B) Death is bad for the one who dies.
C) We should not fear our own deaths.
D) Harm consists of unpleasant sensations.

Answer 1

Death is bad for the one who dies.

Question 2

Which of the following views MUST be rejected by someone who accepts the Hedonic view of well-being?

A) What you do not know about can harm you.
B) What never affects your experiences cannot harm you.
C) Death cannot harm the one who dies.
D) Someone else's death can never harm you.

Answer 2

What never affects your experiences cannot harm you.

Question 3

Nagel's argument is supposed to establish:

A) That what a person does not know about cannot harm her.
B) That a person's death cannot be a harm to her.
C) That a person could be harmed by her own death.
D) That hedonism is correct.

Answer 3

That a person could be harmed by her own death.

Question 4

Which Variant of the Epicurean argument is the most fundamental, and why?

A) The Existence Variant is the most fundamental, for a person must exist to die.
B) The Existence Variant is the most fundamental, for the Hedonic variant rests on its central claim.
C) The Hedonic Variant is the most fundamental, for a person must experience to die.
D) The Hedonic Variant is the most fundamental, for the Existence variant rests on its central claim.

Question 5

What is NOT true on the interest-based account of well-being?

A) A person could be harmed by an event that occurs after her death.
B) A person could be harmed by her death.
C) A person could be harmed by something that she does not know about.
D) None of the above.

Question 6

Could a person who accepts the Hedonic Variant of the Epicurean argument believe that persons could be harmed by events that occur after they are dead? Why, or why not? How is this question related to the question of whether or not death is a harm to the person who dies?

Question 7

Are you persuaded by the Epicurean view of death? Do you believe that its defenders have adequately responded to Nagel's and Feldman's arguments?