Suppose n identical firms engage in Bertrand competition in a stage game repeated infinitely often.What condition on the discount factor 
Is required for firms to be able to tacitly collude on the monopoly industry output?
A) 
B) 
C) 
D) 
Correct Answer:
Verified
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