Assume that two firms are engaged in a pricing rivalry and attempt collusion.If each firm knows that the pricing game will last for a finite number of periods,and the collusion contract is not enforceable,then they will have an incentive to:
A) cheat in every period.
B) cheat in alternate periods.
C) cheat in every period but the first.
D) cheat in every period but the last.
Correct Answer:
Verified
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