Cengage Advantage Books: Foundations of the Legal Environment of Business 3rd Edition by Marianne Jennings

تمرين 6

United States v. Ahmad 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996)
Gasoline, Drains, and Knowledge of the Two Together: A Crime?
Facts
Mr. Ahmad owns a Spin-N-Market in Conroe, Texas. In 1992, Ahmad discovered a leak in one of the highoctane gasoline tanks at the location. The leak was at the top of the tank, so gasoline did not seep out. However, the leak did allow water to get into the tank and contaminate the gas. Because water is heavier than gas, the water sank to the bottom of the tank, and because the tank was pumped from the bottom, Mr. Ahmad was unable to sell gas from it.
Mr. Ahmad hired CTT Environmental Services to test and examine the tank. Jewel McCoy, a CTT employee, told Mr. Ahmad that the leak could not be repaired until the tank was completely empty, which CTT offered to do for 65 cents per gallon plus $65 per hour of labor. Mr. Ahmad then asked Ms. McCoy whether he could empty the tank himself. Ms. McCoy told him that it would be dangerous and illegal for him to do so. Mr. Ahmad then responded, "Well, if I don't get caught, what then?"
Mr. Ahmad then rented a handheld motorized water pump from a local hardware store, telling a hardware store employee that he was planning to use it to remove water from his backyard. Mr. Ahmad hooked the pump up to his tank at the Spin-N-Market and pumped 5,220 gallons of fluid (4,690 were gasoline) into a manhole near the store and into Lewis Street alongside the store.
The gasoline made its way into both the storm sewer system and Possum Creek. Vacuum trucks had to decontaminate Possum Creek. The town sewage center had to be evacuated, and firefighters and hazardous materials crews had to restore the sewage plant to a safe condition. While the crews worked, two area schools had to be evacuated for safety reasons.
Mr. Ahmad was indicted for three violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA): knowingly discharging a pollutant into navigable waters without a permit, knowingly placing others in imminent danger through a pollutant, and knowingly operating a source in violation of pretreatment requirements. Mr. Ahmad did not dispute the conduct; he said he did not meet the "knowingly" requirements because he believed he was discharging water.
The jury found Mr. Ahmad guilty on two of the three charges and deadlocked on the charge of imminent danger. Mr. Ahmad appealed.
Judicial Opinion
SMITH, Circuit Judge Ahmad contends that the jury should have been instructed that the statutory mens rea -knowledge- was required as to each element of the offenses.
The language of the CWA is less than pellucid. Title 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) says that "any person who knowingly violates" any of a number of other sections of the CWA commits a felony. The principal issue is to which elements of the offense the modifier "knowingly" applies. Ahmad's main theory at trial was that he thought he was discharging water, not gasoline.
The Supreme Court has spoken to this issue in broad terms.… "[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent conduct."
The government also protests that CWA violations fall into the judicially created exception for "public welfare offenses," under which some regulatory crimes have been held not to require a showing of mens rea.
At best, the jury charge made it uncertain to which elements "knowingly" applied. At worst, and considerably more likely, it indicated that only the element of discharge need be knowingly. The instructions listed each element on a separate line, with the word "knowingly" present only in the line corresponding to the element that something was discharged. That the district court included a one-sentence summary of each count in which "knowingly" was present did not cure the error.
The obvious inference for the jury was that knowledge was required only as to the fact that something was discharged, and not as to any other fact. In effect, with regard to the other elements of the crimes, the instructions implied that the requisite mens rea was strict liability rather than knowledge.
There was at least a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions in this way, so we conclude that the instructions misled the jury as to the elements of the offense. Because the charge effectively withdrew from the jury's consideration facts that it should have been permitted to find or not find, this error requires reversal.
Most of Ahmad's defense, after all, was built around the idea that he thought water, rather than gasoline, was being discharged. A rational jury could so have found, and at the same time could have found that he did not actually know that he was pumping gas.
Reversed and remanded.
Case Questions
1. Of what significance is Jewel McCoy's testimony in establishing mens rea ?
2. What is the difference between knowledge of the law and knowledge of conduct? What is the significance of Mr. Ahmad's testimony that he thought he was discharging water?
3. What does the court explain is required for the state of mind under the Clean Water Act?