Business Law 16th Edition by Jane Mallor,James Barnes ,Arlen Langvardt,Jamie Darin Prenkert,Martin McCrory

تمرين 8

In 2002, the State charged Bishop, who was 16 at the time, with a misdemeanor DUI. Bishop entered into a diversion agreement with the State to avoid prosecution. In 2004, the City of Pratt charged Bishop with another DUI and disobeying a stop sign. Again, Bishop entered into a diversion agreement with the City to avoid prosecution for the charges. In 2007, Bishop was again arrested under suspicion of driving under the influence. Her blood alcohol test revealed a blood alcohol concentration of.24 grams per 100 milliliters, in excess of the legal limit. The State charged Bishop in the alternative with driving under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered her incapable of safely driving a vehicle (third offense), and with driving under the influence of alcohol while having a blood alcohol content greater than.08 (third offense). A third DUI is a felony. Bishop moved to dismiss the charges, asserting it was not her third offense. She claimed that the State could not rely on the 2002 diversion agreement as a prior conviction because Bishop was 16 when she entered into it and, therefore, it was not a legally binding contract due to her lack of capacity to contract. Is this a good argument under these facts?