Legal Aspects Of Health Care Administration 11th Edition by George Pozgar

تمرين 5

Facts
In January 1983, a blood center knew that blood from homosexual or bisexual males should not be accepted under any circumstances. The blood center's written policy provided that donors who volunteer that they are gay should not be permitted to donate blood.
On April 22, 1983, Kraus, a cardiologist, discovered that Mr. B, the patient, had severe blockage of two major arteries in his heart and recommended cardiac bypass surgery. During surgery, B received seven units of blood by transfusion. In May 1987, B had chest pain and trouble breathing. On June 5, 1987, B was hospitalized. Kraus consulted with two specialists in pulmonary medicine about the unusual pneumonia evident in x-rays of B's lungs. Because there was a possibility that the lung infection was secondary to AIDS, B was tested for HIV. Although B had not yet been formally diagnosed, physicians started him on therapy for AIDS.
B was formally diagnosed as HIV positive. His wife was then tested for HIV, and she learned that she was also HIV positive. On July 2, 1987, B expired. On April 21, 1989, the plaintiffs, Mrs. B and her son, filed suit against the blood center, alleging that her husband contracted HIV from the transfusion of a unit of blood donated at the blood center on April 19, 1983, by a donor identified at trial as Doe. The parties stipulated at trial that Doe was a sexually active homosexual male with multiple sex partners.
The plaintiffs contend that the blood center's negligence in testing and screening blood donors caused Mrs. B's contraction of HIV. At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $800,000 in damages. The blood center filed an appeal arguing the evidence of causation was legally insufficient to support the jury verdict.
Issue
Did the evidence support a finding that the blood center's negligence was the proximate cause of B's contraction of HIV?
Holding
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported a finding that the blood center's negligence in the collection of blood was the proximate cause of B's HIV infection.
Reason
The court held that the blood center, despite its knowledge about the dangers of HIV-contaminated blood, failed to reject gay men, that the blood center's donor screening was inadequate, and that these omissions were substantial factors in causing Mr. and Mrs. B's HIV infections. The blood center's own technical director admitted that there was "strong evidence" that the blood accepted from Doe was contaminated with HIV. Another recipient of components of Doe's blood was diagnosed as HIV positive less than 6 months after Mr. B was diagnosed as HIV positive.
What is meant by foreseeability as it relates to this case?