
Civil Law & Litigation for Paralegals 1st Edition by Neal Bevans
النسخة 1الرقم المعياري الدولي: 978-0073524610
Civil Law & Litigation for Paralegals 1st Edition by Neal Bevans
النسخة 1الرقم المعياري الدولي: 978-0073524610 تمرين 3
The facts of this case are not in dispute. On January 28, 2002, Nicholas Kozar, age 84, died during kidney dialysis treatment at Bio-Medical Applications of Ohio. Coincidentally, an Ohio Edison power line failed, causing temporary, accidental and unexpected power outages at the center. The county medical examiner investigated a possible link between the power outage and Mr. Kozar's death, and reported that Mr. Kozar died of natural causes associated with chronic heart disease, with no causation attributed to the concurrent power outage.
Almost a year later, Peter M. Kozar contacted attorney Mark C. Cavanaugh, seeking to file a lawsuit and relating that an unnamed emergency room physician had alleged that the power outage caused his father's death. Relying on this information and without conducting any legal research, Cavanaugh rushed to file the complaint on January 27, 2003, naming Bio-Medical Applications of Ohio and Ohio Edison as joint defendants and claiming negligence.
On March 13, 2003, Ohio Edison's attorney called Cavanaugh to urge the dismissal of Ohio Edison, instructing him that his claim was baseless under prevailing law and informing him of the medical examiner's conclusion. The call was formalized in a follow-up letter, which detailed the deficiencies of Cavanaugh's claim and warned that a motion for sanctions would be forthcoming unless the suit was dismissed. In his defense, Cavanaugh has insisted that he would not dismiss an action merely on such threats, but also admitted that he did not investigate whether Ohio Edison's assertions had merit.
Ohio Edison moved to dismiss the action on the basis that, under established Ohio law, Ohio Edison owed no duty to Mr. Kozar, a non-customer. At a subsequent deposition, Cavanaugh testified that it was at this point that he did his first legal research. Yet, even with his own research, Ohio Edison's legally compelling motion and the prior warning of insufficiency, Cavanaugh refused to concede. Rather, he opposed the motion by arguing that utilities do owe a duty to non-customers and citing non-Ohio case law. Ohio Edison replied that even these cases were inapplicable, as they addressed intentional misconduct, not negligence. On June 20, 2003, the trial court granted Ohio Edison's motion.
As promised, Ohio Edison moved for attorney fees, under both Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51, alleging a frivolous claim. The trial court conducted a hearing, during which Ohio Edison entered evidence, without objection, of $12,683.15 in attorney fees resulting directly from the claim. The trial court denied the sanctions on January 6, 2004, but expressly ruled on only Civ.R. 11. The order concluded that it was a final appealable order with no just cause for delay, and it is from this order that Ohio Edison appeals.
Ohio Edison timely appealed, asserting two assignments of error for review. We reverse the order of the assignments of error to facilitate review.
II.
As a prelude to this analysis, we begin by noting that this Court has previously decided a case on point. See Ceol v. Zion Industries, Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 610 N.E.2d 1076. In Ceol, counsel for defendant Zion Industries wrote a letter early in the litigation articulating the insufficiency of plaintiff's evidence and the preclusive effect of the established law, and also offering to forgo a motion for sanctions if Mr. Ceol and his attorney would heed their warnings and dismiss the case. Id. at 288, 610 N.E.2d 1076. Mr. Ceol resisted, and upon obtaining summary judgment, Zion Industries moved for sanctions under both Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51. Id. The trial court denied the sanctions. Id. at 289, 610 N.E.2d 1076.
On review, this Court affirmed the denial under Civ.R. 11's subjective bad-faith standard, on the basis that the trial court's refusal to assign subjective bad faith to Mr. Ceol did not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion. Id. at 290-91, 610 N.E.2d 1076. However, this Court reversed the decision under R.C. 2323.51's objective measure of frivolous conduct, finding that the trial court erred as a matter of law by erroneously concluding that a misinterpretation of existing law was enough to meet the objective measure of good faith. Id. at 292-93, 610 N.E.2d 1076. The case was remanded for an award of attorney fees under R.C. 2323.51. Id. at 293, 610 N.E.2d 1076. The present case proceeds along similar lines, and stare decisis guides the outcome.
A.
First Assignment of Error
"THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL COMPLIED WITH CIVIL RULE 11[.]"
Ohio Edison challenges the trial court's finding that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate Cavanaugh's subjective bad faith under Civ.R. 11. We disagree.
The trial court denied Ohio Edison's frivolous conduct claim under Civ.R. 11, and thus denied attorney fees. Civ.R. 11 expressly requires that the frivolous conduct must be willful; mere negligence is insufficient. Riston v. Butler (2002), 149 Ohio App.3d 390, 777 N.E.2d 857, 2002-Ohio-2308, at ¶ 9. We review a decision on Civ.R. 11 for abuse of discretion. City of Lorain v. Elbert (Apr. 22, 1998), 9th Dist. No. 97CA006747.
Regarding the factual inquiry, the trial court found that Cavanaugh relied on his client's story of an unnamed emergency room physician who claimed the power outage killed his father. An attorney's reasonable reliance on the client's representations does not constitute bad faith. See Driskill v. Babai (Mar. 26, 1997), 9th Dist. No. 17914. Regarding the legal inquiry, Cavanaugh's failure to research his claim, his unawareness of the law, and his collection of only inapplicable, out-of-state case law appears to rest in negligence rather than willfulness. The trial court could reasonably decide that the evidence was insufficient to establish subjective bad faith. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in reaching its decision with respect to the Civ.R. 11 claim.
Ohio Edison's first assignment of error is overruled. Costs taxed to both parties equally.
According to the patient's heirs, what impact did the power outage have on the decedent's medical care?
Almost a year later, Peter M. Kozar contacted attorney Mark C. Cavanaugh, seeking to file a lawsuit and relating that an unnamed emergency room physician had alleged that the power outage caused his father's death. Relying on this information and without conducting any legal research, Cavanaugh rushed to file the complaint on January 27, 2003, naming Bio-Medical Applications of Ohio and Ohio Edison as joint defendants and claiming negligence.
On March 13, 2003, Ohio Edison's attorney called Cavanaugh to urge the dismissal of Ohio Edison, instructing him that his claim was baseless under prevailing law and informing him of the medical examiner's conclusion. The call was formalized in a follow-up letter, which detailed the deficiencies of Cavanaugh's claim and warned that a motion for sanctions would be forthcoming unless the suit was dismissed. In his defense, Cavanaugh has insisted that he would not dismiss an action merely on such threats, but also admitted that he did not investigate whether Ohio Edison's assertions had merit.
Ohio Edison moved to dismiss the action on the basis that, under established Ohio law, Ohio Edison owed no duty to Mr. Kozar, a non-customer. At a subsequent deposition, Cavanaugh testified that it was at this point that he did his first legal research. Yet, even with his own research, Ohio Edison's legally compelling motion and the prior warning of insufficiency, Cavanaugh refused to concede. Rather, he opposed the motion by arguing that utilities do owe a duty to non-customers and citing non-Ohio case law. Ohio Edison replied that even these cases were inapplicable, as they addressed intentional misconduct, not negligence. On June 20, 2003, the trial court granted Ohio Edison's motion.
As promised, Ohio Edison moved for attorney fees, under both Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51, alleging a frivolous claim. The trial court conducted a hearing, during which Ohio Edison entered evidence, without objection, of $12,683.15 in attorney fees resulting directly from the claim. The trial court denied the sanctions on January 6, 2004, but expressly ruled on only Civ.R. 11. The order concluded that it was a final appealable order with no just cause for delay, and it is from this order that Ohio Edison appeals.
Ohio Edison timely appealed, asserting two assignments of error for review. We reverse the order of the assignments of error to facilitate review.
II.
As a prelude to this analysis, we begin by noting that this Court has previously decided a case on point. See Ceol v. Zion Industries, Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 610 N.E.2d 1076. In Ceol, counsel for defendant Zion Industries wrote a letter early in the litigation articulating the insufficiency of plaintiff's evidence and the preclusive effect of the established law, and also offering to forgo a motion for sanctions if Mr. Ceol and his attorney would heed their warnings and dismiss the case. Id. at 288, 610 N.E.2d 1076. Mr. Ceol resisted, and upon obtaining summary judgment, Zion Industries moved for sanctions under both Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51. Id. The trial court denied the sanctions. Id. at 289, 610 N.E.2d 1076.
On review, this Court affirmed the denial under Civ.R. 11's subjective bad-faith standard, on the basis that the trial court's refusal to assign subjective bad faith to Mr. Ceol did not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion. Id. at 290-91, 610 N.E.2d 1076. However, this Court reversed the decision under R.C. 2323.51's objective measure of frivolous conduct, finding that the trial court erred as a matter of law by erroneously concluding that a misinterpretation of existing law was enough to meet the objective measure of good faith. Id. at 292-93, 610 N.E.2d 1076. The case was remanded for an award of attorney fees under R.C. 2323.51. Id. at 293, 610 N.E.2d 1076. The present case proceeds along similar lines, and stare decisis guides the outcome.
A.
First Assignment of Error
"THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL COMPLIED WITH CIVIL RULE 11[.]"
Ohio Edison challenges the trial court's finding that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate Cavanaugh's subjective bad faith under Civ.R. 11. We disagree.
The trial court denied Ohio Edison's frivolous conduct claim under Civ.R. 11, and thus denied attorney fees. Civ.R. 11 expressly requires that the frivolous conduct must be willful; mere negligence is insufficient. Riston v. Butler (2002), 149 Ohio App.3d 390, 777 N.E.2d 857, 2002-Ohio-2308, at ¶ 9. We review a decision on Civ.R. 11 for abuse of discretion. City of Lorain v. Elbert (Apr. 22, 1998), 9th Dist. No. 97CA006747.
Regarding the factual inquiry, the trial court found that Cavanaugh relied on his client's story of an unnamed emergency room physician who claimed the power outage killed his father. An attorney's reasonable reliance on the client's representations does not constitute bad faith. See Driskill v. Babai (Mar. 26, 1997), 9th Dist. No. 17914. Regarding the legal inquiry, Cavanaugh's failure to research his claim, his unawareness of the law, and his collection of only inapplicable, out-of-state case law appears to rest in negligence rather than willfulness. The trial court could reasonably decide that the evidence was insufficient to establish subjective bad faith. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in reaching its decision with respect to the Civ.R. 11 claim.
Ohio Edison's first assignment of error is overruled. Costs taxed to both parties equally.
According to the patient's heirs, what impact did the power outage have on the decedent's medical care?
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Civil Law & Litigation for Paralegals 1st Edition by Neal Bevans
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