Deck 48: Transfer and Control of Real Property

Question 1

Robert and Stanley held legal title of record to adjacent tracts of land, each consisting of a number of five acres. Stanley fenced his five acres in 1988, placing his east fence fifteen feet onto Robert's property. Thereafter, he was in possession of this fifteen-foot strip of land and kept it fenced and cultivated continuously until he sold his tract of land to Nathan on March 1, 1994. Nathan took possession under deed from Stanley, and continued possession and cultivation of the fifteen-foot strip that was on Robert's land until May 27, 2013, when Robert, having on several occasions strenuously objected to Nathan's possession, brought suit against Nathan for trespass. Explain whether Nathan has gained title by adverse possession.

Answer 1

Case summary:
R and S has adjacent land and each land is five acres. S fenced the land and cultivated crops. S has taken few footsteps from R's land and continued his cultivation. S sold the land to N and N continued cultivating in the land using R's portion also. R brought a legal action against N.
Adverse possession:
A law permits a person to use and obtain title of the land which is owned by the others for a long tenure is called adverse possession.
Justification:
In the above mentioned case, S fenced the land and cultivated from the year 1988 and R raised the issue of extra occupancy in his land in the year 2013. The piece of land is used by S for a long period of time and that was not objected by R. Tehrefore, the buyer of S's land N gets the adverse possession in R's land.

Question 2

FACTS Plaintiffs, Thomas Cappo and certain other neighbors who reside on Ox Yoke Lane in Norwalk, Connecticut, seek to enforce a restrictive covenant against the defendants, Mark R. Suda, Jr., and Michelle L. Suda, from resubdividing the defendants' property and from constructing a second dwelling. The defendants admit that the properties belonging to the plaintiffs and the defendants are depicted on a ''Map Showing Section Two of Cricklewood, Norwalk … as Map No. 3714'' (Section Two) and admit that their deed contains a reference to restrictive covenants as set forth in volume 416 at page 118 of the Norwalk land records. This restriction, as provided in their warranty deed, states, ''Said tract is subject to the following restrictions:
1. No more than one dwelling together with an attached garage shall be constructed thereon.'' The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed.
DECISION The judgment is affirmed.
OPINION Dupont, J.
In general, restrictive covenants fall into three classes: (1) mutual covenants in deeds exchanged by adjoining landowners; (2) uniform covenants contained in deeds executed by the owner of property who is dividing his property into building lots under a general development scheme; and (3) covenants exacted by a grantor from his grantee presumptively or actually for the benefit and protection of his adjoining land which he retains.… With respect to the second class of covenants, any grantee under such a general or uniform development scheme may enforce the restrictions against any other grantee. [Citation.]
It is undisputed that the restrictive covenants pertaining to the plaintiffs' and defendants' properties are in the second class of covenants.
***
The defendants claim that, although a restrictive covenant that prohibits resubdivision for the purpose of building an additional dwelling was contained in their deed, that restriction has been abandoned because resubdivisions have occurred in surrounding properties, which the defendants contend are part of the same subdivision as their property. The parties reside in a subdivision referred to as Section Two. All thirteen of the lots in Section Two have been developed, and none of the lots contain more than one dwelling. Two other parcels originating from the same grantor and developed into abutting subdivisions exist, namely, ''Cricklewood'' and ''Bow End Road.'' Resubdivisions have occurred in Cricklewood. The court held that the three subdivisions, Section Two, Cricklewood and Bow End Road, were not a single general plan of development and, accordingly, rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. We agree that the subdivisions are separate and not part of one plan of development and, therefore, agree with the court that the Section Two restrictions have not been extinguished or abandoned as a result of resubdivisions that occurred in Cricklewood.
***
When uniform covenants are contained in deeds executed by the owner of property who is dividing his property into building lots under a general development scheme, any grantee under such a general or uniform development scheme may enforce the restrictions against any other grantee. [Citation.] The owner's intent to develop the property under a common scheme is evidenced by the language in the deeds. [Citation.]. ***
There are several factors that help to establish the existence of a common grantor's intent to develop the land according to a uniform plan. These factors include (1) the common grantor's selling or stating an intention to sell an entire tract of land, (2) the common grantor's exhibiting a map or plot of the entire tract at the time of the sale of one of the parcels, (3) the actual development of the tract in accordance with the restrictions, and (4) a substantial uniformity in the restrictions imposed in the deeds executed by the common grantor. [Citation.]
''The factors that help to negate the presence of a development scheme are: (1) the grantor retains unrestricted adjoining land; (2) there is no plot of the entire tract with notice on it of the restrictions; and (3) the common grantor did not impose similar restrictions on other lots.'' [Citation.]
Once a common scheme has been established, it is possible to find that the restrictive covenants are not enforceable because they have been abandoned.
[W]hen presented with a violation of a restrictive covenant, the court is obligated to enforce the covenant unless the defendant can show that enforcement would be inequitable.… [A] [c]hange in circumstances… may justify the withholding of equitable relief to enforce a covenant.… Such a change in circumstances is decided on a case by case basis, and the test is whether the circumstances show an abandonment of the original restriction making enforcement inequitable because of the altered condition of the property involved. [Citation.]
Any such change in conditions must be so substantial so as to frustrate completely the intent of the original covenant so that it would be inequitable to enforce it. [Citation.] Such a change in circumstances includes repeated violations of the restrictions without effective action to enforce them. [Citation.]
*** The defendants admitted that the thirteen parcels in Section Two were developed under a common scheme using substantially uniform restrictions. Excepting the defendants' property, none of the owners of the parcels in Section Two have sought or received resubdivision approval, nor have repeated violations of the restrictions occurred in Section Two. Thus, the deed restrictions have not been abandoned. The plaintiffs met their burden to obtain summary judgment by demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and showing, as a matter of law, that they were entitled to enjoin the defendants from resubdividing their lot and building a second dwelling in contravention of the restrictive covenant.
***
We agree with the trial court that the restrictions in the Section Two deeds have not been extinguished or abandoned as a result of resubdivisions that occurred in Cricklewood, and we agree that the two subdivisions were not developed under a common scheme. Thus, the defendants' claims fail.
INTERPRETATION When uniform restrictive covenants are contained in deeds executed by the owner of property who is dividing his property into building lots under a general development scheme, any grantee under such a general or uniform development scheme may enforce the restrictions against any other grantee.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION What limits should the law place on the extent and duration of private restrictive covenants? Explain.

Answer 2

Case summary:
TC and other group of owners reside in a NW city filed a suit against the MS and MK for building a second dwelling. The board of zonal development permitted the house only for one dwelling and the court favored the plaintiff TC and others.
Restrictive covenant:
A law or act that is developed by the state to restrict the owners of the property to build or lease or develop a property to certain extend is termed as restrictive covenant.
Justification:
In the above mentioned case, TC and other owners of the NW city filled a suit against MS and MK just to avoid uneven development of the city. The particular place is restricted for any other form of development other than uniform development. Uniform development helps the private land owners to get better appreciation of the place. The development of any city is based on the uniformity in development. Therefore, the law should concentrate on restriction only till the point where the land gets a minimum uniform development. And the restrictions may be changed or amended after the minimum development is reached.

Question 3

Where Should Cities House the Disadvantaged?
FACTS Susan Kate is a member of the city council in Wissahicken City. The Clinton Living Center, Inc., has just applied for a special use permit to allow the center to lease a building to use as a group home for the emotionally ill. The home will provide supervised group living quarters for individuals who have suffered from a wide range of emotional problems, including depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and sexual disorders. A small percentage of the proposed occupants will be criminal offenders embarking on the rehabilitative phase of their sentencing, with the ultimate goal of reentering the community. Many of the members will attend school and other job-training programs under supervision during the day.
The Wissahicken zoning ordinance requires that a special permit be obtained annually for hospitals for the insane, the mentally disabled, alcoholics, or drug addicts and for penal or correctional institutions. The building the center wishes to lease is in an R-3 zone that expressly permits apartment houses, multiple dwellings, hospitals, or nursing homes, but excludes penal institutions and homes for the insane, the mentally disabled, alcoholics, or drug addicts. In addition, the building is not far from an upper-middle-class neighborhood consisting of single-family homes. The home would be across the street from a middle school.
Public hearings have been held, and there is widespread community opposition to the proposed lease. Susan Kate, a new and politically ambitious member of the city council, must cast the deciding vote as to whether the special permit should be issued.
Social, Policy, and Ethical Considerations
Should a permit be refused for the purpose of preserving property values? Consider the concerns of a sixty-yearold couple who is close to retirement, has modest cash savings, and has always planned to sell their house in their mid-sixties and move to an apartment. Consider also the concerns of a young, newly married couple in search of affordable housing in a stable, established neighborhood.

Answer 3

Case summary:
CL applied for a special use permit for the center which he is running for emotionally ill people. This special permit is to use the hospitals and other facilities for the emotional patients. The commission decided for a public hearing and SK is an important member to decide on this issue.
Zoning ordinance:
A process of scheming the individuals and private people using the land is knows as zoning. This is also known as traditional method or prime method of controlling the usage of land.
Justification:
In the above mentioned case, if the state permit to run the center in the middle of the city then the residential value of the property may not be affected. Because the center brings in different community people and brings in some facilities like hospital, drug store and others. This shows the center is bringing opportunity for employment for the people around the city. Therefore, the property value may not diminish because of special permission to the center.

Question 4

FACTS In 2000, the city of New London approved a development plan that was ''projected to create in excess of one thousand jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas.'' The plan proposed to replace a faded residential neighborhood-Fort Trumbull-with office space for research and development, a conference hotel, new residences, and a pedestrian ''riverwalk'' along the Thames River. The project, to be built by private developers, is intended to build upon a $350 million research center built nearby by the Pfizer pharmaceutical company.
In assembling the land needed for this project, the city's development agent has purchased property from willing sellers and proposes to use the power of eminent domain to acquire the remainder of the property from unwilling owners of fifteen properties in exchange for just compensation. The unwilling owners claimed that the taking of their properties would violate the ''public use'' restriction in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The trial court granted a permanent restraining order prohibiting the taking of some of the properties located in parcel. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that all of the city's proposed takings were valid. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a city's decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the ''public use'' requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
DECISION Judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed.
OPINION Stevens, J. Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future ''use by the public'' is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example. Neither of these propositions, however, determines the disposition of this case.
***
The disposition of this case therefore turns on the question whether the City's development plan serves a ''public purpose.'' Without exception, our cases have defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.
***
Those who govern the City were not confronted with the need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area, but their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference. The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including-but by no means limited to-new jobs and increased tax revenue. As with other exercises in urban planning and development, the City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and recreational uses of land, with the hope that they will form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. To effectuate this plan, the City has invoked a state statute that specifically authorizes the use of eminent domain to promote economic development. Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
To avoid this result, petitioners urge us to adopt a new bright-line rule that economic development does not qualify as a public use. Putting aside the unpersuasive suggestion that the City's plan will provide only purely economic benefits, neither precedent nor logic supports petitioners' proposal. Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government. There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic development from the other public purposes that we have recognized. ***
Petitioners contend that using eminent domain for economic development impermissibly blurs the boundary between public and private takings. Again, our cases foreclose this objection. Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties. *** Our rejection of that contention has particular relevance to the instant case: ''The public end may be as well or better served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government-or so the Congress might conclude. We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects.'' [Citation.]
***
Alternatively, petitioners maintain that for takings of this kind we should require a ''reasonable certainty'' that the expected public benefits will actually accrue. Such a rule, however, would represent an even greater departure from our precedent. ''When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal courts.'' [Citation.] *** A constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had been assured would unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful consummation of many such plans.
Just as we decline to second-guess the City's considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we also decline to second-guess the City's determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project. ''It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.'' [Citation.]
In affirming the City's authority to take petitioners' properties, we do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of just compensation. We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States already impose ''public use'' requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline.
INTERPRETATION Governments have broad discretion in taking private property for a public purpose, which includes economic development.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION Do you agree with the court's decision? Explain.

Question 5

Marcia executed a mortgage of Blackacre to secure her indebtedness to Ajax Savings and Loan Association in the amount of $125,000. Later, Marcia sold Blackacre to Morton. The deed contained the following provision: ''This deed is subject to the mortgage executed by the Grantor herein to Ajax Savings and Loan Association.'' The sale price of Blackacre to Morton was $150,000. Morton paid $25,000 in cash, deducting the $125,000 mortgage debt from the purchase price. On default in the payment of the mortgage debt, Ajax brings an action against Marcia and Morton to recover a judgment for the amount of the mortgage debt and to foreclose the mortgage. Can Ajax recover from Marcia and Morton? Explain.

Question 6

FACTS In August 1982, defendant, Barba Barba Construction, Inc., constructed a multilevel addition to a single-family house in Glenview, Illinois. Before the addition, the residence consisted of approximately two thousand three hundred square feet. After the addition, the house consisted of approximately three thousand two hundred square feet. More than eleven years later, on November 5, 1993, plaintiff, John W. VonHoldt, purchased the house.
Shortly after taking occupancy, plaintiff noticed a deflection of the wood flooring at the partition wall separating the master bedroom from an adjoining bathroom. This deflection created a depression in the floor plane. Plaintiff maintained that, due to the thickness of the carpet, the depression was nearly concealed. An investigation revealed that the addition had not been constructed in accordance with the architectural plans approved by the Village of Glenview or the Glenview Building Code. This variance resulted in excessive stress on the floor joists and inadequate support for a portion of the roof and ceiling causing a greater-than-expected floor deflection.
The plaintiff brought the present action against defendant alleging that defendant breached an implied warranty of habitability. The trial judge dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff appealed and the appellate court affirmed.
DECISION Judgment affirmed due to the fact that plaintiff's action was barred by the ten-year statute of repose.
OPINION Miller, J. The implied warranty of habitability is a judicially created doctrine designed to avoid the unjust results of caveat emptor and the doctrine of merger. [Citation.] Initially, Illinois courts applied the doctrine to the sale of new homes to protect innocent purchasers who did not possess the ability to determine whether the house they purchased contained latent defects. [Citation.]
*** [T]he owner needs this protection because he is making a major investment, in many instances the largest single investment of his life. [Citation.] Additionally, the owner usually relies on the integrity and skill of the builder, who is in the business of building houses. [Citation.] Finally, the owner has a right to expect to receive a house that is reasonably fit for use as a residence. [Citation.]
***
Plaintiff claims that the implied warranty of habitability should now be extended to include actions against a builder brought by a subsequent purchaser for latent defects in a later addition to a home. In [citation], this court held that the defendants were not subject to the implied warranty of habitability for a condominiumconversion project. The court held that the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability did not apply because the refurbishing and renovation of the project had not been significant. [Citation.] In the present case, the builder made a major addition to an existing home. We now hold that, when a builder makes a significant addition to a previously built home, an action for damages resulting from latent defects affecting habitability exists under the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability.
An owner claiming that latent defects exist in a major addition to a structure, should be provided the same protection for the addition as that given to the [original] owners. *** In both cases, the owner of the house usually has little knowledge regarding the construction. The purchaser of both a completed home and an addition places the same trust in the builder that the structure being erected is suitable for living. Further, the ordinary buyer is not in a position to discover hidden defects in a structure even through the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care.
We must next determine whether the plaintiff can bring this action even though he is a subsequent purchaser. In [citation], this court extended the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers of a new home, finding that there was no need for privity of contract because the warranty of habitability exists independently of the contract for sale. Because the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability has been extended to actions by subsequent purchasers of new homes, we can see no reason why the doctrine should not be extended to actions by subsequent purchasers of a home for latent defects in a significant addition to the home made prior to the time of sale.
***
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that actions for damages from latent defects in the construction of a significant structural addition to an existing residence can be brought against the builder by subsequent purchasers under the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability. However, because here the action was time-barred *** plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed.
INTERPRETATION The implied warranty of habitability applies to a subsequent purchase against a builder who makes a significant addition to a previously built home.
CRITICAL THINKING QUESTION Under what conditions should the implied warranty of habitability be applied? Explain.

Question 7

Where Should Cities House the Disadvantaged?
FACTS Susan Kate is a member of the city council in Wissahicken City. The Clinton Living Center, Inc., has just applied for a special use permit to allow the center to lease a building to use as a group home for the emotionally ill. The home will provide supervised group living quarters for individuals who have suffered from a wide range of emotional problems, including depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and sexual disorders. A small percentage of the proposed occupants will be criminal offenders embarking on the rehabilitative phase of their sentencing, with the ultimate goal of reentering the community. Many of the members will attend school and other job-training programs under supervision during the day.
The Wissahicken zoning ordinance requires that a special permit be obtained annually for hospitals for the insane, the mentally disabled, alcoholics, or drug addicts and for penal or correctional institutions. The building the center wishes to lease is in an R-3 zone that expressly permits apartment houses, multiple dwellings, hospitals, or nursing homes, but excludes penal institutions and homes for the insane, the mentally disabled, alcoholics, or drug addicts. In addition, the building is not far from an upper-middle-class neighborhood consisting of single-family homes. The home would be across the street from a middle school.
Public hearings have been held, and there is widespread community opposition to the proposed lease. Susan Kate, a new and politically ambitious member of the city council, must cast the deciding vote as to whether the special permit should be issued.
Social, Policy, and Ethical Considerations
Would your answers change if the special permit request were for a meeting home for homosexuals or for a group home for the profoundly retarded?

Question 8

On January 1, 2012, Davis and Hershey owned Blackacre as tenants in common. On July 1, 2012, Davis made a written contract to sell Blackacre to Dibbert for $125,000. Pursuant to this contract, Dibbert paid Davis $125,000 on August 1, 2012, and Davis executed and delivered to Dibbert a warranty deed to Blackacre. On May 1, 2013, Hershey quitclaimed his interest in Blackacre to Davis. Dibbert brings an action against Davis for breach of warranty of title. What judgment?

Question 9

In adjoining locations along one side of a single suburban village block, Barker operated a retail bakery; Davidson, a drug store; Farrell, a food store; Gibson, a gift shop; and Harper, a hardware store. As the population grew, the business section developed at the other end of the village, and the establishments of Barker, Davidson, Farrell, Gibson, and Harper were surrounded for at least a mile in each direction solely by residences. A zoning ordinance with the usual provisions was adopted by the village, and the area including the five stores was declared to be a ''residential district for single-family dwellings.'' Thereafter, Barker tore down the frame building that housed the bakery and began to construct a modern brick bakery. Davidson found her business increasing to such an extent that she began to build an addition on the drugstore to extend it to the rear alley. Farrell's building was destroyed by fire, and he started to reconstruct it to restore it to its former condition. Gibson changed the gift shop into a sporting goods store and after six months of operation decided to go back into the gift shop business. Harper sold his hardware store to Hempstead.
The village building commission brings an action under the zoning ordinance to enjoin the construction work of Barker, Davidson, and Farrell and to enjoin the carrying on of any business by Gibson and Hempstead. Assume the ordinance is valid. What result?

Question 10

Alda and Mattingly are residents of Unit I of Chimney Hills Subdivision. The lots owned by Alda and Mattingly are subject to the following restrictive covenant: ''Lots shall be for single-family residence purposes only.'' Alda intends to convert her carport into a beauty shop, and Mattingly brings suit against Alda to enjoin her from doing so. Alda argues that the covenant restricts only the type of building that can be constructed, not the incidental use to which residential structures are put. Will Alda be able to operate a beauty shop on the property? Why or why not?

Question 11

The City of Boston sought to condemn land in fee simple for use in constructing an entrance to an underground terminal for a subway. The owners of the land contend that no more than surface and subsurface easements are necessary for the terminal entrance and seek to retain air rights above thirty-six feet. The city argues that any building using this airspace would require structural supports that would interfere with the city's plan for the terminal. The city concedes that the properties around the condemned property could be assembled and structures could be designed to span over the condemned property, in which case the air rights would be quite valuable. Can the city condemn the property?

Question 12

For seven years, Desford Potts had owned a six-acre tract of land within the corporate limits of the city of Franklin. The tract contained a livestock barn in which Potts stored lumber and other building materials. Bricks were also stored in stacks four or five feet high outside and behind the barn. Franklin passed a zoning ordinance by virtue of which Potts's lot was classified as residential property. Soon afterward, Potts moved some sawn logs onto his back lot, and the city complained that Potts's use of his property for storage of building materials was a ''nonconforming use.'' Potts then brought an action to enjoin interference by the city of Franklin. Explain whether Potts will prevail.

Question 13

In May 2003, Fred Parramore executed four deeds, each conveying a life estate in his land to him and his wife and a remainder interest in one-fourth of his land to each of his four children: Alney, Eudell, Bernice, and Iris. Although Fred executed and acknowledged the four deeds as part of his plan to distribute his estate at his death, he did not deliver them to his children at this time. Instead, he placed the deeds with his will in a safe deposit box and instructed the children to pick up their deeds at his death. Fred later conveyed Alney's deed to Alney, thereby vesting Alney's interest in that parcel, but Eudell, Bernice, and Iris's deeds were never handed over to them during Fred's lifetime. Fred, however, acted as if the land was beyond his control, and on one occasion told a prospective buyer that the land had already been deeded away. When Fred died in November 2013, Alney brought this action, claiming that the deeds to Eudell, Bernice, and Iris were ineffective because they had never been handed over during Fred's lifetime. Accordingly, Alney argued the remaining land should pass in equal shares to each of the four children under the residuary clause of Fred's will. Who will prevail? Why?

Question 14

Where Should Cities House the Disadvantaged?
FACTS Susan Kate is a member of the city council in Wissahicken City. The Clinton Living Center, Inc., has just applied for a special use permit to allow the center to lease a building to use as a group home for the emotionally ill. The home will provide supervised group living quarters for individuals who have suffered from a wide range of emotional problems, including depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and sexual disorders. A small percentage of the proposed occupants will be criminal offenders embarking on the rehabilitative phase of their sentencing, with the ultimate goal of reentering the community. Many of the members will attend school and other job-training programs under supervision during the day.
The Wissahicken zoning ordinance requires that a special permit be obtained annually for hospitals for the insane, the mentally disabled, alcoholics, or drug addicts and for penal or correctional institutions. The building the center wishes to lease is in an R-3 zone that expressly permits apartment houses, multiple dwellings, hospitals, or nursing homes, but excludes penal institutions and homes for the insane, the mentally disabled, alcoholics, or drug addicts. In addition, the building is not far from an upper-middle-class neighborhood consisting of single-family homes. The home would be across the street from a middle school.
Public hearings have been held, and there is widespread community opposition to the proposed lease. Susan Kate, a new and politically ambitious member of the city council, must cast the deciding vote as to whether the special permit should be issued.
Social, Policy, and Ethical Considerations
What are the goals of zoning classifications?

Question 15

The Gerwitz family resides on a piece of land known as Lot 24 of the Belleville tract, which they acquired by deed in 1993. Shortly thereafter, the Gerwitzes began to use the adjacent vacant Lot 25. At various times they planted grass seed, flowers, and shrubs on the land and used it for picnics and cookouts. In 2013, Gelsomin acquired Lot 25 and constructed a foundation on it so that he could place a house there. The Gerwitzes then brought this action to stop him, claiming title to Lot 25 by adverse possession. Discuss whether the Gerwitzes have obtained title by adverse possession.

Question 16

Arthur was the father of Bridgette, Clay, and Dana and the owner of Redacre, Blackacre, and Greenacre.
Arthur made and executed a warranty deed conveying Redacre to Bridgette. The deed provided that ''this deed shall become effective only on the death of the grantor.'' Arthur retained possession of the deed and died, leaving the deed in his safe deposit box.
Arthur made and executed a warranty deed conveying Blackacre to Clay. This deed also provided that ''this deed shall become effective only on the death of the grantor.'' Arthur delivered the deed to Clay. After Arthur died, Clay recorded the deed.
Arthur made and executed a warranty deed conveying Greenacre to Dana. Arthur delivered the deed to Lesley with specific instructions to deliver the deed to Dana on Arthur's death. Lesley duly delivered the deed to Dana when Arthur died.
a. What is the interest of Bridgette in Redacre, if any?
b. What is the interest of Clay in Blackacre, if any?
c. What is the interest of Dana in Greenacre, if any?

Question 17

Leo owned a one-story, one-family dwelling in a singlefamily residential zoning district in Detroit. He attempted to sell the house with its adjoining lot for $138,500. Houses in the neighborhood generally sold for $120,000 to $125,000. Immediately to the west of Leo's property was a gasoline service station. In addition, Leo's property was located on a corner frequented with heavy traffic. After he received no offers from residence-use buyers during the period of more than a year that the property was listed and offered for sale, Leo applied to the board of zoning appeals for a variance to permit the use of the property as a dental and medical clinic and to use the side yard for off-street parking. The variance would be subject to certain conditions, including the preservation of the building's exterior as that of a one-family dwelling. Puritan- Greenfield Improvement Association, a nonprofit corporation, filed a complaint against Leo's variance request. Discuss whether the variance should be granted.

Question 18

Playtime Theaters and Sea-First Properties purchased two theaters in Renton, Washington, with the intention of exhibiting adult films. About the same time, they filed suit seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the First and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by a city of Renton ordinance that prohibits adult motion picture theaters from locating within one thousand feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.
a. What are the arguments that the city has the right to enforce such an ordinance?
b. What are the arguments that the city does not have the right to enforce such an ordinance?
c. What result? Explain.

Question 19

The Glendale Church purchased a twenty-one-acre parcel of land in a canyon along the banks of Mill Creek in Angeles National Forest. The church used the twelve flat acres next to the stream to operate a campground for disabled children. This area had a number of improved buildings located on it. In July, a forest fire destroyed all ground cover upstream from the church's campground, and a subsequent flood destroyed all the buildings. In response, the county of Los Angeles enacted an interim ordinance that temporarily prohibited the church from constructing new buildings. Is the church entitled to compensation for a temporary taking of its property? Why?

Question 20

Where Should Cities House the Disadvantaged?
FACTS Susan Kate is a member of the city council in Wissahicken City. The Clinton Living Center, Inc., has just applied for a special use permit to allow the center to lease a building to use as a group home for the emotionally ill. The home will provide supervised group living quarters for individuals who have suffered from a wide range of emotional problems, including depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and sexual disorders. A small percentage of the proposed occupants will be criminal offenders embarking on the rehabilitative phase of their sentencing, with the ultimate goal of reentering the community. Many of the members will attend school and other job-training programs under supervision during the day.
The Wissahicken zoning ordinance requires that a special permit be obtained annually for hospitals for the insane, the mentally disabled, alcoholics, or drug addicts and for penal or correctional institutions. The building the center wishes to lease is in an R-3 zone that expressly permits apartment houses, multiple dwellings, hospitals, or nursing homes, but excludes penal institutions and homes for the insane, the mentally disabled, alcoholics, or drug addicts. In addition, the building is not far from an upper-middle-class neighborhood consisting of single-family homes. The home would be across the street from a middle school.
Public hearings have been held, and there is widespread community opposition to the proposed lease. Susan Kate, a new and politically ambitious member of the city council, must cast the deciding vote as to whether the special permit should be issued.
Social, Policy, and Ethical Considerations
Is there any justification for requiring a special permit under the circumstances? What are the community's concerns? Are these concerns justified?

Question 21

Robert V. Gross owned certain land on which he proposed to construct an eighty-three-unit apartment house. The land, however, was subject to a restriction imposed by a 1973 deed to a predecessor in title that provided that no part of the premises could be used for business purposes other than raising, growing, and selling live bait, fishing tackle, and sporting goods. Explain whether the restriction prohibits the construction and operation of an apartment house.

Question 22

Arkin, the owner of Redacre, executed a real estate mortgage to the Shawnee Bank and Trust Company for $100,000. After the mortgage was executed and recorded, Arkin constructed a dwelling on the premises and planted a corn crop. After Arkin defaulted in the payment of the mortgage debt, the bank proceeded to foreclose the mortgage. At the time of the foreclosure sale, the corn crop was mature and unharvested. Arkin contends (a) that the value of the dwelling should be credited to him and (b) that he is entitled to the corn crop. Explain whether Arkin is correct.

Question 23

Sam and Eleanor Gaito purchased a home from Howard Frank Auman, Jr., in the spring of 2011. Auman had completed the construction of the house in November 2006. In the interim, three different parties had lived in the house for brief periods, but Auman had retained ownership. The last tenants, the Ashleys, experienced difficulties with the home's air-conditioning system. Repairs were attempted, but no effort was made to change the capacity of the airconditioning unit.
When the Gaitos moved into the house in June 2011 they too had problems with the air-conditioning. The system created only a ten-degree difference between the outside and inside temperatures. The Gaitos complained to Auman on a number of occasions, but extensive repairs failed to correct the cooling problem. In May 2014, the Gaitos brought an action against Auman, alleging that the purchase price of the home included central airconditioning and that Auman had breached the implied warranty of habitability. At trial, an expert in the field of heating and air-conditioning testified that a four-ton airconditioning system, rather than the three-and-a-halfton system originally installed, was appropriate for the Gaitos's house. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Gaitos in the amount of $3,655. Explain whether this decision is correct.

Question 24

Where Should Cities House the Disadvantaged?
FACTS Susan Kate is a member of the city council in Wissahicken City. The Clinton Living Center, Inc., has just applied for a special use permit to allow the center to lease a building to use as a group home for the emotionally ill. The home will provide supervised group living quarters for individuals who have suffered from a wide range of emotional problems, including depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and sexual disorders. A small percentage of the proposed occupants will be criminal offenders embarking on the rehabilitative phase of their sentencing, with the ultimate goal of reentering the community. Many of the members will attend school and other job-training programs under supervision during the day.
The Wissahicken zoning ordinance requires that a special permit be obtained annually for hospitals for the insane, the mentally disabled, alcoholics, or drug addicts and for penal or correctional institutions. The building the center wishes to lease is in an R-3 zone that expressly permits apartment houses, multiple dwellings, hospitals, or nursing homes, but excludes penal institutions and homes for the insane, the mentally disabled, alcoholics, or drug addicts. In addition, the building is not far from an upper-middle-class neighborhood consisting of single-family homes. The home would be across the street from a middle school.
Public hearings have been held, and there is widespread community opposition to the proposed lease. Susan Kate, a new and politically ambitious member of the city council, must cast the deciding vote as to whether the special permit should be issued.
Social, Policy, and Ethical Considerations
What is the social policy behind placing rehabilitative group homes in the heart of a thriving community rather than in an isolated neighborhood?

Question 25

In 1972, South Carolina enacted a Coastal Zone Management Act requiring any person using land in a ''critical area'' to obtain a permit for any uses other than those to which the critical area was devoted when the Act went into effect on September 28, 1977. In 1986, Lucas paid $975,000 for two residential lots on Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, on which he intended to develop a residential subdivision known as ''Beachwood East.'' Because no portion of those lots was included in a ''critical area'' at that time, Lucas was not required to obtain a permit. In 1988, however, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management Act, which established a ''baseline'' for the landwardmost points of erosion and in effect barred the erection of any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels. Lucas filed suit in state court, claiming that the new statute violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by taking property without compensation. Is he entitled to just compensation for his property? Explain.