Deck 13: Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination

Question 1

Red Mendoza filed a sexual harassment action in which she claimed that her supervisor constantly followed her and watched her. In two instances, he looked her up and down, stopped in her groin area, and made a sniffing motion. On another occasion, he passed by her and rubbed his right hip against her left hip and touched her shoulders. Has Mendoza met her burden of proving a hostile work environment?

Answer 1

Hostile work environment is considered to be created when an individual's behavior creates an environment where it becomes difficult for another person to work as per his or her ability. For a hostile work environment claim two criteria need to be fulfilled: ( 1) the harassment should be pervasive enough for being actionable , (2) the employee needs to tolerate the offensive conducts for continuing his or her employment.
Person RM has filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against her supervisor claiming that he used to follow and watch her. As per her claim, two times her supervisor looked her "up and down" and gestured in an unacceptable manner. Besides, on an occasion he passed by her and rubbed his hip against her and also touched her shoulders.
The claims made by Person RM could not meet the burden of proving a hostile work environment due to the following reasons:
• Her supervisor never said anything to her at the times, when RM believed she was being harassed.
• Furthermore, there is only a single instance when the supervisor has made any physical contact with Person RM. At that time, occasion he passed by her and rubbed his hip against her and also touched her shoulders.
Court does not consider these instances to be severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and condition of RM"s employment. Therefore, the burden of proof is not met in this case.

Question 2

Beginning in 1996, Tanisha Matthews, an Apostolic Christian, worked as an overnight stocker at Wal-Mart's store in Joliet, Illinois. In September 2005, during a break in the overnight shift, Matthews took part in a conversation about God and homosexuality. The next day an employee informed a manager that Matthews had made inappropriate comments about gays to a gay employee named Amy. Over the next three months, Wal-Mart investigated the incident by interviewing and obtaining statements from employees who were present during the conversation. In her statement, Amy reported that Matthews was "screaming over her" that God does not accept gays, they should not "be on earth," and they will "go to hell" because they are not "right in the head." Five other employees confirmed that Matthews had said that gays are sinners and are going to hell.
Wal-Mart fired Matthews after concluding that she had engaged in serious harassment in violation of Wal-Mart's Discrimination and Harassment Prevention Policy. This policy, which Matthews was aware of at the time of the incident, prohibits employees from engaging in conduct that could reasonably be interpreted as harassment based on an individual's status, including sexual orientation, and provides that employees who violate the policy will receive "coaching and/or other discipline, up to and including termination." Wal-Mart has a "zero tolerance" policy for harassment "regardless of whether such conduct rises to the level of unlawful discrimination or harassment" and treats serious harassment as gross misconduct and grounds for immediate termination.
Matthews filed suit, alleging that terminating her for stating that gays will go to hell-a belief that she maintains is an aspect of her Apostolic Christian faith-constitutes unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Is she correct? [Matthews v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 417 F. App'x 552 (7th Cir. 2011).]

Answer 2

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin."
In the mentioned case, the employee's claim that company WM had fired him based on religious discrimination is not valid, as the decision to fire is based on Company's policy against discrimination and harassment. By commenting on the gays, the employee of the WM has created a hostile workplace environment. The employee's religious beliefs may disapprove the gays, but it cannot be voiced in a workplace situation, because every organization in the US complies with anti-discrimination statutes. Employee M was well aware of the fact and also knew the consequences at the time of making the comment. As per Title VII's right, it could rather be said the apostolic Christian employee has violated the basic right of the other employee. The WM has the responsibility to provide a non-adversarial environment to the employees; hence, the decision taken by the company against M is justified.

Question 3

Hythem Al-Salem, an immigrant from Libya, asserted that over six months he overheard a coworker call him "camel jockey" and a "sand nigger." He also alleged that a coworker offered him pork, even though he knew Al-Salem's religion forbade it, and that he had heard of his supervisor's comments that he would not be promoted. Has he met his burden of proving a hostile work environment?

Answer 3

Hostile work environment is considered to be created when an individual's behavior creates an environment where it becomes difficult for another person to work as per his or her ability. For a hostile work environment claim two criteria need to be fulfilled: ( 1) the harassment should be pervasive enough for being actionable , (2) the employee needs to tolerate the offensive conducts for continuing his or her employment.
Person HAS, who is an immigrant from Country L, compliant that over a time period of six months he was being addressed with the terms "camel jockey" and "sand nigger" by one of his coworker. Furthermore, he also alleged that one of his coworker offered him pork although he knew that HAS's religion forbade him from doing so. In addition to it, he also heard his supervisor commenting that he would not be promoted.
In order to establish a hostile work environment for racist comments, there needs to be more than few isolated incidents of racial enmity. It means that merely some random slurs cannot constitute a hostile work environment. There needs to be a steady barrage of abusive racial comments.
In this case, a co-worker of HAS was passing racial comments on him over a time period of six months. In addition to it, one of his coworkers knowingly offered him pork that was strictly prohibited in his religion. He has also heard his supervisor commenting on his promotion. All these factors enable him in meeting his burden of proving a hostile work environment.

Question 4

In May 2003, Jennifer Willis, senior account manager at Coca Cola Enterprises, called her supervisor and said she was sick and unable to come to work. She also told him she was pregnant, but did not specify that she was sick because of the pregnancy. When she called in the next day, a Tuesday, to find out where she should report to work, she was told that she needed a medical release. She told her supervisor that she had a doctor's appointment on "Wednesday," which the supervisor assumed was the next day, but the appointment was actually scheduled for the following Wednesday. Willis had no further contact with her employer until Thursday of the next week, when company officials arrived at her home to recover her company car. At that point, she contacted her employer and was eventually brought in for a meeting where she was informed that she had been terminated for violating the company's "No Call/No Show" policy. Under this policy, "an employee absent from work for three consecutive days without notifying the supervisor during that period will be considered to have voluntarily resigned." Willis filed a lawsuit in which she claimed that her termination was discriminatory. Does Willis have a valid claim? How should Coca Cola Enterprises respond? [Willis v. Coca Cola Enterprises, Inc., 445 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2006).]

Question 5

In September 1998, Christie Helm was hired as an administrative assistant for both Judge Frederick Stewart and Judge Robert Bednar in the First Judicial District of Kansas. Judge Stewart began sexually harassing Helm shortly after she was hired. For several years, the harassment primarily involved touching Helm's rear end, thighs, and legs. Additionally, in 1999, Judge Stewart forced a kiss on Helm in front of the courthouse.
Helm took a medical leave of absence during the spring and early summer of 2006. After Helm returned to work, Judge Stewart started touching her inappropriately again. During the spring of 2007, the harassment began to escalate. Throughout March and April, Judge Stewart would regularly close the door of his office and kiss Helm. In addition, he once put his hands up Helm's skirt. In late May or early June 2007, Judge Stewart put his hands up Helm's skirt and penetrated her vagina with his finger. He also told her that he wanted to have sex with her on the couch in his chambers and make her have an orgasm. In June 2007, Judge Stewart unbuttoned Helm's blouse on two different occasions and fondled her breasts.
Between 2003 and 2007, Helm complained to her coworker Karen Connor about Judge Stewart on approximately ten different occasions. She never mentioned specifics, stating only that Judge Stewart made her uncomfortable. In late June or early July 2007, Helm approached David King, the chief judge of the First Judicial District, and told him that Judge Stewart had done something inappropriate and made her feel uncomfortable. She did not disclose any details, however. Chief Judge King advised her of the procedure for making a complaint. He also told her that if she wished to make a complaint, the First Judicial District "would stand beside and support her fully and that there would be no consequence to her as a result of making the complaint." Helm said that she wanted to think about whether to make a complaint, and Chief Judge King responded, "Well, don't take too long, because if you don't do anything, I'm going to have to do something since you've conveyed this to me."
Helm came back to Chief Judge King the same day and said that she had resolved the matter with Judge Stewart and did not wish to pursue it further. Chief Judge King relayed his conversation with Helm to Steven Crossland, the court administrator, but neither King nor Crossland made a report to the Office of Judicial Administration (OJA). In July 2007, Helm requested medical leave so that she could seek treatment for alcohol and drug abuse. She was given permission to take unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act after she exhausted her sick leave and vacation.
On August 8, 2007, before Helm was scheduled to return to work, she reported to Judge Bednar that Judge Stewart had sexually harassed her. Helm told Judge Bednar that the harassment was "basically verbal, but it had gotten to touching or had involved touching." She also informed Judge Bednar about her previous conversations with Chief Judge King.
Judge Bednar immediately reported Helm's complaint to Chief Judge King and Steven Crossland. Crossland notified the OJA of the complaint later that same day. Crossland planned to talk to Helm and Chief Judge King when she returned to work on August 13, 2007, about changing her duties so that she would not have to work for Judge Stewart anymore. Helm did not return to work on August 13.
On September 18, 2007, Helm was arrested following an altercation with her husband. She was charged with aggravated battery (a felony) and domestic battery and disorderly conduct (both misdemeanors). Helm ultimately entered into a diversion agreement that included her stipulation to facts that satisfied the elements of the three charged offenses. On December 3, 2007, Chief Judge King sent Helm a letter informing her that the conduct to which she admitted violated three provisions of the Kansas Court Personnel Rules. He further explained that her decision to enter into a diversion on a felony charge disqualified her from accessing defendants' criminal histories under the rules established for the Kansas Criminal Justice Information System. This precluded her from carrying out her duties as an administrative assistant.
Helm responded in a letter dated December 7, 2007. She provided a number of reasons why she should be allowed to continue working for the First Judicial District, including the fact that Ron Chance, the court administrator who preceded Crossland, had entered into a diversion on a DUI charge and had not been fired. Helm suggested that her criminal prosecution and the proposed termination represented retaliation for her complaining about Judge Stewart's sexual harassment. One week later, Chief Judge King wrote to Helm again and informed her that she was terminated effective immediately. He rejected Helm's attempt to compare her situation to Chance's, explaining that Helm was the only employee that he knew who had admitted to facts constituting a felony offense against another person.
Helm filed a charge of discrimination against the State of Kansas with the EEOC, in which she alleged sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII. What result? [Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2011).]

Question 6

Benjamin Endres was an officer in the Indiana State Police. Soon after Indiana began licensing casinos, Endres was assigned by lottery to a full-time position as a Gaming Commission agent at the Blue Chip Casino in Michigan City, Indiana. Gaming Commission agents certify gambling revenue, investigate complaints from the public about the gaming system, and conduct licensing investigations for the casinos and their employees. Endres, a Baptist, believed that he must neither gamble nor help others do so, because games of chance are sinful.
Endres told the State Police that he was willing to enforce general vice laws at casinos, but that providing the specialized services required of Gaming Commission agents would violate his religious beliefs because it would facilitate gambling. When the State Police refused his request for a different assignment, Endres refused to report for duty and was fired for insubordination.
Endres sues under Title VII, contending that the State of Indiana discriminated against him on account of his religion by failing to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs. The State of Indiana moves to dismiss the claim. How should the court rule? [Endres v. Indiana State Police, 349 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2003).]

Question 7

Amaani Lyle applied for the position of writers' assistant for a television show about the lives of young, sexually active adults. During her interview, she was told that one of the most important aspects of the job was taking very copious and detailed notes for the writers' meetings, where story lines, jokes, and dialogue were discussed. She was also told that she must type incredibly fast. Four months after she was hired, the producers fired Lyle because she consistently missed very important story lines and jokes during the writers' meetings and typed too slowly.
Lyle subsequently filed a claim for sexual harassment. She claimed that during the writers' meetings, the writers constantly engaged in discussions about anal and oral sex, discussed their sexual exploits both real and fantasized, commented on the sexual nature of the female actors on the show, made and displayed crude drawings of women's breasts and vaginas, pretended to masturbate, and altered the words on the scripts and other documents to create new words such as "tits" and "penis."
Warner Brothers defended on the basis that the writers' job was to create jokes, dialogue, and story lines for an adultoriented situation comedy:
[B]ecause "Friends" deals with sexual matters, intimate body parts and risqué humor, the writers of the show are required to have frank sexual discussions and tell colorful jokes and stories (and even make expressive gestures) as part of the creative process of developing story lines, dialogue, gags, and jokes for each episode. Lyle, as a writers' assistant, would reasonably be exposed to such discussions, jokes, and gestures.
Who should prevail on Lyle's sexual harassment claim? [Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions, 132 P.3d 211 (Cal. 2006).]

Question 8

Kenneth Horgan was diagnosed as HIV positive in 1990 but kept his illness confidential. In February 2001, he began working as a sales manager for Morgan, a linen and uniform rental services company. In January 2008, he was promoted to general manager of the Chicago facility. In July 2009, the company's president and Horgan's supervisor, Timothy Simmons, asked to meet with Horgan for what Simmons called a "social visit." During that meeting, he told Horgan that he was "really worried about him" and demanded to know what was going on with him, telling Horgan that "if there was something medical going on, [he] needed to know."
Although Horgan insisted that nothing was going on that would interfere with his work, Simmons "continued to insist that there was something physical or mental" that was affecting Horgan. At that point, Horgan felt compelled to tell Simmons that he was HIV positive, but he assured Simmons that his condition had no effect on his ability to perform his job duties. Simmons then asked about his prognosis, and Horgan replied that he had been HIV positive for a long time, that his condition was under control, and that he had not yet progressed to AIDS. Simmons then asked "how he could ever perform his job with his HIV positive condition and how he could continue to work with a terminal illness." Simmons also said that "a General Manager needs to be respected by the employees and have the ability to lead" and then added that he "did not know how [Horgan] could lead if employees knew about his condition."
Simmons ended the meeting by telling Horgan that he needed to "recover" and that he should "go on vacation" and "leave the plant immediately." Simmons then discussed the issue with Morgan's owner. The next day Horgan received a copy of an e-mail sent to all general managers and corporate staff indicating that "effective immediately" Horgan was "no longer a member of Morgan []."
Horgan brought suit, claiming that he was terminated because of his disability in violation of the ADA and that Simmons's questioning was an impermissible medical inquiry in violation of the ADA. Who will prevail? [Horgan v. Simmons, 704 F. Supp. 2d 814 (N.D. Ill. 2010).]

Question 9

Burnett was a janitor for Habitat, a property management business. His job required him to lift heavy objects. In October 2003, Burnett told Polo, his supervisor, that he had a medical problem. Polo offered to transfer Burnett to a different location, but Burnett declined because of his "weak bladder" and the reduced access to a restroom at the other location. After he missed work for a week in December, Burnett presented Polo with a copy of a doctor's examination that showed he had a serious prostate problem. When he met with Polo to discuss his absence, Burnett said he was feeling sick and compared his symptoms to his brother-in-law's symptoms before he was diagnosed with prostate cancer. In January 2004, Burnett told another supervisor that he was going to have a prostate biopsy at the end of the month. A short time later, Polo reprimanded Burnett for wasting time, and Burnett filed a union grievance.
After the biopsy, Burnett returned to work with a doctor's treatment plan that restricted him from heavy lifting or strenuous activity. Burnett claimed that his supervisors ignored these restrictions, and he submitted two vacation requests. Polo denied the second request and told Burnett that the treatment plan was not important. Burnett said he was going home because he felt sick, and Polo terminated him the next day for insubordination. A week after he was terminated, Burnett was diagnosed with prostate cancer. Burnett claimed Habitat violated the FMLA by denying him leave and violated the ADA. Did Habitat violate the FMLA? The ADA? What defense will Habitat assert? Did Burnett's supervisors exercise good business judgment? Act ethically? [Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2006).]

Question 10

Mo-Tech manufactures molds for the consumer products, automotive, medical, and computer industries. In 2007, it laid off its three oldest and most skilled mold-makers- Richard Rahlf, Frank Stelter, and Scott Johnson-in a reduction in force (RIF). When these three employees began working in the 1980s, molds were made manually. In the early 1990s, Mo-Tech began using a Computer Numerical Control machine (CNC) to help make the molds. A CNC machine is programmed by a mold-maker to the product specifications and directs the production of the mold. Clients often design parts for CNC-generated models, and the CNC technology makes the process easier and faster. Consequently, there is greater need for moldmakers proficient in this technology than for those trained in traditional manual mold-making. Despite the growing popularity of the CNC machine, Mo-Tech did not require or provide its employees with formal training on it. Instead, employees were trained on the job when CNC machines were available. Rahlf practiced on the CNC machines at work; Stelter and Johnson each attended CNC training in the 1990s.
Mo-Tech claimed that its RIF was necessary to meet changing client needs and address anticipated reductions in workload and profitability. The company's stated goal "was to shift the work that remained to the more efficient and less labor intensive CNC mold making process while reducing the total number of Class A manual mold makers employed to reflect the anticipated decrease in its workload." To determine which mold-makers to let go, three Mo-Tech managers ranked the mold-makers based on several factors, including CNC proficiency, general moldmaking efficiency, and their own observations of each employee's work. Within one year after firing the plaintiffs, Mo-Tech hired new (and younger) mold-makers, and its sales increased.
Rahlf, Stelter, and Johnson claimed that Mo-Tech's stated reason for terminating them was pretextual on five grounds: (1) there was no need for a RIF, (2) Mo-Tech failed to review their performance evaluations, (3) Mo-Tech did not follow its own termination criteria, (4) Mo-Tech destroyed the evidence it relied on to make the decision, and (5) Mo- Tech changed its reasons for the termination. What must the plaintiffs show to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination? Does the employer have a valid defense? How might it have avoided this lawsuit? [Rahlf v. Mo-Tech Corp., 642 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2011).]