Deck 38: Gilbert Harman

Question 1

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Explain Harman's two cases of the physicist in the cloud chamber, and the person who discovers hoodlums lighting a cat on fire. In what respects does Harman think the two cases are similar? In what respects does he claim they differ? Do you agree with his assessment?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Some people have claimed that moral standards are in some ways analogous to mathematical facts. What similarities might one point to between the two? What difference does Harman cite between them? Might moral facts be vindicated in the same way that mathematical facts are?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-What does it mean to give a reduction of one kind of fact to another? Give an example of a plausible reduction. Do you think moral facts are reducible to natural facts? Why or why not?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-What is the Open Question Argument, and what does it try to show? What objections does Harman raise to the argument? Do you think Harman's objections are successful? Defend your answer.

Question 5

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-What key difference between ethics and science does Harman claim to have shown? Do you agree that ethics and science are disanalogous in this respect? If so, what implications does this have for ethics?

Question 6

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-What is moral nihilism? What two versions of nihilism does Harman distinguish? Which do you think is preferable and why?

Question 7

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-What is ethical naturalism? How would a functionalist view of moral facts vindicate ethical naturalism? Do you think such a view can succeed? Why or why not?

Question 8

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims a "concept" is what it is by virtue of:

A) its role in a particular theory.
B) its role in what the majority of people think.
C) how it is acquired.
D) the properties and facts it refers to.

Question 9

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims that observations in science are __________, and that observations in ethics are __________.

A) pure; pure
B) pure; theory-laden
C) theory-laden; pure
D) theory-laden; theory-laden

Question 10

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman defines observation as:

A) having certain sensations in one's sensory organs.
B) forming a belief as a direct result of perception.
C) forming a belief based on a chain of inferences, rooted ultimately in perception.
D) forming a belief about physical objects based on scientific testing.

Question 11

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims that ethics and science are similar:

A) in no relevant respects.
B) in that we can know the verdicts of each with certainty.
C) in that they both involve testing general principles against particular judgments.
D) in that neither is genuinely testable.

Question 12

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims that ethics is distinctive in that:

A) ethical claims do no describe the world, but express our feelings.
B) we do not need to make assumptions about moral facts to explain our moral observations.
C) ethical facts are reducible to simpler kinds of facts.
D) all of the above.

Question 13

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-According to Harman, mathematics:

A) can be directly tested against observation.
B) can be tested against observation, but only indirectly.
C) cannot be tested against observation, but is nonetheless real.
D) cannot be tested against observation, and is therefore illusory.

Question 14

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Extreme nihilists hold that:

A) whether a moral claim is true depends on our feelings.
B) whether a moral claim is true depends on the conventions of society.
C) morality is simply an illusion and nothing is ever right or wrong.
D) moral claims are not used to describe the world, but to express our attitudes.

Question 15

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Moderate nihilists hold that.:

A) whether a moral claim is true depends on our feelings.
B) whether a moral claim is true depends on the conventions of society.
C) morality is simply an illusion and nothing is ever right or wrong.
D) moral claims are not used to describe the world, but to express our attitudes.

Question 16

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-According to Harman, whether an object is a good thing of its kind depends on:

A) its function.
B) our interests.
C) our moral sensibilities.
D) none of the above.

Question 17

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims that when we judge something good relative to interests, roles, or functions, such judgments are:

A) emotive.
B) factual.
C) prescriptive.
D) literally meaningless.

Question 18

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Ethical naturalism is the view that:

A) whatever is natural is morally right, and whatever is unnatural is wrong.
B) we morally ought to do whatever comes naturally to us.
C) all moral facts are facts of nature.
D) there are no moral facts.

Question 19

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims that extreme nihilism is difficult to accept because it implies that:

A) human life has no meaning.
B) things like murder and slavery are not wrong.
C) God does not exist.
D) all of the above.

Question 20

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims that the Open Question Argument:

A) decisively refutes naturalism.
B) decisively refutes nihilism.
C) is invalid.
D) none of the above.

Question 21

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-According to redefinitional naturalism:

A) ordinary moral claims are reducible to claims about scientific facts.
B) ordinary moral claims express our feelings.
C) ordinary moral claims state facts about unanalyzable ethical properties.
D) ordinary moral notions are confused.

Question 22

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims the functions of artifacts are determined by:

A) their natural telos.
B) their makers.
C) their users.
D) both b and c.

Question 23

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-According to Harman, some observations are "theory laden" and others are "pure."

Question 24

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims that to explain a particular scientific judgment, we do not need to assume anything about any scientific facts.

Question 25

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims that morality, unlike science, is cut off from observation.

Question 26

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman argues that we have indirect observational evidence for mathematics.

Question 27

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-According to Harman, if we accept naturalism in general we must also accept ethical naturalism.

Question 28

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-According to moderate nihilism, naturalism misconstrues the function of moral judgment.

Question 29

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims that facts about the average American citizen are not reducible to other facts.

Question 30

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-According to Harman, it is a factual question whether a particular thing fulfills its function.

Question 31

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-Harman claims that the open question argument is invalid.

Question 32

Gilbert Harman: The Nature of Morality
Scientific inquiry proceeds largely by testing hypotheses against our observations. Harman argues that moral inquiry cannot proceed in this fashion, and that this disanalogy constitutes a serious problem for ethics. The difference between science and ethics, Harman claims, is that although we must make assumptions about certain physical facts to explain the observations that support our scientific theories, we do not need to make any assumptions about any moral facts to explain our "moral observations." On the contrary, Harman contends, we can explain why someone makes the moral judgments that they do simply by making reference to the nonmoral facts and the "moral sensibilities" of the agent. This seems to make it impossible to test moral claims against reality in the way that we test scientific claims.
Harman discusses several possible responses to this problem. One is to accept moral nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts. Nihilism comes in two flavors. Extreme nihilists hold that morality is simply an illusion, and that nothing is really good or bad, right or wrong. Moderate nihilists hold that the purpose of moral judgments is not to attribute moral properties to things, but simply to express our feelings. Both versions of nihilism conflict with the commonsense notions that some moral claims are true, and that we have some moral knowledge. Another kind of response is to reject nihilism on the grounds that moral facts are definable in terms of facts that do play a role in scientific explanations. This position is reductionism. Some evaluative facts seem to be reducible in this sense. In particular, whether something is a good thing of its kind is reducible to the question of whether it fulfills its function-for example, a good knife is simply a knife that cuts well. Other things can be judged good if and only if they serve a particular interest-for example, a good meal is one that is nourishing or tasty. Harman points out that any reduction of moral facts on these lines would have to be complicated and somewhat vague. He concludes, therefore, that moral facts remain problematic.
-According to Harman, any reduction of moral facts to natural facts would have to be complex, vague, and difficult to specify.