Deck 58: Thomas Nagel

Question 1

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Write an essay critically examining what you take to be the best argument for the conclusion that death is bad. State the argument in detail, and then discuss what you think is the strongest objection to this argument. Do you think the original argument is sound? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-What is Nagel's account of harms like betrayal and being ridiculed behind one's back? What implications does this account have for the issue of death? Do you find his account plausible?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Some people object that death cannot be bad for a person because after one's death there is simply no person to be harmed. How does Nagel respond to this objection? Do you find his response convincing? Why or why not?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Lucretius famously argued that because one is not bothered by the eternity of nonexistence that preceded one's birth, one should not be troubled by death. What does Nagel think is wrong with this argument? Whose view do you find more plausible and why?

Question 5

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-In what sense does Nagel think that death is bad? What is his argument for this conclusion? Do you find the argument convincing? Why or why not?

Question 6

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-How does Nagel respond to the objection that nothing can be good or bad for a person unless it is experienced as unpleasant? What are the broader implications of his response for the way we think about benefits and harms? Do you find his account plausible?

Question 7

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-What is the asymmetry objection to the claim that death is bad for us? How does Nagel respond to this objection? Is his response successful in defusing the objection? Defend your answer.

Question 8

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel defines permanent death as:

A) the end of our bodily existence.
B) the end of our bodily existence, but our conscious survival.
C) the end of our bodily existence, unsupplemented by conscious survival.
D) none of the above.

Question 9

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel argues that death is an evil primarily because it:

A) causes anxiety and distress.
B) involves long periods of nonexistence.
C) deprives us of the goods of life.
D) none of the above.

Question 10

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel claims that if we set aside the good and bad contents of one's experiences, life is:

A) good.
B) completely neutral.
C) bad.
D) differently valuable for different people.

Question 11

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel argues that if death is an evil, then what is objectionable is:

A) the state of being dead.
B) being unconscious.
C) being non-existent.
D) the loss of life.

Question 12

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel claims that the value of life attaches to:

A) organic survival.
B) the goods of experience.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 13

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel claims that the goods of life:

A) can be multiplied by time.
B) diminish as one's life span gets longer.
C) cannot be added to one another.
D) are only good in light of life's hardships.

Question 14

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-According to Nagel, some people find the view that death is bad simply because it deprives a person of the goods of life objectionable on the alleged grounds that:

A) nothing can be bad for a person unless it is experienced as positively unpleasant.
B) there is no subject to whom the supposed misfortunate of death can be assigned.
C) because our prenatal nonexistence is nothing bad, our posthumous nonexistence cannot be bad either.
D) all of the above.

Question 15

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-According to Nagel, things that we do not experience:

A) can both harm us and benefit us.
B) can benefit us, but cannot harm us.
C) can harm us, but cannot benefit us.
D) can neither harm nor benefit us.

Question 16

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-According to Nagel, it is commonly believed that:

A) betrayal is bad because its discovery makes us unhappy.
B) the discovery of betrayal makes us unhappy because it is bad.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 17

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel claims that we can be harmed:

A) only by circumstances that coincide with us in space.
B) only by circumstances that coincide with us in time.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 18

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel claims that his case of the man with mental degeneration is an example of a harm that depends on:

A) pain and suffering.
B) the nonrelational properties of an individual.
C) a contrast between reality and possible alternatives.
D) a contrast between reality and one's present desires.

Question 19

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-According to Nagel, being born is _________ and not being born is __________.

A) fortunate; not a misfortune
B) fortunate; a misfortune
C) not fortunate; not a misfortune
D) not fortunate; a misfortune

Question 20

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-The problem of temporal asymmetry was pointed out by the philosopher:

A) Aristotle.
B) Lucretius.
C) Immanuel Kant.
D) James Rachels.

Question 21

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-According to Nagel, the time before one is born is time that one is __________, and the time after one's death is time that one is __________.

A) deprived of; deprived of
B) deprived of; not deprived of
C) not deprived of; deprived of
D) not deprived of; not deprived of

Question 22

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel claims that if people can be frozen without reduction of their conscious lifespan, it will be inappropriate:

A) to unfreeze them because of the dramatic changes in ways of life likely to have taken place in the interim.
B) to unfreeze them because their immune system would be unable to fend of terrible diseases.
C) to freeze them in the first place.
D) to pity those who are temporarily out of circulation.

Question 23

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-According to Nagel, the badness of death is a product, not of its positive features, but of what it deprives us of.

Question 24

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel claims that it is a mistake to try to imagine what it is like to be dead.

Question 25

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-According to Nagel, betrayal is bad because its discovery makes us unhappy.

Question 26

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel claims that when life contains more negative experiences than positive ones, it is not worth living.

Question 27

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel claims that the main objection to death is that it involves long periods of nonexistence.

Question 28

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-According to Nagel, all people are fortunate to have been born.

Question 29

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel claims that death cannot be a misfortune because there is no subject to whom that misfortune can be assigned.

Question 30

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel argues that the goods of life are irreducibly relational; they hold between reality and possible alternatives.

Question 31

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-According to Nagel, the goods and evils that can befall a person are restricted to nonrelational properties ascribable to him at particular times.

Question 32

Thomas Nagel: Death
Suppose that death is the permanent end of human existence. If so, is death bad for the person who dies? Some argue that such a claim is senseless, on the grounds that nothing can be bad for a person who no longer exists. Nagel rejects these arguments, and defends the view that death is bad for us. In Nagel's view, death is not bad because of any of the positive features of death, but because it deprives us of the goods that life contains. Nagel defends his view from three objections.
The first objection is based on the assumption that nothing can be good or bad for someone unless it is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant. Because the dead do not experience anything, it seems that death cannot be bad for us. Nagel responds by denying the assumption behind the objection. We can be harmed by people betraying us behind our backs and without our knowledge, and we can even be harmed by people neglecting our wishes after our deaths.
The second objection is that death cannot be bad for a person, because after death there is simply no subject for which anything can be good or bad. In response, Nagel claims that it would be bad for a person to be reduced to the cognitive level of an infant, even if he remained perfectly content. The badness of such a fate is not undermined by the contention that the original person no longer exists, for the badness is grounded in the contrast between what actually transpired and possible alternatives. Such a fate is bad because it deprives a person of potential goods. Nagel claims that death is similar in this respect.
The third, and final, objection is this: because we were not harmed by our prenatal nonexistence, we cannot be harmed by posthumous nonexistence. Nagel responds that although our nonexistence before our birth did not deprive us of anything, death deprives us of time that we would otherwise be alive. Ultimately, then, Nagel concludes that these three objections fail to undermine the thought that death is bad for us.
-Nagel argues that death at the age of 80 is bad for the person who suffers it.