Deck 30: Physical Realism and the Mind: Quine, Denne

Question 1

Quine believes that traditional empiricism has been dogmatic in

A) holding that no sharp line divides analytic truths from synthetic truths.
B) thinking that meaningful statements about the objective world reduce to statements about experiential data.
C) its view that philosophy is just an extension of empirical science.
D) blurring the line between natural science and speculative metaphysics.

Answer 1

thinking that meaningful statements about the objective world reduce to statements about experiential data.

Question 2

Quine's holism means that

A) statements about the world can be judged only as a corporate body.
B) total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are mathematical.
C) A conflict in the interior of the web of belief will occasion a reassignment of truth values at the periphery.
D) only logical laws are immune from revision.

Answer 2

statements about the world can be judged only as a corporate body.

Question 3

Observation sentences, Quine says,

A) are about the subjective content of our experience.
B) are about the stimulation of our sense organs.
C) are the only sentences immune from revision.
D) are the final checkpoint for theory.

Answer 3

are the final checkpoint for theory.

Question 4

Quine's criterion for ontological commitment

A) tells us what we should be committed to by way of our ontology.
B) commits us to the existence of what medieval philosophers called "universals."
C) shows us not what there is, but what a theory says that there is.
D) is a way of committing metaphysics "to the flames."

Question 5

Naturalized epistemology

A) is basically third-person epistemology.
B) is basically first-person epistemology.
C) solves once and for all the skeptical problem of the external world.
D) guarantees the truth of observation sentences.

Question 6

To say that Intentionality is a fundamental characteristic of mental acts is to say that

A) intending to do some act is the basic fact about mind.
B) every mental act is about something.
C) there are no mental acts that are unconscious.
D) physical realism is false.

Question 7

Taking up Dennett's Intentional stance toward some object

A) is intending to understand its design and physical behavior.
B) enables us to predict the behavior of even a malfunctioning machine.
C) is incompatible with regarding it as a machine.
D) means treating it as though it were rational and goal-directed.

Question 8

A functionalist account of mental concepts (believing, intending, desiring, etc.)

A) entails that the mind is a "ghost in a machine."
B) is incompatible with locating mental phenomena in the brain.
C) allows that a purely physical item might perform the functions.
D) commits one to physical realism.

Question 9

Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment is supposed to show that

A) no one can learn Chinese in isolation from other people.
B) strong AI is a mistake.
C) Chinese is a very difficult language to master.
D) only someone growing up speaking Chinese can speak like a native.

Question 10

The idea that there is "something it is like" to be a certain entity

A) raises doubts about the sufficiency of functionalist accounts of the mind.
B) derives from science fiction stories about robots.
C) can be explained by the consciousness gene.
D) is a staple of third-person epistemology.

Question 11

When Mary, the neuroscientist, exits her black-and-white room, she learns (according to Jackson)

A) which brain states correlate with which colors.
B) what people say when they see red.
C) how many people are really color-blind.
D) What it is like to see red.

Question 12

The hard problem, according to David Chalmers, is

A) how to give a functionalist analysis of brain states.
B) how qualia relate to brain states.
C) whether there is any relation at all between brain states and consciousness.
D) whether zombies really exist.

Question 13

Dennett's heterophenomenology is a technique for

A) giving a third-person description of the contents of consciousness.
B) refuting Hegel's notion of Spirit.
C) supporting epiphenomenalism.
D) proving the existence of Feenoman.

Question 14

What role do posits play in the philosophy of Quine?

Question 15

How does Quine suggest that we determine ontological commitment?

Question 16

In what way does evolutionary epistemology provide at least a partial justification of our epistemic practices?

Question 17

What is Intentionality?

Question 18

Explain Dennett's three stances: Design, Physical, and Intentional.

Question 19

How does the notion of function help to reconcile a physicalist ontology with the property of Intentionality?

Question 20

Contrast what David Chalmers calls the "easy problem" with the "hard problem," indicating what is hard about the latter.

Question 21

Is science just another ideology, or is there something unique about it in regard to discovering the truth about the world we live in? Evaluate the arguments offered by the postmodernists and the physical realists on this question.

Question 22

Could a machine think? Be conscious? Be a responsible agent? Why or why not?

Question 23

Is there a "hard problem" about consciousness? If so, what is it? If not, why not?