Deck 2: The Mind-Body Problem

Question 1

Can the mind be identified with an immaterial substance such as the soul? Why or why not?

Answer 1

Not Answer.

Question 2

Does being in a mental state require having a certain behavioral disposition? Why or why not?

Answer 2

Not Answer.

Question 3

Does being in a mental state require having a brain? Why or why not?

Answer 3

Not Answer.

Question 4

Does being in a mental state require being in a certain functional state? Why or why not?

Question 5

Is the verifiability theory an adequate theory of meaning? Why or why not?

Question 6

According to logical behaviorism, is it possible for our minds to survive the death of our bodies? Why or why not?

Question 7

According to the identity theory, is it possible for our minds to survive the death of our bodies? Why or why not?

Question 8

Is it possible to give a complete description of the world in purely physical terms? Why or why not?

Question 9

Could a zombie (a creature with no consciousness and thus no feelings) do everything we can do? Why or why not?

Question 10

According to Descartes, machines will never be able to

A) act like we do.
B) talk like we do.
C) walk like we do.
D) look like we do.

Question 11

Which of the following do Cartesian dualists reject?

A) that minds and bodies exist.
B) that minds and bodies can exist independently of each other.
C) that minds exist in time.
D) that minds exist in space.

Question 12

According to Descartes, knowledge is

A) power.
B) unattainable.
C) certain.
D) fleeting.

Question 13

Descartes uses the method of doubt to cast doubt on

A) the existence of the external world.
B) the existence of God.
C) the existence of dreams.
D) the existence of demons.

Question 14

For Descartes, cogito ergo sum is

A) a proof for the existence of God.
B) an indubitable truth.
C) an obvious FALSEhood.
D) a way to make money.

Question 15

Descartes cannot conceive of

A) existing without a body.
B) existing without a mind.
C) existing without a brain.
D) existing without a heart.

Question 16

According to Descartes, the mind affects the body through

A) the central nervous system.
B) the heart.
C) the liver.
D) the pineal gland.

Question 17

One of the problems with Cartesian dualism is that

A) it cannot explain perception.
B) it cannot explain emotions.
C) it cannot explain reason.
D) it cannot explain mind/body interaction.

Question 18

For Descartes, mental substance (mind) is entirely different from physical substance (body) because

A) mental substance is imaginary while physical substance is real.
B) mental substance is a projection of the brain.
C) physical substance is a projection of the mind.
D) physical substance is divisible while mental substance is indivisible.

Question 19

The view that the mind interacts with the body is a problem for substance dualists like Descartes because it raises questions like

A) how can the mind survive the death of the body?
B) how can the existence of the mind be known?
C) how can the existence of bodies be known?
D) how can something with no physical properties affect something physical?

Question 20

The theory that claims that the body affects the mind, but the mind does not affect the body is known as

A) Occasionalism.
B) Interactionism.
C) Epiphenomenalism.
D) Dualism.

Question 21

According to empiricism, our only source of knowledge about the world is

A) reason.
B) sense experience.
C) God.
D) the Bible.

Question 22

According to logical positivism, a sentence is meaningful only is

A) it is logical.
B) it is not negative.
C) it is verifiable.
D) it is believable.

Question 23

"Parallelism" is a kind of explanation designed to apply to which theory?

A) Materialism
B) Idealism
C) Dualism
D) Neutralism

Question 24

The claim that every physical event has a purely physical cause is known as

A) The identity theory.
B) Epiphenomenalism.
C) The causal closure of the physical.
D) The identity of indiscernables.

Question 25

According to logical behaviorists,

A) it is easier for other people to know our mental states than us.
B) it is easier for other people to know our brain states than us.
C) we have no mental states.
D) we have no brain states.

Question 26

According to Gilbert Ryle, it is a category mistake to think that minds are things because minds are

A) immaterial spirits.
B) brains.
C) microscopically small bodies.
D) patterns of behavior.

Question 27

According to Ryle, the mind cannot affect the body because

A) the mind is an immaterial thing and the body is a material thing.
B) it's impossible to detect the mind.
C) minds are theoretical entities.
D) minds, unlike bodies, are not things.

Question 28

Logical behaviorism claims that mental states are

A) behavioral dispositions.
B) behavioral propositions.
C) behavioral acquisitions.
D) behavioral subdivisions.

Question 29

According to the identity theory, minds are

A) souls.
B) thoughts.
C) brains.
D) programs.

Question 30

If two things do not have the same properties, they are not

A) different.
B) identical.
C) ideal.
D) real.

Question 31

Putnam believes that computers can

A) think like we do.
B) act like we do.
C) feel like we do.
D) all of these.
E) none of these.

Question 32

Which of the following is not consistent with the identity theory

A) mental states are physical states.
B) minds are material objects.
C) to have a mind is to have a certain composition.
D) to have a mind is to behave in a certain way.

Question 33

According to Thomas Nagel, mental states cannot be reduced to brain states because

A) we can know everything there is to know about the brain without knowing what it is like to be in a mental state.
B) We can know everything there is to know about the mind without knowing what it is like to have a brain.
C) We can know everything there is to know about bats without knowing how bats fly.
D) We can know everything there is to know about bats without knowing how bats see.

Question 34

According to strong AI, minds are to brains as

A) blood is to the heart.
B) bile is to the liver.
C) modems are to the Internet.
D) software is to hardware.

Question 35

Functionalists believe that in order to determine whether a computer has a mind, we must determine

A) whether it behaves like it has a mind.
B) whether it has a brain.
C) whether it has a soul.
D) whether it's inputs and outputs are similar to ours.

Question 36

Searle thinks that there must be more to having a mind than just running a program because

A) computers can run many programs at the same time.
B) humans can't run many programs at the same time.
C) something can run a program without knowing what its symbols mean.
D) something can run a program even though it's not alive.

Question 37

A philosophical zombie does not have

A) Sensations.
B) Emotions.
C) Beliefs.
D) All of the above.
E) None of the above.

Question 38

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of determining

A) Which brain states cause which mental states.
B) Which brain states produce what type of behavior.
C) Why brain states produce mental states.
D) Why brain states produce behavior.

Question 39

The inverted spectrum problem tries to show that being in a functional state

A) is not sufficient for being in a mental state.
B) is not necessary for being in a mental state.
C) is not a relevant condition for being in a mental state.
D) is not a significant condition for being in a mental state.

Question 40

The Turing test was intended to indicate whether

A) computers can speak.
B) computers can think.
C) computers can feel.
D) computers can act.

Question 41

Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment is designed to indicate whether passing the Turing test

A) requires intelligence.
B) requires understanding.
C) requires a knowledge of semantics.
D) all of these.
E) none of these.

Question 42

The intentional content of a mental state is

A) what it is trying to accomplish.
B) what it contains.
C) what it is about.
D) what it is made of.

Question 43

Eliminative materialists maintain that

A) there are no material objects.
B) there are no abstract objects.
C) there are no physical states.
D) there are no mental states.

Question 44

For which theory of mind is an inverted spectrum a problem?

A) Cartesian dualism.
B) Identity theory.
C) Behaviorism.
D) Functionalism.

Question 45

Folk psychology is the view that

A) most folks need psychological help.
B) most psychological problems are caused by other folks.
C) actions can be explained in terms of beliefs and desires.
D) actions can be explained in terms of reward and punishment.

Question 46

If physicalism were TRUE, which of the following would not be TRUE?

A) only physical objects would exist
B) only physical facts would be TRUE
C) no physical objects would exist
D) no physical facts would be FALSE

Question 47

According to eliminative materialism, zombies (creatures with no feelings) could

A) take over the world.
B) do everything we can do.
C) form a rock group.
D) all of these.
E) none of these.

Question 48

Who said, "[T]here is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible."

A) Rene Descartes.
B) John Locke.
C) Hilary Putnam.
D) Gilbert Ryle.

Question 49

The "Chinese room" thought experiment is supposed to discredit which theory?

A) Intentionality.
B) Strong AI.
C) Weak AI.
D) Eliminative materialism.

Question 50

The doctrine that "there's nothing in the intellect that wasn't first in the senses" was accepted by

A) the rationalists.
B) Socrates.
C) the empiricists.
D) Descartes.

Question 51

Who wrote, "I am, I exist, is necessarily TRUE each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it."

A) Rene Descartes.
B) David Hume.
C) Gottfried Leibniz.
D) Baruch Spinoza.

Question 52

Materialism has trouble accounting for

A) the interaction of mind and body.
B) the existence of physical objects.
C) the existence of consciousness.
D) the existence of motion.

Question 53

In the second meditation, Descartes concludes that he is a thing that thinks because

A) he is a rationalist.
B) he is an empiricist.
C) he can doubt that he has a body.
D) he cannot doubt that he has a mind.

Question 54

According to logical behaviorism, all talk about mental states is really talk about

A) brain states.
B) the unconscious.
C) behavioral dispositions.
D) behavioral propositions.

Question 55

In the philosophy of mind, "qualia" refers to

A) high-quality thinking.
B) qualities possessed by brains.
C) qualities possessed by computers.
D) what it feels like to be in a mental state.

Question 56

Panpsychism may be TRUE because

A) everything is one.
B) God is everywhere.
C) the mental is not reducible to the physical.
D) the physical is not reducible to the mental.

Question 57

Descartes' Mechanical Moron thought experiment is intended to show that

A) human beings are not mere machines.
B) human beings are just bodies.
C) some machines are more intelligent than human beings.
D) human beings are mere machines.

Question 58

Leibniz's Mental Mill thought experiment is intended to show that

A) it's possible to provide a mechanical account of the mind.
B) thinking machines are impossible.
C) an understanding of nerve cells will yield an understanding of the mind.
D) it's impossible to provide a mechanical account of the mind.

Question 59

Ryle's University Seeker thought experiment is intended to show that

A) minds exist in the same way that bodies do.
B) minds are not simply complex patterns of behavior.
C) minds, like universities, are simply complex patterns of behavior.
D) the "ghost in the machine" is an accurate description of the mind-body relationship.

Question 60

The Perfect Pretender thought experiment is intended to show that

A) mental states do not exist.
B) having the right behavioral dispositions is not sufficient for being in a mental state.
C) to have behavioral dispositions is to have a mind.
D) having the right behavioral dispositions is sufficient for being in a mental state.

Question 61

Putnam's Super-Spartans thought experiment is intended to show that

A) no one can be in pain without behaving as if in pain.
B) being in pain requires behaving in a certain way.
C) being in pain doesn't require behaving in a certain way.
D) being in pain and acting as if in pain are the same thing.

Question 62

Nagel's Bat thought experiment is intended to show that

A) mental states cannot be identical to physical states.
B) it's possible to know everything about the mind by knowing everything about the brain.
C) mental states are identical to brain states.
D) mental states are behavioral states.

Question 63

Lewis's Pained Martian thought experiment is intended to show that

A) to have a mind is to have a brain.
B) having a brain is necessary for having a mind.
C) minds do not exist.
D) having a brain is not necessary for having a mind.

Question 64

Putnam's Conscious Computer thought experiment is intended to show that

A) identifying a mental state with its physical or chemical realization is absurd.
B) facts about mental states suggest that mental states are sophisticated illusions.
C) identifying a mental state with its physical or chemical realization is a reasonable supposition.
D) identifying a mental state with its physical or chemical realization is not at all absurd.

Question 65

Searle's Brain Replacement thought experiment is intended to show that

A) both the identity theory and logical behaviorism are mistaken.
B) the identity theory is unfounded, but logical behaviorism is TRUE.
C) both the identity theory and logical behaviorism are TRUE.
D) neurons function like artificial devises.

Question 66

The Your Mother, the Zombie thought experiment is intended to show that

A) behaviorism is a viable theory.
B) dualism, identity theory, and functionalism are questionable theories.
C) dualism, identity theory, and functionalism are plausible theories.
D) functionalism is as good a theory as behaviorism.

Question 67

Lewis's Pained Madman thought experiment is intended to show that

A) it's possible to be in a mental state without being in any particular functional state.
B) functionalism is TRUE.
C) it's not possible to be in a mental state without being in a particular functional state.
D) identity theory is a better theory than functionalism.

Question 68

Block's Chinese Nation thought experiment is intended to show that

A) functionalism can account for the mind's qualitative content.
B) a billion Chinese can constitute a mind.
C) functionalism is plausible.
D) functionalism is implausible.

Question 69

Putnam's Inverted Spectrum thought experiment is intended to show that

A) only a particular kind of functional state can produce qualitative content.
B) mental states are functional states.
C) having a certain functional organization is not a sufficient condition for being in a certain mental state.
D) having a certain functional organization is a sufficient condition for being in a certain mental state.

Question 70

The Imitation Game thought experiment is intended to show that

A) Turing thinks all computers are intelligent.
B) passing the Turing Test proves that you are human.
C) Turing thinks that anything that can use language like we do must be intelligent.
D) Turing thinks being able to use language has nothing to do intelligence.

Question 71

Block's Conversational Jukebox thought experiment is intended to show that

A) there's more to being intelligent than simply producing the right output relative to a given input.
B) Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment proves nothing.
C) the conversational Jukebox can have mental states.
D) No one has mental states.

Question 72

Rorty's Demons thought experiment is intended to show that

A) mental states are more real than physical states.
B) to talk about mental states is to talk about physical states.
C) someday the advance of scientific knowledge may show that there are no mental states.
D) mental states affect behavior.

Question 73

Jackson's Color-Challenged Scientist thought experiment is intended to show that

A) if you know the physical facts about the world, you have complete knowledge of the world.
B) a complete knowledge of all the physical facts about the world would not give you a complete knowledge of the world.
C) reductive materialism is TRUE.
D) there are no nonphysical things or properties.

Question 74

Chalmer's Zombies thought experiment is intended to show that

A) Chalmers's zombies are inconceivable.
B) mental properties can be explained in terms of physical properties.
C) mental properties cannot be explained in terms of physical properties.
D) substance dualism is the best explanation of conscious experience.

Question 75

Jacquette's Intentionality Test thought experiment is intended to show that

A) the intentional content of mental states is reducible to physical or functional properties.
B) intentionality is not a primitive property.
C) what our thoughts are about is determined by features of them other than their intentionality.
D) what our thoughts are about is not determined by any feature of them other than their intentionality.

Question 76

A Cartesian dualist believes that the mind is dependent on the body.

Question 77

Descartes was an idealist, because he believed that all reality is mental.

Question 78

According to Descartes, it's impossible to conceive of existing without a body.

Question 79

According to Descartes, minds cannot be divided.

Question 80

Descartes argues that mental states cannot possibly be physical states.