Deck 12: The Volunteers Dilemma: a Collective Inaction Problem

Question 1

A situation in which a single individual can provide a public good is known as

A) a monopoly.
B) the volunteer's dilemma.
C) eminent domain.
D) diffusion of responsibility.

Answer 1

the volunteer's dilemma.

Question 2

When your professor asks a question that everyone in the class knows the answer to, yet no one raises his or her hand to answer the question, this is an example of what economists call

A) flying under the radar.
B) shirking responsibility.
C) the volunteer's dilemma.
D) a game of chicken.

Answer 2

the volunteer's dilemma.

Question 3

All of the following are examples of the volunteer's dilemma except which one?

A) You are trying to decide whether to spend time volunteering at a local homeless shelter or at a neighborhood elementary school.
B) You, along with a dozen other drivers, witness a car accident. You cannot decide whether to dial 911 or let one of the other witnesses dial 911 instead.
C) Five high school students are contemplating sneaking out of school after lunch. One student has to create a diversion that will get him sent to detention in order for the others to escape unseen.
D) A house is on fire and there may be someone still inside. Who will go inside the burning house to attempt to rescue the potential victim?

Answer 3

You are trying to decide whether to spend time volunteering at a local homeless shelter or at a neighborhood elementary school.

Question 4

Mamihlapinatapai is a one-word summary of the volunteer's dilemma from

A) Buddhist monks in Thailand.
B) ancient Hawaii.
C) the Maasai tribe of Tanzania.
D) the Yaghan Indians.

Question 5

When Major League Baseball players were awarded the right of free agency, no player had to give up their own free agency in order for someone else to get it, and no one could be excluded from free agency. These two characteristics of free agency demonstrate that it meets the criteria of a

A) pure public good.
B) club good.
C) common pool resource.
D) pure private good.

Question 6

A situation in which a single individual can provide a private good is known as the volunteer's dilemma.

Question 7

Because a public good creates benefits everyone shares, individuals are generally very willing to bear the cost of providing the good.

Question 8

Explain how the volunteer's dilemma is a special case of the public goods problem in which the possibility exists that no one will end up providing the public good.

Question 9

Pluralistic ignorance exists when

A) the members of a group believe one thing but mistakenly assume that most of the other members believe something else.
B) a group of bystanders all agree that something needs to be done but each feels less personal responsibility for taking action because each perceives that there are others who could take action.
C) a majority of people in a group do not have the intellectual capacity of arriving at a viable solution to a public goods problem.
D) the least-capable member of a group exerts his influence over the rest of the group when trying to arrive at a decision on how to internalize an externality.

Question 10

Jeremiah is not a fan of the ballet, but he believes that his friends all enjoy the cultural experience that ballet brings and he does not want to appear unsophisticated. Unbeknownst to Jeremiah, all of his friends share the same opinion of the ballet as he does, and none of them want to appear unsophisticated to the rest of the group. This results in the entire group of friends attending a production of Swan Lake, a production none of the friends actually had any desire to attend. This is an example of

A) diffusion of responsibility.
B) dysfunctional family syndrome.
C) pluralistic ignorance.
D) a prisoner's dilemma.

Question 11

Diffusion of responsibility exists when

A) the members of a group believe one thing but mistakenly assume that most of the other members believe something else.
B) a group of bystanders all agree that something needs to be done but each feels less personal responsibility for taking action because each perceives that there are others who could take action.
C) a majority of people in a group do not have the intellectual capacity of arriving at a viable solution to a public goods problem.
D) the least-capable member of a group exerts his influence over the rest of the group when trying to arrive at a decision on how to internalize an externality.

Question 12

With respect to diffusion of responsibility,

A) the larger the group, the more likely that any one individual will act.
B) the larger the group, the less likely that any one individual will act.
C) the size of the group has no bearing on the likelihood of any one individual to act.
D) individuals are likely to take no action only if the group of individuals is small.

Question 13

The instructor of your wine tasting class trips and falls while discussing the merits of spitting out the wine samples after you have tasted them instead of swallowing them, so as not to get inebriated during the class. You are afraid that he might have hurt himself in the fall, but since no one else in the class is rushing up to help him, you mistakenly believe that the rest of the class thinks the instructor is trying to prove a point about drinking too much in the class. You therefore doubt your own judgement and decide to also not get up to help the instructor back to his feet. This is an example of

A) diffusion of responsibility.
B) pluralistic ignorance.
C) mob mentality.
D) passing the buck.

Question 14

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. What is the probability of Simon trying to rescue the man and Paula not helping?

A) 9%
B) 21%
C) 49%
D) 70%

Question 15

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. What is the probability of Paula trying to rescue the man and Simon not helping?

A) 9%
B) 21%
C) 49%
D) 70%

Question 16

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. What is the probability of both Simon and Paula trying to rescue the man?

A) 9%
B) 21%
C) 49%
D) 70%

Question 17

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. What is the probability of either Simon, Paula, or both of them trying to rescue the man?

A) 9%
B) 49%
C) 70%
D) 91%

Question 18

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. What is the probability of neither Simon nor Paula trying to rescue the man?

A) 9%
B) 21%
C) 30%
D) 49%

Question 19

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. Suppose that a third friend, Ryan, joins Simon and Paula on their way home from school, and this reduces the probability of any particular individual from stepping forward to help the man being attacked from 70% to 60%. What is the probability of either Simon, Paula, Ryan, or any combination of the three trying to rescue the man?

A) 21.6%
B) 50.4%
C) 72.0%
D) 93.6%

Question 20

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. Suppose that a third friend, Ryan, joins Simon and Paula on their way home from school, and this reduces the probability of any particular individual from stepping forward to help the man being attacked from 70% to 60%. What is the probability of none of the three people trying to rescue the man?

A) 6.4%
B) 28.0%
C) 49.6%
D) 78.4%

Question 21

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. Suppose that a third friend, Ryan, joins Simon and Paula on their way home from school, and this reduces the probability of any particular individual from stepping forward to help the man being attacked from 70% to 60%. In this case, the ________ and the the man's chance of being rescued ________ because of Ryan joining the group.

A) size effect outweighed the diffusion effect; increased
B) size effect outweighed the diffusion effect; decreased
C) diffusion effect outweighed the size effect; increased
D) diffusion effect outweighed the size effect; decreased

Question 22

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. Suppose that a third friend, Ryan, joins Simon and Paula on their way home from school, and this reduces the probability of any particular individual from stepping forward to help the man being attacked from 70% to 40%. What is the probability of either Simon, Paula, Ryan, or any combination of the three trying to rescue the man?

A) 28.8%
B) 49.6%
C) 78.4%
D) 93.6%

Question 23

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. Suppose that a third friend, Ryan, joins Simon and Paula on their way home from school, and this reduces the probability of any particular individual from stepping forward to help the man being attacked from 70% to 40%. What is the probability of none of the three people trying to rescue the man?

A) 6.4%
B) 21.6%
C) 50.4%
D) 71.2%

Question 24

Scenario 12.1 : Simon and Paula are walking home from school and come across a man being attacked by a crazed miniature poodle. It takes only one of them to save the man from the poodle, but since responsibility is diffuse, each is only 70% likely to try to rescue the man.

-Refer to Scenario 12.1. Suppose that a third friend, Ryan, joins Simon and Paula on their way home from school, and this reduces the probability of any particular individual from stepping forward to help the man being attacked from 70% to 40%. In this case, the ________ and the the man's chance of being rescued ________ because of Ryan joining the group.

A) size effect outweighed the diffusion effect; increased
B) size effect outweighed the diffusion effect; decreased
C) diffusion effect outweighed the size effect; increased
D) diffusion effect outweighed the size effect; decreased

Question 25

The positive effect of having more potential volunteers resulting in a greater likelihood of a beneficial outcome is known as the

A) diffusion effect.
B) externalizing effect.
C) group dynamic effect.
D) size effect.

Question 26

The negative effect of having more potential volunteers resulting in a reduced likelihood of a beneficial outcome is known as the

A) diffusion effect.
B) externalizing effect.
C) group dynamic effect.
D) size effect.

Question 27

Pluralistic ignorance exists when the members of a group believe one thing but mistakenly assume that most of the other members believe something else.

Question 28

The larger the group, the more diffuse responsibility is.

Question 29

The positive effect of having more potential volunteers resulting in a greater likelihood of a beneficial outcome is known as the diffusion effect.

Question 30

The size effect and the diffusion effect always occur in isolation.

Question 31

With respect to diffusion of responsibility, the diffusion effect is always greater than the size effect.

Question 32

There is a man yelling for help on a crowded subway platform. What are two reasons that the man may not get the help he needs?

Question 33

What happens to the likelihood of a volunteer being found as the group of potential volunteers grows if the diffusion effect is greater than the size effect?

Question 34

Three potential rescuers witness a drowning surfer. Each is willing to rescue the surfer with probability 0.80. What is the probability that the surfer is rescued?

Question 35

A game in which one player's winnings equal the other player's losings is called a

A) tit-for-tat game.
B) all-or-nothing game.
C) fair-and-balanced game.
D) zero-sum game.

Question 36

When playing a game, a pure strategy refers to

A) a strategy that does not allow any players to cheat.
B) the best possible strategy that can be played, given other players' strategies.
C) using the same strategy time after time.
D) the only possible winning strategy.

Question 37

When playing a game in which players are in direct competition with one another, it is best to ________ a pure strategy because the strategy is ________.

A) use; predictable
B) use; unpredictable
C) avoid; predictable
D) avoid; unpredictable

Question 38

When playing a game, a mixed strategy refers to

A) randomly selecting a strategy.
B) consistently alternating between two strategies each time a game is played.
C) never playing the same strategy twice in a row.
D) never playing the same strategy more than once.

Question 39

When playing a game in which players are in direct competition with one another, it is best to ________ a mixed strategy because the strategy is ________.

A) use; predictable
B) use; unpredictable
C) avoid; predictable
D) avoid; unpredictable

Question 40

Kyle and Stan are playing Odds or Evens, where Kyle is designated as the "odd"player and Stan is designated as the "even"player. They decide to play the game 10 times. If Kyle adopts a pure strategy of "shoot 2,"Stan should

A) also adopt a pure strategy of "shoot 2."
B) adopt a pure strategy of "shoot 1."
C) adopt a mixed strategy of "shoot 1" 50% of the time and "shoot 2" 50% of the time.
D) adopt a mixed strategy of "shoot 1" more than 50% of the time and "shoot 2" less than 50% of the time.

Question 41

Kyle and Stan are playing Odds or Evens, where Kyle is designated as the "odd"player and Stan is designated as the "even"player. They decide to play the game 10 times. If Kyle changes from a pure strategy of "shoot 2"and decides to "shoot 1"in two of the games, Stan would be best off if he

A) stuck with a pure strategy of "shoot 2."
B) switched to a pure strategy of "shoot 1."
C) stuck with a mixed strategy of "shoot 1" 50% of the time and "shoot 2" 50% of the time.
D) switched to a mixed strategy of "shoot 1" more than 50% of the time and "shoot 2" less than 50% of the time.

Question 42

Kyle and Stan are playing Odds or Evens, where Kyle is designated as the "odd"player and Stan is designated as the "even"player. They decide to play the game 10 times. If Kyle changes from a pure strategy of "shoot 2"and decides to "shoot 1"in seven of the games, Stan would be best off if he

A) switched to a pure strategy of "shoot 2."
B) switched to a pure strategy of "shoot 1."
C) switched to a mixed strategy of "shoot 1" 50% of the time and "shoot 2" 50% of the time.
D) switched to a mixed strategy of "shoot 1" less than 50% of the time and "shoot 2" more than 50% of the time.

Question 43

Kyle and Stan are playing Odds or Evens, where Kyle is designated as the "odd"player and Stan is designated as the "even"player. They decide to play the game 10 times. Kyle's ideal mixture is to

A) "shoot 1" every time since he is the "odd" player.
B) "shoot 2" every time since Stan is the "even" player.
C) "shoot 1" 50% of the time and "shoot 2" 50% of the time.
D) Kyle's ideal mixture depends on Stan's ideal mixture.

Question 44

Kyle and Stan are playing Odds or Evens, where Kyle is designated as the "odd"player and Stan is designated as the "even"player. They decide to play the game 10 times. Stan's ideal mixture is to

A) "shoot 1" every time since Kyle is the "odd" player.
B) "shoot 2" every time since he is the "even" player.
C) "shoot 1" 50% of the time and "shoot 2" 50% of the time.
D) Stan's ideal mixture depends on Kyle's ideal mixture.

Question 45

Kyle and Stan are playing Odds or Evens, where Kyle is designated as the "odd"player and Stan is designated as the "even"player. They decide to play the game 10 times. If Kyle plays his ideal mixture, Stan's expected payoff is zero when he

A) plays a pure strategy of "shoot 1."
B) plays a pure strategy of "shoot 2."
C) plays his ideal strategy.
D) All of the above are correct.

Question 46

Kyle and Stan are playing Odds or Evens, where Kyle is designated as the "odd"player and Stan is designated as the "even"player. They decide to play the game 10 times. If Stan plays his ideal mixture, Kyle's expected payoff is zero when he

A) plays a pure strategy of "shoot 1."
B) plays a pure strategy of "shoot 2."
C) plays his ideal strategy.
D) All of the above are correct.

Question 47

Kyle and Stan are playing Odds or Evens, where Kyle is designated as the "odd"player and Stan is designated as the "even"player. They decide to play the game 10 times. The mixed-strategy equilibrium in this zero-sum game occurs when

A) each player plays a pure strategy.
B) one player plays a pure strategy and the other plays a mixed strategy.
C) both players play their ideal mixtures.
D) There is never an equilibrium in a zero-sum game.

Question 48

Kyle and Stan are playing Odds or Evens, where Kyle is designated as the "odd"player and Stan is designated as the "even"player. They decide to play the game 10 times. At the mixed-strategy equilibrium in this zero-sum game,

A) each player's expected payoff equals zero.
B) one player earns all possible points and the other player earns zero points.
C) one player's payoff is positive and the other player's payoff is negative.
D) There is never an equilibrium in a zero-sum game.

Question 49

In a zero-sum game, one player's winnings equal the other player's losses.

Question 50

When players are in direct competition with one another, they should avoid using a pure strategy.

Question 51

When players are in direct competition with one another, playing a mixed strategy leads to more predictable results than playing a pure strategy.

Question 52

When both players in a zero-sum game play their ideal strategies, the expected payoff for each player is zero.

Question 53

Betty and Veronica are playing Odds or Evens, where Betty is designated as the "odd"player and Veronica is designated as the "even"player. They decide to play the game 10 times. If Betty adopts a pure strategy of "shoot 1,"what strategy should Veronica adopt to maximize her payoff?

Question 54

Explain what it means to have a mixed-strategy equilibrium in a zero-sum game. What happens if a player deviates from this mixed-strategy equilibrium?

Question 55

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. In this game, there is (are)

A) 4 Nash equilibria.
B) 2 Nash equilibria.
C) 1 Nash equilibrium.
D) zero Nash equilibria.

Question 56

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. In this game, Jerome's tough strategy would lead to his preferred equilibrium of

A) Eliza donates a kidney and Jerome does not.
B) both Eliza and Jerome donate a kidney.
C) Jerome donates a kidney and Eliza does not.
D) neither Eliza nor Jerome donates a kidney.

Question 57

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. In this game, Eliza's tough strategy would lead to her preferred equilibrium of

A) Eliza donates a kidney and Jerome does not.
B) both Eliza and Jerome donate a kidney.
C) Jerome donates a kidney and Eliza does not.
D) neither Eliza nor Jerome donates a kidney.

Question 58

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. In this game, if the players successfully coordinate and Jerome ends up playing his weak strategy, then

A) Eliza will donate a kidney and Jerome will not donate.
B) both Eliza and Jerome will donate a kidney.
C) Jerome will donate a kidney and Eliza will not donate.
D) neither Eliza nor Jerome will donate a kidney.

Question 59

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. In this game, if the players successfully coordinate and Eliza ends up playing her weak strategy, then

A) Eliza will donate a kidney and Jerome will not donate.
B) both Eliza and Jerome will donate a kidney.
C) Jerome will donate a kidney and Eliza will not donate.
D) neither Eliza nor Jerome will donate a kidney.

Question 60

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. In this game, if both players end up playing their weak strategies, then

A) Eliza will donate a kidney and Jerome will not donate.
B) both Eliza and Jerome will donate a kidney.
C) Jerome will donate a kidney and Eliza will not donate.
D) neither Eliza nor Jerome will donate a kidney.

Question 61

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. In this game, if both players end up playing their tough strategies, then

A) Eliza will donate a kidney and Jerome will not donate.
B) both Eliza and Jerome will donate a kidney.
C) Jerome will donate a kidney and Eliza will not donate.
D) neither Eliza nor Jerome will donate a kidney.

Question 62

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. The ideal mixed strategy for Eliza has her donating her kidney with ________ probability.

A) 15%
B) 25%
C) 45%
D) 75%

Question 63

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. The ideal mixed strategy for Jerome has Jerome waiting for Eliza to donate her kidney with ________ probability.

A) 25%
B) 55%
C) 75%
D) 85%

Question 64

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. If each player plays an ideal mixed strategy, then both will donate a kidney about ________ of the time.

A) 6.25%
B) 12.5%
C) 37.5%
D) 50%

Question 65

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. If each player plays an ideal mixed strategy, then either Jerome or Eliza, but not both, will donate a kidney about ________ of the time.

A) 6.25%
B) 12.5%
C) 37.5%
D) 56.25%

Question 66

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. If each player plays an ideal mixed strategy, then neither Jerome nor Eliza will donate a kidney about ________ of the time.

A) 6.25%
B) 12.5%
C) 37.5%
D) 56.25%

Question 67

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.

-Refer to Scenario 12.2. This scenario has the characteristics of what game structure?

A) prisoner's dilemma
B) pure coordination
C) chicken
D) assurance

Question 68

In the organ donation game, donating an organ is a tough strategy.

Question 69

One feature of the volunteer's dilemma is that as the group gets larger, individuals in the group are less likely to volunteer.

Question 70

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.
-Refer to Scenario 12.2. Explain why the situation described in the scenario is neither a prisoner's dilemma nor a battle of the sexes.

Question 71

Scenario 12.2: Shari needs a kidney, and her two friends, Jerome and Eliza, are both good potential donors. If Shari gets a kidney, she will live and each of her two friends will get 8,000 units of satisfaction. If Shari does not get a kidney, she will die and each of her friends will get no satisfaction. The cost of donating a kidney totals - 6,000 units of satisfaction.
-Refer to Scenario 12.2. This scenario describes a volunteer's dilemma. Explain what would likely happen if the pool of potential kidney donors increased from 2 friends (Jerome and Eliza) to 4 friends in terms of the likelihood of any one person volunteering to donate a kidney and in terms of the likelihood that no one at all would donate a kidney.

Question 72

With limited exceptions, all Israeli citizens over the age of 18 are required to serve in the Israeli military. This is an example of

A) compulsory volunteerism.
B) coalition building.
C) bargaining.
D) eminent domain.

Question 73

Laws in some countries require bystanders to come to the aid of people in mortal danger. This legal obligation is called

A) compulsory volunteerism.
B) judicial discretion.
C) the duty to rescue.
D) eminent domain.

Question 74

The compulsory military service in the United States which was required from 1940 until 1973 was known as the draft.

Question 75

With coalition building and bargaining, transactions costs are higher the larger number of people involved.