Deck 12: Choices Involving Strategy

Question 1

Refer to Figures b and c.Given the rules of the game described in problem 17,what is Kate's dominant strategy?

A) Squeal
B) Deny
C) She does not have one
D) It depends upon what Alice does

Answer 1

Squeal

Question 2

Refer to Figure a.Given the game described in problem 9,if Charlie knows Joe always throws scissors,what is Charlie's best response?

A) Rock
B) Paper
C) Scissors
D) Cannot be determined

Answer 2

Rock

Question 3

A player's best response is

A) A strategy that provides him with a minimum payoff, assuming that other players behave in a specified way
B) A strategy that provides him with the highest possible payoff, assuming that other players behave in a specified way
C) A strategy that provides him with some payoff defined by a probability
D) None of these

Answer 3

A strategy that provides him with the highest possible payoff, assuming that other players behave in a specified way

Question 4

Refer to Figure a.Charlie and Joe both want to ride shotgun with their mother,so they play a game of rock-paper-scissors to determine who gets to sit in the front seat.If -1 represents a loss,1 a win and 0 a tie and Joe's payoff is shown in the upper left-hand corner of each cell,while Charlie's appears in the lower right-hand corner,which set of rules is illustrated in the following payoff matrix?

A) Rock tears paper, paper covers scissors, scissors clip rock
B) Rock crushes scissors, scissors cuts paper, paper covers rock
C) Rock crushes scissors, scissors cuts paper, scissors clip rock
D) Rock tears paper, paper covers scissors, paper covers rock

Question 5

Refer to Figure a.Given the game described in problem 9,what is Charlie's dominant strategy?

A) Rock
B) Paper
C) Scissors
D) He does not have one

Question 6

Refer to Figures b and c.Given the rules of the game described in problem 17,what is Alice's best response?

A) Squeal
B) Deny
C) She does not have one
D) It depends upon what Alice does

Question 7

Refer to Figures b and c.Assume instead of the rules described in problem 13,the girls' mother shows favoritism towards Kate because she is the younger of the two girls.If both girls deny watching TV,Kate will not be punished,but Alice will still be grounded for 3 weeks because she is older and should be setting a good example for her younger sister.The altered game is shown in the following payoff matrix.What is Kate's best response?

A) Squeal
B) Deny
C) She does not have one
D) It depends upon what Alice does

Question 8

A strategy is weakly dominated if

A) There are no other strategies that yield higher payoffs, regardless of others' choices
B) There is some other strategy that yields a strictly higher payoff regardless of others' choices
C) There is some other strategy that yields a strictly higher payoff in some circumstances and that never yields a lower payoff regardless of others' choices
D) There is some other strategy that yields a strictly higher payoff in some circumstances and may yield a lower payoff, depending upon other players' choices

Question 9

Refer to Figure b.Given the game described in problem 13,what is Alice's dominant strategy?

A) Squeal
B) Deny
C) She does not have one
D) It depends upon what Alice does

Question 10

A game is

A) A situation in which each member of a group makes at least one decision and cares both about his own choice and about others' choices
B) Describes a situation in which strategy plays a role
C) Provides the foundation for understanding competition in industries with only a few producers
D) All of these

Question 11

Refer to Figure b.Kate and Alice are sisters with a very strict mother.The girls are not allowed to watch television during the day when their mother is at work.The mother comes home one day and knows at least one girl was watching the television because it is warm.She sends the girls to their separate bedrooms while she decides what to do.After giving it some thought,she decides to send a message to the naughty girls and offers them the following deal: if they both deny watching TV,they will each be grounded for 3 weeks; if one squeals on the other,but the other denies watching TV,the squealer is grounded for 2 weeks,while the denier is grounded for 10; if they both squeal,each is grounded for 6 weeks.The following payoff matrix illustrates the girls' dilemma,with Kate's payoff shown in the upper left-hand corner of each cell and Alice's in the lower right-hand corner.What is Kate's best response?

A) Squeal
B) Deny
C) She does not have one
D) It depends upon what Alice does

Question 12

Refer to Figures b and c.Given the rules of the game described in problem 17,what is Alice's dominant strategy?

A) Squeal
B) Deny
C) She does not have one
D) It depends upon what Alice does

Question 13

Refer to Figure b.Given the game described in problem 13,what is Kate's dominant strategy?

A) Squeal
B) Deny
C) She does not have one
D) It depends upon what Alice does

Question 14

A strategy is dominated if

A) There are no other strategies that yield higher payoffs, regardless of others' choices
B) There is some other strategy that yields a strictly higher payoff regardless of others' choices
C) There is some other strategy that yields a strictly higher payoff in some circumstances and that never yields a lower payoff regardless of others' choices
D) There is some other strategy that yields a strictly higher payoff in some circumstances and may yield a lower payoff, depending upon other players' choices

Question 15

Refer to Figure b.Given the game described in problem 13,what is Alice's best response?

A) Squeal
B) Deny
C) She does not have one
D) It depends upon what Alice does

Question 16

A strategy is dominant if

A) It is one of several best responses for a player, regardless of other players' choices
B) It is a player's only best response, given a particular choice of the other players
C) It is independent of other players' choices
D) It is a player's only best response, regardless of other players' choices

Question 17

The iterative deletion of dominated strategies refers to the following process:

A) Continue removing the weakly dominated strategies until there are no more weakly dominated strategies left to remove
B) Continue removing the dominant strategies until there are no more dominant strategies left to remove
C) Continue removing the dominated strategies until there are no more dominated strategies left to remove
D) Continue removing the best responses until there are no more best responses left to remove

Question 18

In a one-stage game

A) At least one participant observes a choice by another participant before making some decision
B) Each participant makes all of his choices before observing any choice by any other participant
C) At least one participant makes his choice before observing the choices made by other participants
D) One participant has full information of the other players' choices before making his choice

Question 19

In a multiple-stage game

A) At least one participant observes a choice by another participant before making some decision
B) Each participant makes all of his choices before observing any choice by any other participant
C) At least one participant makes his choice before observing the choices made by other participants
D) One participant has full information of the other players choices before making his choice

Question 20

Refer to Figure a.Given the game described in problem 9,if Joe knows Charlie knows he always throws scissors,what is Joe's best response?

A) Rock
B) Paper
C) Scissors
D) Cannot be determined

Question 21

Refer to Figure e.Brandon and Allie want to go on a date one summer evening.Allie is a Red Sox fan,while Brandon is a Mets fan.Both teams are playing that evening,but not against each other.Each would rather watch their team,neither can force the other to watch a particular game and each is willing to suffer through the other's game if it means time together.Figure e illustrates both Allie and Brandon's payoffs for each choice,with Allie's payoff in the southwest corner of each cell and Brandon's in the northwest corner.If Brandon watch the Mets,what is Allie's best response?

A) Watch the Red Sox
B) Watch the Mets
C) Neither; she is indifferent between the Red Sox and the Mets
D) To not consider Brandon's choice

Question 22

A player is playing a mixed strategy when

A) He chooses a rule to randomize over the choice of a strategy
B) He chooses a strategy without randomizing
C) There is no uncertainty in his choice
D) It is perfectly predictable

Question 23

Refer to Figure d.In the game described in problem 21,Darren's dominant strategy is

A) East
B) West
C) Neither east nor west because east is only weakly dominated
D) Both east and west

Question 24

Refer to Figure c.What is the Nash equilibrium in problem 17?

A) Kate squeal, Alice squeal
B) Kate deny, Alice deny
C) Kate squeal, Alice deny
D) Kate deny, Alice squeal

Question 25

In a mixed strategy equilibrium

A) A players' probabilities are chosen to make sure that he is indifferent
B) Players choose mixed strategies, but the mixed strategy chosen by each is not necessarily a best response to the mixed strategies chosen by the others
C) Players choose mixed strategies and the mixed strategy chosen by each is a best response to the mixed strategies chosen by the others
D) A and C

Question 26

Refer to Figure a.What is the Nash equilibrium in problem 9?

A) Charlie rock, Joe rock
B) Charlie rock, Joe paper
C) Charlie paper, Joe scissors
D) There is not one

Question 27

Refer to Figure d.In the game described in problem 21,for Travis,north is

A) The best response
B) The dominant strategy
C) Is weakly dominated
D) Dominated

Question 28

A best response function

A) Is also known as a reduction function
B) Is upward sloping if free riding occurs
C) Shows the relationship between a player's choice and another player's best response
D) Must be the same for all players in the game

Question 29

Refer to Figure d.What is the Nash equilibrium in problem 21?

A) Travis north, Darren east
B) Travis north, Darren west
C) Travis south, Darren east
D) Travis south, Darren west

Question 30

Refer to Figure d.The payoff matrix below illustrates a game played by Travis and Darren.Travis has two choices,north and south,while Darren's choices are east and west.Travis's payoffs are shown in the lower right-hand corner of each cell and Darren's are in the upper left-hand corner.For Darren,east is

A) The best response
B) The dominant strategy
C) Is weakly dominated
D) Dominated

Question 31

Refer to Figure b.What is the Nash equilibrium in problem 13?

A) Kate squeal, Alice squeal
B) Kate deny, Alice deny
C) Kate squeal, Alice deny
D) Kate deny, Alice squeal

Question 32

Refer to Figure e.If Allie watches the Red Sox,what is Brandon's best response?

A) Watch the Red Sox
B) Watch the Mets
C) Neither; she is indifferent between the Red Sox and the Mets
D) To not consider Allie's choice

Question 33

Refer to Figure e.What is the Nash equilibrium?

A) The only Nash equilibrium occurs when Allie watches the Red Sox, Brandon watches the Mets
B) The only Nash equilibrium occurs when Allie and Brandon both watch the Red Sox
C) The only Nash equilibrium occurs when Allie and Brandon both watch the Mets
D) There is more than one Nash equilibrium.

Question 34

Refer to Figure e.If Brandon watches the Red Sox,what is Allie's best response?

A) Watch the Red Sox
B) Watch the Mets
C) Neither; she is indifferent between the Red Sox and the Mets
D) To not consider Brandon's choice

Question 35

A player is playing a pure strategy when

A) He chooses a rule to randomize over the choice of a strategy
B) He chooses a strategy without randomizing
C) There is uncertainty in his choice
D) It is not perfectly predictable

Question 36

In a Nash equilibrium

A) The strategy played by an individual depends upon the strategy played by other players
B) The strategy played by each individual is a best response to the strategies played by everyone else
C) There is no incentive for any player to deviate
D) All of these

Question 37

Free riding

A) Cannot occur if strategizing takes place
B) Is reflected by a downward sloping best response function
C) Is reflected by an upward sloping best response function
D) Is no player's best response

Question 38

Refer to Figure d.In the game described in problem 21,Travis's dominant strategy is

A) North
B) South
C) East
D) West

Question 39

Refer to Figure e.If Allie watches the Mets,what is Brandon's best response?

A) Watch the Red Sox
B) Watch the Mets
C) Neither; she is indifferent between the Red Sox and the Mets
D) To not consider Allie's choice

Question 40

A self-enforcing agreement

A) In an incentive compatible agreement
B) Requires a contract
C) Is not a Nash equilibrium
D) Is not mutually agreeable

Question 41

Playing the equilibrium of a one-stage game over and over again when the one-stage game is repeated is

A) Always a Nash equilibrium
B) Only a Nash equilibrium if the game is finite
C) Only a Nash equilibrium if the game is infinite
D) Dominated in some cases

Question 42

Playing the equilibrium of a one-stage game over and over again when the one-stage game is repeated is

A) Always a Nash equilibrium
B) Dominated in some cases
C) Weakly dominated in some cases
D) Weakly dominated in all cases

Question 43

Dean and Kennedy are playing a single stage game.Each simultaneously chooses either 1 or 2.If they both select 1,Dean pays Kennedy $2.If they both pick 2,Dean pays Kennedy $4.If they select different numbers,Kennedy pays Dean $3.Draw a table showing the two players' strategies and payoffs.Are any strategies dominant? Weakly dominant? Dominated? Solve for a mixed strategy equilibrium.

Question 44

Equilibrium in a repeated one-stage game

A) Requires cooperation
B) Does not require cooperation
C) Can only be found if the game is finite
D) Can only be found if the game is infinite

Question 45

Cooperation

A) Is sustained by the threat of punishment for bad behavior
B) Is sustained by the promise of punishment for good behavior
C) Can be established even if threats/promises are not credible
D) All of these

Question 46

Use the concepts of reputation and asymmetric information to explain why some faculty members become less productive after gaining tenure.

Question 47

Which of the following is a game of perfect information?

A) Chess
B) Poker
C) Rock-paper-scissors
D) Chicken

Question 48

Cooperation in an infinite game

A) Is impossible
B) Is possible if grim strategies are used
C) Is guaranteed
D) Is possible if no one cares about the future

Question 49

John Nash shared the Nobel Prize in Economics with

A) John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selton
B) Reinhard Selton
C) Robert Auman and Reinhard Selton
D) Milton Friedman

Question 50

Cooperation

A) Is individually rational
B) Fails when the temptation to cheat is sufficiently strong
C) Eliminates the temptation to cheat
D) Is always the best response

Question 51

Cooperation

A) Is sustained by the threat of punishment for bad behavior
B) Is sustained by the promise of reward for good behavior
C) Will fail to be established if threats/promises are not credible
D) All of these

Question 52

A repeated game

A) Can be finite or infinite
B) Is formed by playing a simpler game many times in succession
C) Is a multiple-stage game
D) All of these