
Business 8th Edition by Marianne Jennings
Edition 8ISBN: 978-1285428710
Business 8th Edition by Marianne Jennings
Edition 8ISBN: 978-1285428710 Exercise 2
Pattern Makers' League of North America , AFL-CIO v NLRB
473 U.S. 95 (1985)
You Can't Make Me Strike If I Want to Work
Facts
The Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO, provides in its constitution that union members may not resign during a strike or when a strike is imminent. The league fined ten of its members who, in violation of this provision, resigned during a strike and returned to work. The NLRB held that the union rule violated section 8(b) of the NLRA, which provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed herein...."
The union rule (League Law 13) provides: "No resignation or withdrawal from an Association or from the League shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout appears imminent."
The U.S. court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the board's order. The league appealed.
Judicial Opinion
POWELL, Justice
Section 7 of (the NLRA) grants employees the right to "refrain from any or all (concerted) activities." The general right is implemented by § 8(b)(a)(A). The latter section provides that a union commits an unfair labor practice if it "restrains or coerces employees in the exercise" of their § 7 rights. When employee members of a union refuse to support a strike (whether or not a rule prohibits returning to work during a strike), they are refraining from "concerted activity." Therefore, imposing fines on these employees for returning to work "restrains" the exercise of their § 7 rights. Indeed, if the terms "refrain" and "restrain or coerce" are interpreted literally, fining employees to enforce compliance with any union rule or policy would violate the Act.
Language and reasoning from other opinions of this Court confirm that the Board's construction of § 8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable. Tn Scofield v NLRB , 394 U.S. 423 (1969), the Court upheld a union rule setting a ceiling on the daily wages that members working on an incentive basis could earn. The union members' freedom to resign was critical to the Court's decision that the union rule did not "restrain or coerce" the employees within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(A).
The decision in NLRB v Textile Workers , 409 U.S. 213 (1972) also supports the Board's view that Section 8 prohibits unions from punishing members not free to resign. There, thirty-one employees resigned their union membership and resumed working during a strike. We held that fining these former members "restrained or coerced" them. In reaching this conclusion, we said "the vitality of Section 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May"
League Law 13 curtails (the) freedom to resign from full union membership. Nevertheless, the petitioners (League) contend that League Law 13 does not contravene the policy of voluntary unionism imbedded in the Act. They assert that this provision does not interfere with workers' employment rights because offending members are not discharged, but only fined. We find this argument unpersuasive, for a union has not left a "worker's employment rights inviolate when it exacts (his entire) paycheck in satisfaction of a fine imposed for working." Congress in 1947 (with the Taft-Hartley Act) sought to eliminate completely any requirement that the employee maintain full union membership. Therefore, the Board was justified in concluding that by restricting the right of employees to resign, League Law 13 impairs the policy of voluntary unionism.
Petitioners... argue that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) expressly allows unions to place restrictions on the right to resign.
Neither the Board nor this Court has ever interpreted the proviso as allowing unions to make rules restricting the right to resign. Rather, the Court has assumed that "rules with respect to the... retention of membership" are those that provide for expulsion of employees from the union. Accordingly, we find no basis for refusing to defer to the Board's conclusion that League Law 13 is not a "rule with respect to the retention of membership" within the meaning of the proviso.
The petitioners next argue that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that Congress made a considered decision not to protect union members' right to resign.
The legislative history does not support this contention. The "right to resign" apparently was included in the original House bill to protect workers unable to resign because of "closed shop" agreements. Union constitutions limiting the right to resign were uncommon in 1947.
The Board has the primary responsibility for applying "the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life." Where the Board's construction of the Act is reasonable, it should not be rejected.... [T]he Board has consistently construed § 8(b)(1)(A) as prohibiting the imposition of fines on employees who have tendered resignations invalid under a union constitution. Therefore we conclude that the Board's decision here is entitled to our deference.
Affirmed.
What union rule is at issue?
473 U.S. 95 (1985)
You Can't Make Me Strike If I Want to Work
Facts
The Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO, provides in its constitution that union members may not resign during a strike or when a strike is imminent. The league fined ten of its members who, in violation of this provision, resigned during a strike and returned to work. The NLRB held that the union rule violated section 8(b) of the NLRA, which provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed herein...."
The union rule (League Law 13) provides: "No resignation or withdrawal from an Association or from the League shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout appears imminent."
The U.S. court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the board's order. The league appealed.
Judicial Opinion
POWELL, Justice
Section 7 of (the NLRA) grants employees the right to "refrain from any or all (concerted) activities." The general right is implemented by § 8(b)(a)(A). The latter section provides that a union commits an unfair labor practice if it "restrains or coerces employees in the exercise" of their § 7 rights. When employee members of a union refuse to support a strike (whether or not a rule prohibits returning to work during a strike), they are refraining from "concerted activity." Therefore, imposing fines on these employees for returning to work "restrains" the exercise of their § 7 rights. Indeed, if the terms "refrain" and "restrain or coerce" are interpreted literally, fining employees to enforce compliance with any union rule or policy would violate the Act.
Language and reasoning from other opinions of this Court confirm that the Board's construction of § 8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable. Tn Scofield v NLRB , 394 U.S. 423 (1969), the Court upheld a union rule setting a ceiling on the daily wages that members working on an incentive basis could earn. The union members' freedom to resign was critical to the Court's decision that the union rule did not "restrain or coerce" the employees within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(A).
The decision in NLRB v Textile Workers , 409 U.S. 213 (1972) also supports the Board's view that Section 8 prohibits unions from punishing members not free to resign. There, thirty-one employees resigned their union membership and resumed working during a strike. We held that fining these former members "restrained or coerced" them. In reaching this conclusion, we said "the vitality of Section 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May"
League Law 13 curtails (the) freedom to resign from full union membership. Nevertheless, the petitioners (League) contend that League Law 13 does not contravene the policy of voluntary unionism imbedded in the Act. They assert that this provision does not interfere with workers' employment rights because offending members are not discharged, but only fined. We find this argument unpersuasive, for a union has not left a "worker's employment rights inviolate when it exacts (his entire) paycheck in satisfaction of a fine imposed for working." Congress in 1947 (with the Taft-Hartley Act) sought to eliminate completely any requirement that the employee maintain full union membership. Therefore, the Board was justified in concluding that by restricting the right of employees to resign, League Law 13 impairs the policy of voluntary unionism.
Petitioners... argue that the proviso to § 8(b)(1)(A) expressly allows unions to place restrictions on the right to resign.
Neither the Board nor this Court has ever interpreted the proviso as allowing unions to make rules restricting the right to resign. Rather, the Court has assumed that "rules with respect to the... retention of membership" are those that provide for expulsion of employees from the union. Accordingly, we find no basis for refusing to defer to the Board's conclusion that League Law 13 is not a "rule with respect to the retention of membership" within the meaning of the proviso.
The petitioners next argue that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that Congress made a considered decision not to protect union members' right to resign.
The legislative history does not support this contention. The "right to resign" apparently was included in the original House bill to protect workers unable to resign because of "closed shop" agreements. Union constitutions limiting the right to resign were uncommon in 1947.
The Board has the primary responsibility for applying "the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life." Where the Board's construction of the Act is reasonable, it should not be rejected.... [T]he Board has consistently construed § 8(b)(1)(A) as prohibiting the imposition of fines on employees who have tendered resignations invalid under a union constitution. Therefore we conclude that the Board's decision here is entitled to our deference.
Affirmed.
What union rule is at issue?
Explanation
Union rule at issue:
The union rule (Le...
Business 8th Edition by Marianne Jennings
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