Labor Economics 5th Edition by George Borjas

Exercise 11

Phil has two periods of work remaining prior to retirement. He is currently employed in a firm that pays him the value of his marginal product, $50,000 per period. There are many other firms that Phil could potentially work for. There is a 50 percent chance of Phil being a good match for any particular firm, and a 50 percent chance of him being a bad match. If he is in a good match, the value of his marginal product is $56,000 per period. If he is in a bad match, the value of his marginal product is $40,000 per period. If Phil quits his job, he can immediately find employment with any of the alternative firms. It takes one period to discover whether Phil is a good or a bad match with a particular firm. In that first period, while Phil's value to the firm is uncertain, he is offered a wage of $48,000. After the value of the match is determined, Phil is offered a wage equal to the value of his marginal product in that firm. When offered that wage, Phil is free to (a) accept; (b) reject and try some other firm; or (c) return to his original firm and his original wage. Phil maximizes the present value of his expected lifetime earnings, and his discount rate is 10 percent. What should Phil do