Chat with AI
Managerial Economics 2nd Edition by William Boyes
Edition 2ISBN: 978-0618988624Managerial Economics 2nd Edition by William Boyes
Edition 2ISBN: 978-0618988624 Exercise 14
Intelligence Failure
Between 1947 and 2004, the U.S. intelligence system consisted of 15 separate agencies, including several that were run within the Department of Defense and dedicated to obtaining intelligence data through technical means such as spy satellites. An official appointed by the president of the United States-the director of Central Intelligence-was responsible for coordinating all the agencies concerned with foreign intelligence. Following September 11, 2001, a number of official investigations concluded that lack of coordination among intelligence agencies was one reason that the U.S. government did not foresee and forestall the attacks. Per the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President George W. Bush signed into law on December 17, 2004. The director of National Intelligence is the chief of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies and is supposed to coordinate their work and analytic product. The head of the Central Intelligence Agency reports to him.
In the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, virtually the entire intelligence system of the United States (and the world) held the mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. In the 12 years preceding the invasion, "the Intelligence Community did not produce a single analytical product that examined the possibility that Saddam Hussein's desire to escape sanctions … would cause him to destroy his WMD" (WMD Commission, 2005, pp. 155-156).
The intelligence agencies relied heavily on information supplied by Iraqi exiles, some of whose reports came through the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella Iraqi opposition group organized in the early 1990s that attempted to coordinate the actions of all the anti-Hussein groups. The reports contained similar findings, and this appearance of corroboration made them persuasive.
In 2007, the U.S. intelligence agency produced the National Intelligence Estimate. This document stated that U.S. agencies "judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program" and that "the halt lasted at least several years." But in 2009 that opinion was reversed.
Is the new hierarchical organization working for U.S. intelligence agencies?
Between 1947 and 2004, the U.S. intelligence system consisted of 15 separate agencies, including several that were run within the Department of Defense and dedicated to obtaining intelligence data through technical means such as spy satellites. An official appointed by the president of the United States-the director of Central Intelligence-was responsible for coordinating all the agencies concerned with foreign intelligence. Following September 11, 2001, a number of official investigations concluded that lack of coordination among intelligence agencies was one reason that the U.S. government did not foresee and forestall the attacks. Per the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President George W. Bush signed into law on December 17, 2004. The director of National Intelligence is the chief of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies and is supposed to coordinate their work and analytic product. The head of the Central Intelligence Agency reports to him.
In the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, virtually the entire intelligence system of the United States (and the world) held the mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. In the 12 years preceding the invasion, "the Intelligence Community did not produce a single analytical product that examined the possibility that Saddam Hussein's desire to escape sanctions … would cause him to destroy his WMD" (WMD Commission, 2005, pp. 155-156).
The intelligence agencies relied heavily on information supplied by Iraqi exiles, some of whose reports came through the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella Iraqi opposition group organized in the early 1990s that attempted to coordinate the actions of all the anti-Hussein groups. The reports contained similar findings, and this appearance of corroboration made them persuasive.
In 2007, the U.S. intelligence agency produced the National Intelligence Estimate. This document stated that U.S. agencies "judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program" and that "the halt lasted at least several years." But in 2009 that opinion was reversed.
Is the new hierarchical organization working for U.S. intelligence agencies?
Explanation
Verified
Verified
Case summary:
There are 15 separate age...
Managerial Economics 2nd Edition by William Boyes
Why don’t you like this exercise?
Other Minimum 8 character and maximum 255 character
Character 255
