Business Law 11th Edition by Kenneth Clarkson,Roger LeRoy Miller,Gaylord Jentz,Frank Cross

Exercise 11

Yale Diagnostic Radiology v. Estate of Harun Fountain
Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2004. 267 Conn. 351, 838 A.2d 179.
BORDEN, J. [Justice]
The sole issue in this appeal is whether a medical service provider that has provided emergency medical services to a minor may collect for those services from the minor when the minor's parents refuse or are unable to make payment. The defendants, the estate of Harun Fountain, an unemancipated minor, and Vernetta Turner-Tucker (Tucker) * * * claim that the [appellate] court improperly determined that they are liable to the plaintiff [Yale Diagnostic Radiology] for payment of Fountain's medical expenses.* * *
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* * * In March, 1996, Fountain was shot in the back of the head at point-blank range by a playmate. As a result of his injuries, including the loss of his right eye, Fountain required extensive lifesaving medical services from a variety of medical services providers, including the plaintiff. The expense of the services rendered by the plaintiff to Fountain totaled $17,694. The plaintiff billed Tucker, who was Fountain's mother, but the bill went unpaid and, in 1999, the plaintiff obtained a collection judgment against her. In January, 2001, however, all of Tucker's debts were discharged pursuant to an order of [a federal bankruptcy court]. Among the discharged debts was the judgment in favor of the plaintiff against Tucker.
During the time between the rendering of medical services and the bankruptcy filing, Tucker * * * initiated a tort action against the boy who had shot him. Among the damages claimed were substantial sums of money expended on medical care and treatment * * *. A settlement was reached, and funds were placed in the estate established on Fountain's behalf * * *.
Following the discharge of Tucker's debts, the plaintiff [filed a motion with the state trial court] for payment of the $17,694 from the estate. The [court] denied the motion, reasoning that * * * parents are liable for medical services rendered to their minor children, and that a parent's refusal or inability to pay for those services does not render the minor child liable. The * * * court further ruled that minor children are incapable of entering into a legally binding contract or consenting, in the absence of parental consent, to medical treatment. The * * * court held, therefore, that the plaintiff was barred from seeking payment from the estate.
The plaintiff appealed the decision * * * [to the state intermediate appellate court, which held that] minors are liable for payment for their necessaries, even though the provider of those necessaries relies on the parents' credit for payment when the injured child lives with his parents * * *. The [appellate] court reasoned that, although parents are primarily liable, * * * for their child's medical bills, the parents' failure to pay renders the minor secondarily liable. Additionally, the [appellate] court relied on the fact that Fountain had obtained money damages, based in part on the medical services rendered to him by the plaintiff. This appeal followed.
The defendants claim that the [appellate] court improperly determined that a minor may be liable for payment for emergency medical services rendered to him. They further claim that the [appellate] court, in reaching its decision, improperly considered the fact that Fountain had received a settlement, based in part on his medical expenses.* * *
Connecticut has long recognized the common-law rule that a minor child's contracts are voidable. Under this rule, a minor may, upon reaching majority, choose either to ratify or to avoid contractual obligations entered into during his minority. The traditional reasoning behind this rule is based on the well established common-law principles that the law should protect children from the detrimental consequences of their youthful and improvident acts, and that children should be able to emerge into adulthood unencumbered by [free of] financial obligations incurred during the course of their minority. The rule is further supported by a policy of protecting children from unscrupulous individuals seeking to profit from their youth and inexperience. [Emphasis added.]
The rule that a minor's contracts are voidable, however, is not absolute. An exception to this rule, eponymously [by name] known as the doctrine of necessaries, is that a minor may not avoid a contract for goods or services necessary for his health and sustenance. Such contracts are binding even if entered into during minority, and a minor, upon reaching majority, may not, as a matter of law, disaffirm them. [Emphasis added.]
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We have not heretofore articulated the particular legal theory underlying the doctrine of necessaries. We therefore take this occasion to do so, and we conclude that the most apt theory is that of an implied in law contract, also sometimes referred to as a quasi-contract.* * * In distinction to an implied in fact contract, a quasi or implied in law contract is not a contract, but an obligation which the law creates out of the circumstances present, even though a party did not assume the obligation. * * * It is based on equitable principles to operate whenever justice requires compensation to be made * * *. With no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances, is just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, it becomes necessary * * * to examine the circumstances and the conduct of the parties and apply this standard. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, when a medical service provider renders necessary medical care to an injured minor, two contracts arise: the primary contract between the provider and the minor's parents; and an implied in law contract between the provider and the minor himself. The primary contract between the provider and the parents is based on the parents' duty to pay for their children's necessary expenses * * *. Such contracts, where not express, may be implied in fact and generally arise both from the parties' conduct and their reasonable expectations. The primacy of this contract means that the provider of necessaries must make all reasonable efforts to collect from the parents before resorting to the secondary, implied in law contract with the minor.
The secondary implied in law contract between the medical services provider and the minor arises from equitable considerations, including the law's disfavor of unjust enrichment. Therefore, where necessary medical services are rendered to a minor whose parents do not pay for them, equity and justice demand that a secondary implied in law contract arise between the medical services provider and the minor who has received the benefits of those services. These principles compel the conclusion that, in the circumstances of the present case, the [defendant is] liable to the plaintiff, under the common-law doctrine of necessaries, for the services rendered by the plaintiff to Fountain.
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The judgment is affirmed.
1. What might have happened in future cases if the court had held that there was no implied-in-law contract between Fountain and Yale Diagnostic Radiology
2. How does the result in this case encourage payment on contracts for necessaries