Deck 4: Minds, Bodies, and Persons

Question 1

Armstrong ultimately suggests that a philosophy of mind should . . .

A) Follow the discoveries and hypotheses of science.
B) Follow religious doctrines that are important to humanity.
C) Be developed using strict logic.
D) None of the above.

Answer 1

A

Question 2

What scientific doctrine does Armstrong think should be taken into consideration by philosophers?

A) Evolution
B) Humans are nothing but physico-chemical mechanisms
C) The scientific method
D) Behaviorism

Answer 2

B

Question 3

Physicalists and materialists offer accounts of the nature of mind that are . . .

A) Incompatible with behaviorism
B) Incompatible with the view that we are simply physico-chemical mechanisms
C) Compatible with behaviorism
D) Compatible with the view that we are simply physico-chemical mechanisms

Answer 3

D

Question 4

Why does Armstrong think that philosophers should develop their theories following science?

A) Science doesn't rely on superstition like philosophy
B) Science is primarily concerned with truth, whereas philosophy is ultimately a moral pursuit
C) Science is the only area in which we seem intellectual consensus
D) Armstrong doesn't think philosophers should take their lead from scientists

Question 5

What, roughly, is behaviorism?

A) The view that we are composed of a mind and a body
B) The view that we are simply physical and chemical processes
C) The view that the mind is simply part of physical behavior
D) The view that the mind is an inner principle

Question 6

To refine their view, what did behaviorists like Ryle appeal to?

A) Materialism
B) Mental states
C) Chemical processes
D) Dispositions

Question 7

Why does Armstrong ultimately reject behaviorism?

A) It is necessarily incompatible with a physicalist account of the mind
B) It cannot account for the phenomenon of thinking
C) It posits a "ghost in the machine"
D) It cannot account for our third-personal experience of behavior

Question 8

Armstrong suggests that a scientist would understand a disposition to be . . .

A) A state
B) An inner principle
C) The liability something has to transition to a certain state
D) None of the above

Question 9

How does Armstrong propose we conceive of the mind?

A) A so-called "ghost in the machine"
B) As outward behavior
C) A disposition to behave in certain ways
D) An inner principle identified with outward behavior

Question 10

What is consciousness, for Armstrong?

A) The exercise of control over our actions
B) Something that goes on in us that is apt to cause certain sorts of behavior
C) The perception of the state of one's own mind
D) None of the above

Question 11

Armstrong embraces the influence that modern science is having on philosophy.

Question 12

Armstrong holds that there was plenty of intellectual consensus before the advent of modern science.

Question 13

Brittleness is an example of a disposition.

Question 14

By "mental state," Armstrong means a state of a person apt for producing certain ranges of behavior.

Question 15

Armstrong considers the worry that his view fails to do justice to our third-personal experience of behavior.

Question 16

Churchland from the identity theory dubious. Why?

A) It cannot coherently be asserted
B) It has be disproven by science
C) It seems unlikely that there is a one-to-one matchup between folk psychology and neuroscience
D) Churchland doesn't take the identity theory to be dubious

Question 17

For eliminative materialists, folk psychology . . .

A) Is a misrepresentation of our internal states and activities.
B) Is an incomplete representation of our internal states and activities.
C) Is a perfect representation of our internal states and activities.
D) None of the above.

Question 18

Churchland aims to offer a new framework for thinking about . . .

A) Folk psychology
B) Functionalism
C) The ontology of mental states, like belief, desire, and pain
D) None of the above

Question 19

Why, for Churchland, might eliminative materialism benefit humanity?

A) The understanding it offers might contribute toward a more peaceful and human society
B) It will give us a better understanding of the varieties and causes of mental illness
C) By better understanding socialization and emotion, it might reduce the amount of misery in the world
D) All of the above

Question 20

What threat to humanity might eliminative materialism pose, according to Churchland?

A) By increasing our knowledge, it will increase our power, which can be dangerous
B) People might become depressed by the fact that we don't have desires or values
C) It might be more difficult to relate to other people if we accept it
D) Churchland holds that eliminative materialism poses absolutely no threat to humanity

Question 21

Why, for Churchland, isn't folk psychology successful as an explanatory or predictive theory?

A) It can't explain what sleep is or why we need it
B) It can't explain the grounds for variations in intelligence
C) It can't explain what mental illness is, or how to cure it
D) All of the above

Question 22

What "inductive lesson" speaks against folk psychology, according to Churchland?

A) Neuroscience has proven incredibly fruitful, so it will probably continue to prove fruitful
B) Life has only gotten better as science has progressed and replaced old theories
C) So far, most of our folk theories have been wrong, so folk psychology probably will be too
D) Folk psychology has failed to explain common phenomena, like sleep and mental illness

Question 23

Functionalism denies . . .

A) The existence of neurons.
B) The existence of only of universal types.
C) The existence of specific types.
D) The existence of species.

Question 24

According to Churchland, the a priori probability of eliminative materialism is ___ than functionalism

A) the same
B) at least the same if not higher
C) lower
D) higher

Question 25

Which of the following isn't an argument that Churchland considers against eliminative materialism?

A) Introspection reveals the existence of pains, beliefs, and desires, so it must be false
B) It cannot be coherently asserted, because doing so expresses a belief
C) It exaggerates the defects of folk psychology and underplays its successes
D) None of the above

Question 26

Churchland rejects the identity theory of the mind.

Question 27

Eliminative materialism aims to justify the traditional ontology in a new way.

Question 28

Eliminative materialism stands to benefit humanity, according to Churchland.

Question 29

Eliminative materialism is the view that folk psychology needs to be revised to better reflect neuroscience.

Question 30

Churchland is a functionalist.

Question 31

Mary is . . .

A) Confined to a black and white room.
B) Taught everything there is to know about physics, chemistry, neurophysiology, etc.
C) Educated through black and white books.
D) All of the above.

Question 32

Which of the following best defines physicalism, according Jackson?

A) The view that the actual world is entirely physical
B) The view that the actual world is largely physical
C) The view that the actual world is ultimately not physical
D) The view that qualia aren't real

Question 33

Physicalists hold that complete physical knowledge is _______ knowledge simplified.

A) incomplete
B) complete
C) true
D) false

Question 34

Why is Mary's case problematic for physicalists?

A) Because it seems like she can only learn physical things about the world
B) Because it seems as though she can learn something about the world that isn't physical
C) Because it is unclear whether she has learned anything new
D) Because they deny the existence of color

Question 35

The knowledge that Mary lacks, according to Jackson, is knowledge about . . .

A) Her own experience
B) The physical world
C) The experience of others
D) Physics

Question 36

Which of the following is Churchland's first point against the knowledge argument?

A) The argument equivocates on the sense of "knows about"
B) If the argument works against physicalism, then it also works against dualism
C) That its claim that Mary couldn't imagine the relevant experience is false
D) None of the above

Question 37

Which of the following is Churchland's second point against the knowledge argument?

A) The argument equivocates on the sense of "knows about"
B) That its claim that Mary couldn't imagine the relevant experience is false
C) If the argument works against physicalism, then it also works against dualism
D) None of the above

Question 38

Which of the following is Churchland's third point against the knowledge argument?

A) The argument equivocates on the sense of "knows about"
B) If the argument works against physicalism, then it also works against dualism
C) That its claim that Mary couldn't imagine the relevant experience is false
D) None of the above

Question 39

Which of the following best defines "qualia"?

A) The imagine the mind comes up with when it imagines a color
B) A feature of something
C) The physical explanation for a color
D) What it is like to feel an experience

Question 40

According to David Lewis and Laurence Nemirow, why doesn't Mary learn something upon her release?

A) Because she already could imagine what color was
B) Because she simply acquires an imaginative ability
C) Because she already had the experience of color in her confinement
D) None of the above

Question 41

Central to Jackson's argument is the fact that Mary gains an ability to imagine the experience of color upon her release.

Question 42

For physicalists, if I have complete physical knowledge of the world, I still don't necessarily know everything there is to know about the world.

Question 43

The knowledge argument rests upon the fact that Mary couldn't imagine color before her release.

Question 44

Jackson holds that Mary learns something new upon her release.

Question 45

For Jackson, the knowledge argument is a valid argument from demonstrable premises.

Question 46

What is "neurophilosophy," according to Churchland?

A) Neurophilosophy is a subfield of philosophy that uses scientific discoveries to explore traditional philosophical questions
B) Neurophilosophy is the view that there is a mind that is separate from our brains
C) Neurophilosophy is the view that there is no difference between mind and brain
D) Neurophilosophy is a subfield in philosophy that uses only neuroscience to answer questions in philosophy of mind.

Question 47

Why is it relevant to Churchland that neuroscience is a relatively new field?

A) Because this suggests it is not a reliable source of information about philosophy
B) Because this suggests it is a promising field, which will continue to develop
C) Because this suggests that it will likely not develop, and so it isn't a good source of knowledge
D) Because it suggests that chemistry is a better field for philosophers to focus on

Question 48

According to dualists . . .

A) There is only one kind of stuff in the world: physical stuff
B) There is only one kind of stuff in the world: non-physical stuff
C) There are two kinds of stuff in the world: physical stuff and non-physical stuff
D) None of the above

Question 49

According to physicalists . . .

A) There is only one kind of stuff in the world: physical stuff
B) There is only one kind of stuff in the world: non-physical stuff
C) There are two kinds of stuff in the world: physical stuff and non-physical stuff
D) None of the above

Question 50

Which of the following doesn't Churchland use to argue against dualism?

A) Split-brain studies
B) Focal brain damage studies
C) Our evolutionary relationship to other mammals
D) None of the above

Question 51

According to Churchland, why can't empirical evidence ever completely force dualists to give up their position?

A) Because empirical evidence will never be convincing enough
B) Because dualists arrive at their position through religious faith
C) Because it is always logically consistent for a dualist to insist on their position
D) Because epiphenomenalism is true

Question 52

What is epiphenomenalism?

A) A dualist view, which takes it that there is no interaction between mind and brain
B) A dualist view, which takes it that mental states don't cause brain states
C) A dualist view, which takes it that brains states don't cause mental states
D) A dualist view, which takes it that brain states cause mental states and vice versa

Question 53

Why does Churchland think that the epiphenomenal view is problematic?

A) Because it (falsely) suggests that there should be anomalies with respect to the conservation of energy
B) Because it is logically inconsistent
C) Because there are a number of thought experiments that count against it
D) All of the above

Question 54

What is David Chalmers' "data neutrality" argument?

A) Chalmers argues that the neuroscientific data are neutral between dualism and physicalism
B) Chalmers argues that the neuroscientific data are not neutral, but favor dualism
C) Chalmers argues that the neuroscientific data are not neutral, but favor physicalism
D) Chalmers argues that data are always interpreted, and so can support any theory

Question 55

What is Quine's "dogma," to which Churchland refers?

A) Philosophers think they can just use thought experiments and intuition to clarify concepts
B) Philosophers think by clarifying concepts they also learn about how the world is
C) Philosophers are too caught up in trying to make their views match science
D) None of the above

Question 56

Neurophilosophy uses scientific discoveries to answer traditional philosophical questions.

Question 57

Churchland is a dualist, because neuroscience suggests this is the correct view.

Question 58

Churchland argues that dualism is mysterious.

Question 59

Churchland holds that neuroscience is both necessary and sufficient for understanding the mind.

Question 60

Chalmers and Nagel are famous proponents of dualism.

Question 61

What question does Turing propose instead of "Can machines think?"

A) Are there imaginable digital computers that would do well in an imitation game?
B) Could a machine ever think?
C) What is thinking?
D) What does it mean for a machine to think?

Question 62

Which of the following is a worry that Turing considers for the imitation game?

A) Machines and computers don't look like humans
B) It relies on normal words, which can be misleading
C) The odds are weighted too heavily against the computer
D) All of the above

Question 63

Which of the following is a restriction Turing puts on his game?

A) The only "thinking machines" allowed to take part are digital computers
B) The interrogator can only ask five questions
C) The engineers must be able to describe how the machine works
D) None of the above

Question 64

Which of the following isn't a part Turing ascribes to digital computers?

A) Store
B) Executive unit
C) Control
D) None of the above

Question 65

According to Turing, what is the idea behind computers?

A) To stimulate our minds by offering various digital tasks
B) Turing explicitly states that there is no idea behind computers
C) To be able to carry out any operations that could be done by a human computer
D) To improve the world by allowing us to more efficiently accomplish various tasks

Question 66

Which of the following best describes a "discrete state machine"?

A) Machines that operate by levers or switches
B) Machines that move by sudden jumps from one definite state to another
C) Machines that mimic the functioning of a human brain
D) Machines with definite outputs

Question 67

Turing holds that . . .

A) A computer will never be able to regularly win the imitation game
B) Eventually, there will be no difference between a machine and a human
C) Eventually, there will be computers that regularly win the imitation game
D) At best, computers will be able to win the imitation game half the time

Question 68

What is the "mathematical objection" to Turing's position?

A) Logical systems, like machines, are limited in certain ways
B) Machines will never be able to feel things
C) Machines can never learn
D) None of the above

Question 69

Why does Turing ultimately reject the mathematical objection?

A) Machines are capable of learning
B) Even if machines are limited, so are humans
C) It relies on a kind of solipsistic view
D) He doesn't reject the mathematical objection

Question 70

Which of the following best describes the "argument from consciousness"?

A) Logical systems, like machines, are limited in certain ways
B) Machines will never be able to feel things
C) Machines can never learn
D) None of the above

Question 71

Turing proposes an "imitation game" to think about the possibility that machines might be able to think.

Question 72

Turing restricts the imitation game to digital computers.

Question 73

Lady Lovelace first proposed the idea of learning machines, which could pass the imitation game.

Question 74

Digital computers are "universal" because they can mimic any discrete state machine.

Question 75

Turing rejects solipsism.

Question 76

Which of the following best describes the position of Strong AI?

A) An appropriately programmed computer is a mind, in the sense that it can understand
B) Computers cannot be minds
C) Having a mind is a matter of having the right outputs
D) The principal value of computers is that they are powerful tools for studying the mind

Question 77

Which of the following best describes Robert Schank's program?

A) A robot, designed to perceive with a video camera
B) A program with the aim of simulating the human ability to understand stories
C) A program with the aim of simulating the human ability to understand Chinese
D) None of the above

Question 78

What is Searle's "Chinese room" thought experiment supposed to show?

A) That computers aren't yet able to simulate the human ability to understand
B) That no machine can demonstrate genuine understanding
C) That it is only possible for systems to demonstrate understanding
D) That understanding involves more than the ability to formally reproduce appropriate outputs

Question 79

Why does Searle think we often attribute intentionality to machines?

A) Because they demonstrate genuine intentionality
B) Because they have intentional outputs
C) We extend our own intentionality to them
D) None of the above

Question 80

Which of the following best describes the "systems reply" to Searle's thought experiment?

A) We only attribute understanding to people because of their behavior, so we should for machines too
B) While the individual in the room doesn't understand the story, the system she's a part of does
C) There would be understanding if we put the system into a mechanism that walked around, perceiving
D) None of the above