Deck 10: David Hume

Question 1

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume claims that moral judgments are not the verdicts of reason. What is his argument for this claim? What do you think is the strongest objection to this argument? Do you think Hume's argument is sound? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Explain Hume's remarks about the relationship between "is" claims and "ought" claims. What implications do Hume's observations have for moral philosophy?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Write an essay critically examining Hume's account of justice. In what circumstances does Hume think justice is relevant? Why does he think justice is valuable? Do you find his account plausible?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-What is the ultimate source of morality, according to Hume? What are the advantages and disadvantages of such a view? Do you agree with his position? Defend your answer.

Question 5

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-What is the relationship between reason and morality, according to Hume? Does Hume think we can know our moral obligations based on reason? Do you think he is correct about this? Why or why not?

Question 6

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-What does it mean, in Hume's view, to say that an action is wrong, or that a person is virtuous? What does Hume think ultimately grounds our judgments of morality? Does he provide a plausible foundation for morality? Defend your answer.

Question 7

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-What does Hume mean by sympathy, and what role does this notion play in his moral theory? Does sympathy actually have the moral importance that Hume suggests it has?

Question 8

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-According to Hume, reason:

A) should serve our passions.
B) should operate completely independently of our passions.
C) should be used to direct our passions.
D) should be used to extinguish our passions.

Question 9

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume claims that reason alone:

A) cannot motivate us to act.
B) cannot discover relations of ideas.
C) cannot identify means to our ends.
D) all of the above.

Question 10

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume divides our perceptions into two categories:

A) sensations and emotions.
B) impressions and ideas.
C) static and dynamic.
D) simple and complex.

Question 11

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume claims that nothing can oppose the impulse of a passion except:

A) the rule of reason.
B) a contrary impulse.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 12

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-In the Inquiry, Hume claims that our final verdicts on moral matters are derived from:

A) reason.
B) a moral sense that is unique to each person.
C) a moral sense that is universal in our species.
D) emotion.

Question 13

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume claims that of all human traits, the most praised is:

A) wisdom.
B) courage.
C) justice.
D) benevolence.

Question 14

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-According to Hume, justice:

A) has no value.
B) has value in part because it is useful to society.
C) has value solely because it is useful to society.
D) has value solely because it is useful to the agent.

Question 15

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-According to Hume:

A) justice would not exist in conditions of extreme abundance.
B) justice would not exist in conditions of extreme scarcity.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 16

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume claims that a person who is unaffected by images of human happiness or misery will also be indifferent to:

A) art and beauty.
B) virtue and vice.
C) his own well-being.
D) all of the above.

Question 17

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-According to Hume, human sympathy:

A) extends equally to all people, including oneself.
B) extends equally to all others, but is weaker than our own self-regard.
C) is weaker than our self-regard, and is fainter for those who are far away than those close by.
D) is stronger than our self-regard.

Question 18

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume defines virtue as:

A) a tendency to maximize happiness.
B) a tendency to pursue justice.
C) whatever mental action or quality gives a spectator a sentiment of approbation.
D) whatever mental action or quality brings about the best consequences for all.

Question 19

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume claims it is inexplicable how one could infer:

A) an "ought" claim from an "is" claim.
B) an "is" claim from an "ought" claim.
C) a claim about justice from a claim about utility.
D) a claim about utility from a claim about justice.

Question 20

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-According to Hume, morality is ultimately based on:

A) reason.
B) God's commands.
C) social agreements.
D) sympathy.

Question 21

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-According to Hume, reason can only have an influence on our actions by:

A) informing us of the existence of an object of passion.
B) discovering the means of attaining an object of passion.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 22

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume describes artificial virtues as:

A) virtues needed for successful cooperation.
B) the most important virtues.
C) the least important virtues.
D) not actually virtues.

Question 23

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-According to Hume, individuals are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to the dictates of reason.

Question 24

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-In Hume's view, morality is ultimately determined by sentiment.

Question 25

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-According to Hume, our passions can be unreasonable only when they are founded on false suppositions.

Question 26

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume states that moral distinctions are the offspring of reason.

Question 27

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume claims that virtue is natural, whereas vice is unnatural.

Question 28

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-According to Hume, whatever is produced by a man's industry ought to be secured to him as property.

Question 29

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume claims that reason is sometimes sufficient to produce moral blame or approbation.

Question 30

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-According to Hume, utility is pleasing to us because of our sympathy for others.

Question 31

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume holds that justice is valuable only because it contributes to utility.

Question 32

David Hume: A Treatise Concerning Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
In his Treatise Concerning Human Nature, Hume argues that morality is based not in reason, but in moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. According to Hume, reason can only serve two functions: It can investigate matters of fact, or it can examine the relationships between ideas. In either case, the verdicts of reason are "cool and disengaged" in that they do not motivate us to action. Moral judgments, on the other hand, are practical and do motivate us to behave in certain ways. Therefore, Hume concludes, moral judgments cannot be verdicts of reason. Instead, Hume claims that moral judgments are ultimately rooted in our passions, so that "when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it."
Hume further develops this account in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in which he discusses a number of different virtues. Benevolence, he claims, is the most widely praised of all virtues, and is valuable for its own sake. Justice, in contrast, is a virtue that arises only in particular circumstances-those of moderate scarcity, and the rough equality of persons-and is valuable not for its own sake but only for the sake of the utility it brings about. Hume maintains that the ultimate sanction of these virtues is not their intrinsic natures, but rather "some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." Although reason might be crucial in determining which actions will be best suited to our ends, Hume claims that it is only our passions that can determine which ends are themselves worth pursuing. In this sense, as Hume declared in the Treatise, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
-Hume claims that our natural sentiments of sympathy extend equally to all people.