Deck 14: Henry Sidgwick

Question 1

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick claims that moral judgments cannot be understood as expressing nothing more than the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of actions. What is Sidwick's argument for this claim? Is his argument convincing? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick claims that the existence of external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee that moral conduct will produce the greatest balance of personal happiness for an individual. What is Sidwick's argument for this claim? Is his argument convincing? Why or why not?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Although Sidwick does not think utilitarianism can be proven in the ordinary sense of the term, he nonetheless claims there are reasons that can lead someone to accept it. What are these reasons? Are they convincing in your view? Why or why not?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick argues that despite its insistence on impartiality, utilitarianism can still defend the special treatment we often think it is justified toward our special relations like family and friends. Is Sidwick's argument convincing? Why or why not?

Question 5

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick claims that moral notions like "right" and "ought" cannot be defined. Do you think this is true? Why or why not? If not, how do you think these terms might be defined?

Question 6

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick suggests that utilitarians should extend their moral concern to all beings capable of feeling pleasure and pain as well as to future generations. Do you think this is correct? Why or why not?

Question 7

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick raises the important question of whether the utilitarian should aim at producing the greatest total amount happiness on the whole or the greatest average happiness per person. Which do you think is correct and why?

Question 8

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick moral judgments express:

A) self-evident propositions.
B) sentiments of approbation and aversion.
C) the will of God.
D) none of the above.

Question 9

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick claims that moral terms like "right" and "ought" are:

A) too simple to be defined.
B) meaningless.
C) too complex to be fully analyzed.
D) none of the above.

Question 10

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick calls the faculty of moral cognition:

A) Intuition.
B) Moral Sense.
C) Conscience.
D) Reason.

Question 11

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Following Bentham, Sidwick calls the pleasures consequent to obeying moral rules and the pains consequent to violating them:

A) reward and punishment.
B) justice.
C) sanctions.
D) satisfaction and guilt.

Question 12

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick argues that legal sanctions are insufficient to make immoral behavior always imprudent because:

A) laws are not designed to punish immorality.
B) secret crimes sometimes go undiscovered.
C) legal punishments are too weak to deter immorality effectively.
D) none of the above.

Question 13

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick argues that internal sanctions are insufficient to make immoral behavior always imprudent because:

A) they are not sufficiently intense.
B) some people are not subject to them.
C) there is no such thing as moral conscience.
D) none of the above.

Question 14

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick, Reason aims to discover principles that are:

A) mutually consistent.
B) self-evident.
C) clear and precise.
D) all of the above.

Question 15

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-One example Sidwick gives of a self-evident moral principle is:

A) The Principle of Truth.
B) The Principle of Rational Benevolence.
C) The Principle of Universal Charity.
D) The Principle of Utility.

Question 16

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Although Sidwick acknowledges that self-evident principles do exist, he claims that they:

A) are too abstract to guide action.
B) are too difficult for most people discover.
C) are too abstract for people to understand.
D) pertain to logic and mathematics rather than morality.

Question 17

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Of the various methods of ethics considered, the one Sidwick finds most promising is:

A) universalistic hedonism.
B) philosophical intuitionism.
C) egoistic hedonism.
D) rational benevolence.

Question 18

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidiwick, utilitarians should impartially consider the happiness of:

A) all human beings.
B) future generations.
C) non-human beings.
D) all of the above.

Question 19

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick, utilitarians often ignore:

A) the happiness of non-human beings.
B) the question of how happiness should be distributed.
C) duties to our special relations.
D) all of the above.

Question 20

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Regarding commonsense moral rules, Sidwick claims that utilitarianism:

A) broadly supports them.
B) can resolve conflicts between them.
C) can help make them more precise.
D) all of the above.

Question 21

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick, the special treatment we show to our special relations like family and friends is:

A) a private matter outside the scope of moral philosophy.
B) is opposed to the utilitarian insistence on impartiality.
C) can be justified on utilitarian grounds.
D) none of the above.

Question 22

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick, utilitarians must confront the paradoxical conclusion that:

A) it might be wrong, on utilitarian grounds, to advocate for utilitarianism publicly.
B) utilitarianism demands a degree of impartiality incompatible with human nature.
C) utilitarianism is correct in principle, but too difficult to adopt in practice.
D) all of the above.

Question 23

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick, moral terms like "right" and "ought" cannot be defined.

Question 24

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-On Sidwick's view, moral judgments simply affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of behaviors.

Question 25

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick, external and internal sanctions are sufficient to make immoral behavior imprudent in some cases.

Question 26

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick argues that the principle of utility is the only self-evidence moral principle.

Question 27

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick claims that utilitarianism largely conflicts with commonsense morality.

Question 28

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-Sidwick claims that utilitarianism can address the limitations of commonsense morality.

Question 29

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick, utilitarians generally agree that our moral concern should extend to the happiness of all beings capable of feeling pleasure and pain.

Question 30

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick, utilitarians need not extend their moral concern to future generations.

Question 31

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick, the strict impartiality of utilitarianism forbids giving special treatment to our family and friends.

Question 32

Henry Sidwick: The Methods of Ethics
In these selections from The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidwick begins by examining the meaning of moral judgments. What precisely is expressed in saying that some action is "right" or "what ought to be done"? Sidwick rejects the view that moral judgments merely affirm the existence of feelings of approval and disapproval toward certain kinds of conduct and then gives his own view on the matter, namely that notions like "right" and "ought" are too elementary to admit of definition or analysis into more basic terms.
Sidwick next turns to the question of moral cognition. How do we arrive at reasoned moral judgments about what actions are right and ought to be done? Sidwick considers three methods for doing so. According to the first, egoistic hedonism, right conduct always coincides with the course of action that produces the most happiness (or least pain) for ourselves. Sidwick, however, argues that external and internal sanctions are insufficient to guarantee such a perfect coincidence between prudential self-interest and moral, pro-social behavior. Sidwick then considers philosophical intuitionism, according to which right conduct is determined by rationally self-evident moral principles that can be directly intuited in reflection. Sidwick finds this method wanting as well because although he acknowledges that some such principles exist, they are too abstract and general to guide action in particular cases.
Lastly, Sidwick considers utilitarianism, which of the three methods has the most to recommend it in his view. For one, utilitarianism largely supports the familiar rules of commonsense morality. But utilitarianism also improves commonsense morality by providing a precise guide to action when commonsense moral rules are ambiguous or vague, in conflict with one another, or in need of qualification. Although utilitarianism has these features to recommend it, Sidwick recognizes that it faces serious questions and challenges as well. For example, there is the question of whether utilitarianism must take into account the welfare of non-human beings as well as future generations, and, if so, how their welfare can enter into hedonistic calculations with sufficient precision. Perhaps the most pressing question is whether it is wrong, from a utilitarian point of view, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.
-According to Sidwick, it may be wrong, on utilitarian grounds, to advocate openly for utilitarianism.