Deck 17: H.A.Prichard

Question 1

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-What is the mistake on which Prichard thinks moral philosophy rests? What reasons does he give for thinking it is a mistake? Do you agree with him?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Why does Prichard object to the attempt to prove that you ought to do something on the grounds that it will be to your advantage to do so? Do you find his objection plausible?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-According to utilitarianism, all of our obligations derive from one supreme moral principle: Do whatever brings about the greatest amount of happiness. What objections does Prichard raise to such a principle?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Explain Prichard's analogy between Moral Philosophy and Theory of Knowledge. With what questions does he think each inquiry begins? What problems does Prichard claim each inquiry faces?

Question 5

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-What two types of answers does Prichard think can be given to the skeptical question "Why should I do the things I've always believed I ought to do?" What problems does he raise for each of these answers?

Question 6

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-How does Prichard think we can come to have moral knowledge? How does his view differ from the views he discusses in the first half of his paper? Which do you think is more plausible?

Question 7

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-According to Prichard, what is the difference between morality and virtue? From what kinds of motives do moral actions and virtuous actions arise, on his view?

Question 8

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard claims that moral philosophy rests on a mistaken question, which is:

A) "Is there a God?"
B) "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?"
C) "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which others hitherto have acted?"
D) "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which the virtuous would act in my circumstances?"

Question 9

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-According to Prichard, all attempts to prove that we ought to do something invoke either:

A) God or an afterlife.
B) self-interest or goodness.
C) reward or punishment.
D) laws or conventions.

Question 10

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-If one were to prove that an action is in one's self-interest, Prichard would say that this would:

A) make one want to do the action, but would not prove that one ought to do it.
B) prove that one ought to do the action, but might not make one want to do it.
C) both make one want to do the action and prove that one ought to do it.
D) neither make one want to do the action nor prove that one ought to do it.

Question 11

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-According to Prichard, the claim that we ought to do that which will bring about a good outcome presupposes the idea that:

A) we have duties to ourselves as well as to others.
B) morality is ultimately rooted in self-interest.
C) what is good ought to be.
D) there are no moral obligations.

Question 12

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-In Prichard's view, when we claim an action is "good," we do so in virtue of:

A) the consequences of the action.
B) the motive of the action.
C) the agent who performs the action.
D) none of the above.

Question 13

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard claims that a sense of obligation:

A) always moves us to act.
B) sometimes moves us to act.
C) never moves us to act.
D) none of the above.

Question 14

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-According to Prichard, we can know that an action is right by:

A) deriving this conclusion from a moral theory.
B) relying on our religious faith.
C) directly appreciating its rightness through moral thinking.
D) all of the above.

Question 15

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard argues that moral knowledge is:

A) impossible.
B) incapable of being proven.
C) apprehended immediately.
D) both a and b.

Question 16

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-According to Prichard, acting from a sense of obligation:

A) is the only way for an action to be morally good.
B) involves acting with no purpose or end.
C) does not involve acting on the basis of a desire.
D) all of the above.

Question 17

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-In Prichard's view, for an act to be virtuous, it must be performed:

A) from an intrinsically good emotion.
B) from a sense of obligation.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 18

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard compares Moral Philosophy to:

A) Metaphysics.
B) Philosophy of Science.
C) Logic.
D) Theory of Knowledge.

Question 19

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard claims that morality and virtue:

A) are illusions.
B) are the same thing.
C) are ultimately unknowable.
D) are independent, although related, species of goodness.

Question 20

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-According to Prichard, we cannot feel an obligation to:

A) do what is right.
B) act from a sense of duty.
C) act from a certain desire.
D) act courageously.

Question 21

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard claims that when we say we doubt whether we know something, what we really mean is that we doubt:

A) whether we really believe it.
B) whether our belief is justified.
C) whether our belief is true.
D) all of the above.

Question 22

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-If we doubt whether we have a particular moral obligation, Prichard recommends:

A) deducing the obligation from a general moral theory.
B) asking others for guidance.
C) doing whatever is most advantageous to ourselves.
D) imagining ourselves in the relevant situation and letting our moral capacities do their work.

Question 23

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard claims that a "motive" is what moves us to act.

Question 24

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-According to Prichard, moral philosophy involves attempting to prove things that we have previously believed without proof.

Question 25

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard claims that we can prove that one ought to do something by showing that it will promote one's own self-interest.

Question 26

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-According to Prichard, the word "ought" properly applies only to states of affairs, not to actions.

Question 27

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard claims that the view that we ought to perform actions because of the goodness that they bring about fails to correspond to our actual moral convictions.

Question 28

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-In Prichard's view, intrinsic goodness of an action lies solely in its motive.

Question 29

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard claims that whether an action is right or wrong depends on the motive behind the action.

Question 30

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard claims that although moral knowledge cannot be proven, it can be directly apprehended.

Question 31

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-In Prichard's view, actions are only truly moral if they are performed from a sense of obligation.

Question 32

H. A. Prichard: Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Prichard begins by considering a skeptical question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" Consideration of this question leads us to seek a proof of our ethical convictions, which we previously accepted without proof. The trouble is, Prichard claims, that the available answers to this question are inadequate. On the one hand, one could try to show we ought to do some action because it is in our interest. But this, Prichard objects, would not show that we ought to perform that action; it would merely succeed in making us want to perform it. On the other hand, one could claim that we should do some action because of the goodness either of the action or of its consequences. Prichard argues, however, that neither of these suffices to show that the action is obligatory.
Contrasting his own view with these attempts to prove that we ought to do something via argument, Prichard claims that our sense of obligation to perform an action "is absolutely underivative or immediate," known directly via an act of moral thinking. Although we may need to figure out the consequences of an action before we can see whether it is right or wrong, Prichard argues that once we have done so, our knowledge of our obligations is noninferential. After clarifying several aspects of his view, Prichard address the original question: Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? Prichard's answer is that if we conceive of moral philosophy as the attempt to give arguments that will prove that we do have certain obligations, then the enterprise does rest on a mistake. This is because, on Prichard's view, moral knowledge cannot be proven, but can only be known directly by applying our moral capacities to particular situations.
-Prichard claims that virtue and morality are the same thing.