Deck 19: C.L.Stevenson

Question 1

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson draws a distinction between descriptive and dynamic uses of language. Explain this distinction and the role it plays in Stevenson's theory.

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson claims that "Ethical claims are social instruments." What does he mean by this? Do you agree with this claim? Why or why not?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-What account does Stevenson give of the nature of ethical disagreements? How does ethical disagreement differ from scientific disagreement, on his view? To what extent does he think it is possible to argue about ethics?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Why does Stevenson think that goodness is not verifiable using the scientific method? How does his theory account for this?

Question 5

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-What is an "interest theory" of goodness? What objections does Stevenson raise to interest theories? How does his theory differ from the interest theories he criticizes?

Question 6

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-What three criteria does Stevenson claim that the "vital" sense of "good" must meet? Explain why he thinks his theory meets these criteria.

Question 7

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-What does Stevenson mean by "emotive meaning"? What role does this notion play in his theory?

Question 8

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson's primary aim is to:

A) provide an account of what makes right actions right.
B) establish which things are good in themselves.
C) develop a theory of good moral character.
D) make ethical questions clear.

Question 9

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson claims that dynamic uses of language:

A) vent feelings.
B) create moods.
C) incite people.
D) all of the above

Question 10

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Interest theories of the good define goodness in terms of:

A) approval or desire.
B) benefit to oneself.
C) the consequences of one's actions.
D) prima facie duties.

Question 11

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson argues that any adequate philosophical account of ethical judgments must account for:

A) the possibility of intelligent moral disagreement.
B) the way judging something to be good creates a tendency to act in its favor.
C) how ethical judgments cannot be verified by empirical methods.
D) all of the above.

Question 12

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson claims that the primary use of ethical judgments is to:

A) state facts.
B) influence the interests of others.
C) describe one's own approval of things.
D) none of the above.

Question 13

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson claims that descriptive uses of language:

A) record.
B) clarify.
C) communicate beliefs.
D) all of the above.

Question 14

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson identifies the meaning of a term with:

A) the empirical observations to which it applies.
B) all the psychological causes and effects that attend its utterance.
C) the psychological causes and effects it has a tendency to be connected with.
D) the set of other words that are synonyms to the original word.

Question 15

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-The "emotive meaning" of a term is:

A) a tendency to produce affective responses in people.
B) typically identical to the propositional meaning of the term.
C) solely a function of the purpose of the speaker.
D) all of the above.

Question 16

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-According to Stevenson, the word "good" has a pleasing emotive meaning that fits it for:

A) descriptive use.
B) constructive use.
C) dynamic use.
D) propositional use.

Question 17

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson claims that moral uses of the term "good" differ from nonmoral uses in that:

A) moral goodness is objective, whereas nonmoral goodness is not.
B) moral judgments involve a stronger sort of approval than nonmoral judgments.
C) it is impossible to disagree about moral goodness.
D) moral goodness is empirically verifiable.

Question 18

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-According to Stevenson, moral disagreements involve:

A) disagreement in interest.
B) disagreement in belief.
C) disagreement in theory.
D) disagreement in practice.

Question 19

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Which of the following claims does Stevenson make about the relationship between disagreement in interest and disagreement in belief?

A) Disagreement in belief is always rooted in disagreement in interest.
B) Disagreement in belief is sometimes, but not always, rooted in disagreement in interest.
C) Disagreement in interest is always rooted in disagreement in belief.
D) Disagreement in interest is sometimes, but not always, rooted in disagreement in belief.

Question 20

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson claims that when we morally approve of something, we feel:

A) security when it prospers.
B) indignant when it does not prosper.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 21

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-According to Stevenson, philosophers are:

A) the only people who can make well-founded judgments about goodness.
B) especially well-suited to make judgments about goodness, although others may responsibly do so.
C) not particularly well-suited to make judgments about goodness.
D) entirely unequipped to make judgments about goodness.

Question 22

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-According to Stevenson, empirical methods:

A) are never useful in resolving ethical disagreement.
B) are sometimes useful in resolving ethical disagreement, but are not always sufficient.
C) are in principle always sufficient for resolving ethical disagreement.
D) provide the only responsible way to engage in moral philosophy.

Question 23

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson claims that the term "good" is ambiguous.

Question 24

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson thinks that "good" means "desired by me."

Question 25

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-According to Stevenson, it is possible to sensibly disagree about whether something is good.

Question 26

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-In Stevenson's view, goodness is not scientifically verifiable.

Question 27

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson claims that the primary use of ethical language is to state facts.

Question 28

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-According to Stevenson, the difference between descriptive and dynamic uses of language depends on the purpose of the speaker.

Question 29

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-Stevenson claims that ethical terms are instruments used to adjust human interests.

Question 30

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-According to Stevenson, traditional interest theories fail to account for the way judging something to be good creates a tendency to act in its favor.

Question 31

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-In Stevenson's view, ethical disagreements are disagreements in belief.

Question 32

C. L. Stevenson: The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms
Stevenson claims that before we can hope to answer ethical questions, we must first try to understand exactly what is being asked. In light of this, he examines the question: what does it mean to call something good? According to interest theories, to say that something is good is simply to say that it is approved of or desired, either by the speaker or by some group of people. Stevenson denies that such theories can fully capture what it means to call something good, and sets out to provide a more satisfying theory. He claims that any such theory must account for three things: (i) people may sensibly disagree about what is good, (ii) goodness has a "magnetism" in that judgments about goodness motivate us to act, and (iii) claims about goodness are not empirically verifiable. Stevenson believes his theory, emotivism, meets these requirements. According to emotivism, ethical claims are not simply attempts to describe the world, but are primarily used to influence others. As Stevenson puts the point, "ethical terms are instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests."
Stevenson maintains that ethical terms have emotive meanings, in the sense that they tend to produce affective responses in people. We use these emotive meanings to try to influence others to approve or disapprove of certain things. Thus, on Stevenson's view, to claim that something is good is both to express one's own approval of the thing, as well as to encourage one's audience to join in approving of it. Moral disagreements are therefore not mere disagreements in belief, in which one person believes a proposition and the other one disbelieves it. Rather, in ethical disagreements, one person has a favorable attitude toward something, whereas the other has an unfavorable attitude, and neither is content to let the other's attitude remain.
-According to Stevenson, disagreement in interest may be rooted in disagreement in belief.