Deck 20: John Dewey

Question 1

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey argues that a theory of valuation must be empirically verifiable. Why does he impose this desideratum? Do you find this desideratum plausible? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey gives a number of examples to support his theory of valuation. Describe one of these examples. Does it support his theory? Defend your answer.

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey maintains that the measure of the value a person attaches to a given end is determined by her behavior. What is Dewey's argument for this position? Do you find his argument plausible? Why or why not?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey worries that his theory faces a potential infinite regress. Explain this regress and how Dewey attempts to avoid it. Do you think his response is successful?

Question 5

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Why does Dewey think that we face a problem of valuation? What does he think is the solution to this problem? Do you find his view attractive?

Question 6

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-What is a value-expression, in Dewey's view? How does he think we make such expressions? Do you find Dewey's account plausible? Defend your answer.

Question 7

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, what is the relation of "means" to "ends"? Do you agree with Dewey that it is absurd to value and end apart from the means by which it is to be attained. Why or why not?

Question 8

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, the most extreme theory of value holds that values are:

A) derived from the commands of God.
B) emotional epithets or ejaculations.
C) a priori principles of validity.
D) none of the above.

Question 9

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, the problem of value arose:

A) when teleological considerations were eliminated from the natural sciences.
B) when theism no longer seemed tenable.
C) alongside non-cognitivism.
D) none of the above.

Question 10

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey claims that value-expressions:

A) are social phenomena.
B) refer directly to an existing situation.
C) refer indirectly to a future situation which it is intended and desired to produce.
D) all of the above.

Question 11

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey maintains that the existence of valuations is determined:

A) a priori.
B) by meeting the dictionary definition.
C) by observations of behavior.
D) by passions.

Question 12

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, what distinguishes a "wish" from a "desire" is:

A) wishes are accompanied by an absence of effort.
B) wishes are improbable.
C) wishes are harder to satisfy.
D) unsatisfied wishes are more painful

Question 13

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey claims that value-propositions are:

A) propositions about the relations of ideas.
B) propositions about matters of fact.
C) a unique class of propositions.
D) none of the above.

Question 14

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, an end-in-view proposition is warranted insofar as:

A) existing conditions have been surveyed and appraised in their capacity as means.
B) existing conditions have been surveyed and appraised in their capacity to cohere with other ends.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 15

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey claims that the measure of the value a person attaches to a given end is:

A) what he says about its preciousness.
B) the care he devotes to obtaining it.
C) the time he is willing to sacrifice for it.
D) the other ends he is willing to forgo to attain it.

Question 16

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey maintains that "extrinsic value" is:

A) the most important kind of value.
B) parasitic on instrumental value.
C) parasitic on intrinsic value.
D) a contradiction in terms.

Question 17

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, desires are matured by:

A) the agreement of the consequences with the ends anticipated.
B) agreement of the desires with what is intrinsically valuable.
C) refining desires in light of the total set of one's desires.
D) agreement between self-interested desires and the desires of others.

Question 18

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey claims that the difference between "what is desired" and "what is desirable" is:

A) that the former is an unexamined impulse, and the latter the product of investigation.
B) that the former is what we actually want, and the latter is what other people want for us.
C) that the former is what we actually want, and the latter is what an idealized version of ourselves would want.
D) there is no difference.

Question 19

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey maintains that desires arise:

A) when there is some trouble.
B) when something is lacking or wanting in the situation.
C) when a conflict of tendencies needs to be resolved by changing existing conditions.
D) all of the above.

Question 20

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey argues that ends-in-view depend on:

A) the adequacy with which inquiry into the existing situation has been carried out.
B) the adequacy with which inquiry into a course of action will satisfy an existing need.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 21

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey claims that Lamb's essay on the origin of roast pork shows:

A) the absurdity of non-cognitivism.
B) the absurdity of any end set up apart from the means.
C) the absurdity of a priori assessments of value.
D) the absurdity of extrinsic value.

Question 22

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, an end-in-itself is:

A) required to ground intrinsic value.
B) required to calculate the cost of means.
C) required to ground human dignity.
D) self-contradictory.

Question 23

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by estimates of value of the ends to be attained.

Question 24

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, the problem of valuation stretches back to antiquity.

Question 25

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey argues that value-expressions are not truth-apt.

Question 26

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, valuations require statement in verifiable propositions.

Question 27

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey claims that vital impulses are valuations.

Question 28

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey argues that valuation-propositions form a distinct, special class of propositions.

Question 29

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-According to Dewey, rules of appraisal rest upon scientifically warranted physical generalizations.

Question 30

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey claims that persons modify their desires in light of the effort it would take to satisfy them.

Question 31

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey argues that propositions in which things are appraised as means enter necessarily into the desires that determine the value of ends.

Question 32

John Dewey: Theory of Valuation
Dewey begins with a puzzle. On the one hand, the natural sciences do not contain value-expressions. On the other hand, all planned human conduct seems to be guided by the value of our ends. This puzzle Dewey calls "the problem of valuation" - it is the problem of directing human conduct within a naturalistic worldview.
The solution to this problem, Dewey argues, lies in a behavioristic theory of valuation. Take the simple case of a baby crying. The cry, Dewey claims, aims to illicit a certain response in order to bring about a certain consequence. Similarly, when we make value-expressions, we find ourselves in a certain predicament. We then refer to our situation with aversion and an inclination to a different, more amenable, future situation. Importantly, given that such expressions aim to solve a particular problem, value expressions are subject to empirical verification. We can, that is, test the results of our value expressions by seeing how well they guide our action in getting us out of the predicament. The existence of valuations, Dewey maintains, is thus determined entirely by observations of behavior.
There is, Dewey recognizes, a potential objection to this account: namely, it seems to apply to the value of things as means only, and not to things as ends. Without an explanation of why we should value certain ends, the account appears to be objectionably incomplete. In response, Dewey attempts to blur the distinction between means and ends. He argues that we do not have definite ends, which we then devise the means to accomplish. Rather, our means and ends our fluid. If the means to a given end are prohibitively costly we revise our initial assessment of the value of the end. The value of the end is thus bound up with the means. We value the two as a package, not taken separately. The objection, accordingly, loses its force. Dewey therefore concludes that his theory of valuation provides a complete account that is both naturalistically respectable and able to guide human conduct.
-Dewey maintains that there is a sharp separation between things as useful and things as intrinsically good.