Deck 21: R.M.Hare

Question 1

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Describe the case of the debtor that Hare presents, and explain the kind of moral reasoning that goes on in this case. What method does Hare think we ought to use to reason about ethics, generally?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-What four "necessary ingredients" does Hare think are required for a moral argument to proceed? Explain each ingredient.

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that moral arguments would have no force against a "completely apathetic person." Why is this a consequence of his theory? Do you agree with this claim?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-What is a "fanatic," in Hare's terminology? To what extent does Hare think it is possible to argue with fanatics?

Question 5

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-What similarities does Hare find between scientific investigation and moral inquiry? What differences does he see between the two? Do you find his account of the relationship between science and ethics plausible?

Question 6

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-What two alleged features of moral language does Hare claim provide the "logical framework" within which ethical inquiry takes place? Do you agree that moral language has these two features? Why or why not?

Question 7

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-What does Hare mean when he says that "all moral arguments are ad hominem"? Why is this a consequence of his theory?

Question 8

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that the two essential features of the logic of moral judgments are:

A) consequentialism and hedonism.
B) universalizability and prescriptivity.
C) contractualism and rule-following.
D) consistency and coherence.

Question 9

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-In Hare's example of the debtors, B cannot accept the judgment that he ought to put A in prison because:

A) this would not maximize happiness.
B) he cannot universalize the principle behind it.
C) he cannot accept the prescription "Let C put me in prison."
D) both b and c.

Question 10

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare asserts that ethics and science are similar in that:

A) both seek to provide us with true beliefs about the world.
B) both are essential components of a worthwhile life.
C) both involve testing general principles by examining their logical consequences.
D) all of the above.

Question 11

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that ethics and science are different in that:

A) scientific claims express beliefs, whereas ethical claims express prescriptions.
B) ethical claims, unlike scientific ones, can be refuted by imagined cases.
C) ethical arguments, unlike scientific ones, rely on our inclinations.
D) all of the above.

Question 12

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that moral principles that suggest themselves to us by our:

A) recognizing that they are supported by the best scientific theories.
B) intuition.
C) noting that they would be agreed on by hypothetical contractors.
D) following out their consequences and seeing whether we can accept them.

Question 13

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare defines ethics as:

A) the attempt to state, in very general terms, which actions are right and wrong.
B) the study of what we ought to do in particular, everyday situations.
C) the study of the logical properties of moral words.
D) the study of what God commands us to do.

Question 14

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that once two people agree on the meaning of the term "ought":

A) they will share all the same moral opinions.
B) they will disagree morally only if they disagree about the facts of the case.
C) they will disagree morally only if they have different inclinations.
D) none of the above.

Question 15

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-According to Hare, if one were to use "ought" in a way that is not universalizable, then:

A) one would no longer be expressing moral judgments.
B) one would be behaving immorally in doing so.
C) it would become impossible to issue prescriptions.
D) all of the above.

Question 16

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that one who refuses to make any positive moral judgments:

A) is irrational.
B) is immoral.
C) cannot coherently invoke morality to protect one's own interests.
D) couldn't possibly exist.

Question 17

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-According to Hare, people with eccentric desires:

A) must revise their moral views in light of the desires of others.
B) have incoherent moral views.
C) sometimes have strange moral views that cannot be successfully argued against.
D) tend to have better justified moral views than others.

Question 18

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare argues that in order to succeed in rejecting an evaluative proposition, a moral argument necessarily requires:

A) that the facts of the case be given.
B) a logical framework.
C) inclinations.
D) all of the above.

Question 19

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that one must be prepared to give weight to another's inclinations as if they were:

A) a parent's.
B) a close friend's.
C) his own.
D) all of the above.

Question 20

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare refers to people who endorse ideals without regard for whether people's interests are pursued by them as:

A) fanatics.
B) amoralists.
C) immoralists.
D) maniacs.

Question 21

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-According to Hare, if one were to use "ought" in a way that was not prescriptive, then:

A) any supposed moral disagreements that were to arise would be merely verbal.
B) one could still make moral judgments, so long as one remained willing to universalize them.
C) one would be contradicting oneself.
D) one would do serious damage to the institution of morality.

Question 22

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that all moral arguments are:

A) useless.
B) valid.
C) ad hominem.
D) sound.

Question 23

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-According to Hare, moral judgments are essentially prescriptive.

Question 24

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that for there to be genuine moral disagreement the parties must differ over some universal principle about what ought to be done.

Question 25

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare argues that a moral argument cannot proceed unless the facts of the case are given.

Question 26

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare argues that moral principles can be rationally rejected only on the basis of observation.

Question 27

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that philosophical ethics is morally neutral in that it does not entail any substantial moral judgments.

Question 28

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-According to Hare, moral argument is impossible against someone who refuses to make any moral judgments.

Question 29

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that it is logically possible to want anything.

Question 30

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-In Hare's view, moral judgments are deducible from factual statements about people's inclinations.

Question 31

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare claims that it is logically impossible to sincerely endorse genocide.

Question 32

R. M. Hare: Freedom and Reason
Hare argues that moral judgments are universalizable and prescriptive. That is, he claims that to genuinely make a moral judgment, one must be willing to universalize that judgment-if you claim that another person ought not do x, you must also be willing to admit that you ought not do x if faced with the same circumstances. Furthermore, he maintains that moral judgments are characteristically prescriptive, such that making the judgment "I ought to do x" involves (among other things) accepting the prescription "Let me do x."
Given these two features of moral judgments, Hare develops a theory of moral reasoning that parallels scientific reasoning. Like scientific reasoning, moral reasoning involves assessing general principles by attempting to falsify their particular consequences. While scientific hypotheses can be falsified only by actual observations, however, Hare claims that moral principles can be reasonably rejected on the basis of merely supposed cases. Thus, to test the principle "creditors always ought to imprison their debtors," we need not find a case that contradicts the principle; it is sufficient if we can imagine a case in which a creditor ought not to imprison a debtor.
In Hare's view, moral reasoning involves four necessary ingredients: (i) a knowledge of all the relevant facts of the case, (ii) an appreciation of the logical framework provided by the constraints of universalizability and prescriptivity, (iii) a set of inclinations, and (iv) the power to imagine what it is like to be in the shoes of others. To discover what we morally ought to do, we must ask whether we would be able to universalize the principles we are inclined to accept. Hare concludes by considering how one might try to escape from the type of moral arguments he advocates. He concludes that although we can often rationally persuade others to adopt our moral views, it might be impossible, even in principle, to do so when dealing with people who have very unusual inclinations.
-Hare maintains that morality provides protection for those who refrain from making moral judgments.