Deck 22: J.J.C.Smart

Question 1

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-What is the main divide between extreme and restricted utilitarianism? What are strengths and weaknesses of each position? Does one of the views of a clear theoretical advantage? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-How, according to Smart, does the extreme utilitarian rely on rules? Does this push the extreme utilitarian toward restricted utilitarianism? Use Smart's example of the rules of the road in explaining your answer.

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Describe the case of the desert-island promise that Smart presents. Does extreme or restricted utilitarianism yield the more plausible verdict about whether to keep the promise? Explain your answer.

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart charges restricted utilitarianism with engaging in rule-worship. What is his argument for this charge? Do you think his argument succeeds? Why or why not?

Question 5

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-According to Smart, there is a distinction between the utility of the action and the utility of the praise of it. What does Smart mean by this claim, and what are its implications? Do you think this distinction is sustainable?

Question 6

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart argues that if a rule to act-optimifically were added to the set of rules endorsed by restricted utilitarianism, restricted utilitarianism would collapse into extreme utilitarianism. Is Smart right about this? Defend your answer.

Question 7

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Describe Smart's watering gardens case. Does extreme or restricted utilitarianism yield the more plausible verdict? Explain your answer.

Question 8

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.

-According to Smart, there are two versions of utilitarianism depending on how we interpret:

A) consequences.
B) the word "actions."
C) happiness.
D) pleasure.

Question 9

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart claims that extreme utilitarianism:

A) tests individual actions by their consequences.
B) tests actions by rules and rules by consequences.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 10

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-According to Smart, the extreme utilitarian relies on rules:

A) when there is a lack of time.
B) when there is a lack of information.
C) when persons are inclined to be biased.
D) all of the above.

Question 11

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart claims that restricted utilitarianism:

A) tests individual actions by their consequences.
B) tests actions by rules and rules by consequences.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 12

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-According to Smart, the restricted utilitarian relies on acts:

A) when an action comes under two conflicting rules.
B) when there is no rule under which the act falls.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 13

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-According to Smart, a restricted utilitarian would apply the universalization principle in:

A) the hypothetical form.
B) the causal form.
C) the Kantian form.
D) none of the above.

Question 14

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart claims that, for the extreme utilitarian, moral rules are:

A) worthless.
B) rules of thumb.
C) of intrinsic moral significance.
D) akin to rules of etiquette.

Question 15

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart argues that if we continue to follow a rule when we know that in this instance to break it will have better results:

A) we are engaged in superstitious rule-worship.
B) we are doing what is required.
C) we are doing what is permissible.
D) we are doing what is supererogatory.

Question 16

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-According to Smart, Mill's example of the nautical almanac:

A) supports extreme utilitarianism.
B) supports restricted utilitarianism.
C) does not support extreme utilitarianism.
D) does not support restricted utilitarianism.

Question 17

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-In the desert-island promise case, Smart argues that we should:

A) keep the promise.
B) break the promise.
C) deny that the promise is still binding.
D) none of the above.

Question 18

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart claims that when we perform the right action:

A) we are never blamable.
B) we are always blameless.
C) we are sometimes blamable.
D) none of the above.

Question 19

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-In Smart's view, what is needed to illuminate the basis of ethics is:

A) a theory of games.
B) a system of precise rules.
C) a theory of justice.
D) commonsense methodized and corrected.

Question 20

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Each utilitarian, according to Smart, is trying to:

A) get as much as possible for himself.
B) get as much as possible for his loved ones.
C) get as much for humanity excluding himself.
D) get as much for humanity as possible.

Question 21

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart claims that the reason to obey the rule to drive on a particular side of the road is:

A) because that is the rule.
B) because it is the law.
C) because it is the most rational course of action.
D) all of the above.

Question 22

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart conceives of ethics as:

A) the study of how it would be most rational to act.
B) the study of the rules we ought to follow.
C) the study of how we should live.
D) the study of who we should be.

Question 23

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-According to Smart, restricted utilitarianism regards moral rules as rules of thumb.

Question 24

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart claims that utilitarianism is the doctrine that the rightness of actions is to be judged by their consequences.

Question 25

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-According to Smart, we should break the desert-island promise.

Question 26

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart claims that hedonistic utilitarianism holds that the goodness of the consequences of an action is a function only of its pleasurableness.

Question 27

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart claims that if restricted utilitarianism introduces an act-optimifically rule, then it collapses into extreme utilitarianism.

Question 28

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-According to Smart, the extreme utilitarian would apply the hypothetical form of the universalization principle.

Question 29

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart maintains that either restricted utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship, or it collapses into extreme utilitarianism.

Question 30

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart relies on "the common moral consciousness" to decide between extreme and restricted utilitarianism.

Question 31

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-According to Smart, an extreme utilitarian may praise actions which he knows to be wrong.

Question 32

J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism judges actions by their consequences, but are acts to be judged individually or by classes? Smart refers to the former view as extreme utilitarianism, which holds that we should test individual actions by their consequences. He refers to the latter view as restricted utilitarianism, which holds that actions are to be tested by rules and rules by consequences. The main divide between these two forms of utilitarianism, then, comes down to whether rules have intrinsic moral significance. Smart thinks not.
Smart argues that restricted utilitarianism faces a damning dilemma. If we must follow the rules even when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism is committed to an implausible form of rule worship. For example, suppose that we knew a given rule produced the best outcome 99% of the time, but we also know that in this particular instance it will not. To follow this rule, when we know it will not produce the best result is, Smart claims, to idolize the rule. And rules, unlike the good, do not themselves provide us with reasons. If, to avoid such worship, we implement a rule that prescribes breaking the rules when non-optimific, then rule utilitarianism collapses into extreme utilitarianism. Thus, either rule utilitarianism is implausible or it is extensionally identical to act utilitarianism. Either way, Smart concludes, extreme utilitarianism is to be preferred.
-Smart argues that people will probably most often act in an extreme utilitarian way if they do not try to think as extreme utilitarians.