Deck 28: Barbara Herman

Question 1

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-According to Kant, under what circumstances does an action have moral worth? What implications of this view have people found troubling? Do you find Kant's view plausible? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Explain the "fitness report" and "battle citation" models of moral worth. What problems does Herman raise for these models? How serious are these problems for the views?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-What does it mean to say that the motive of duty functions as a "limiting condition"? Can actions on which the motive of duty serves as a limiting condition have moral worth, on Kant's view? Why or why not?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Can overdetermined actions have moral worth or not? Explain your answer.

Question 5

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-What is the "motive of duty"? How does Kant think the motive of duty relates to moral worth? Why has his view been controversial?

Question 6

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-What objections does Herman raise to the idea that actions performed from entirely nonmoral motives can have moral worth? Do you find these objections convincing? Why or why not?

Question 7

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-What is Kant's conception of motives and how does it differ from empiricist accounts of motives? What roles does Kant's theory of motives in Herman's argument?

Question 8

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-According to Herman, even sympathetic readers of Kant have been troubled by:

A) the inflexibility of Kant's ethics.
B) Kant's claim that dutiful actions have no moral worth unless performed for the sake of duty.
C) the way it treats consequences as morally irrelevant.
D) all of the above.

Question 9

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Kant introduces the concept of moral worth as part of the account of:

A) the kingdom of ends.
B) autonomy.
C) the categorical imperative.
D) the good will.

Question 10

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-According to Herman, Kant's cases of good willing are set up as cases:

A) that demonstrate human frailty.
B) that show the connection between good willing and autonomy.
C) where good willing is perspicuous.
D) as the only kinds of cases of good willing.

Question 11

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Herman claims that the class of actions that follow from the inclination to help others:

A) is a subset of the class of dutiful actions.
B) is not a subset of the class of dutiful actions.
C) is a subset of the class of actions with moral worth.
D) is not a subset of the class of actions with moral worth.

Question 12

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-According to the "fitness report" model of moral worth, a dutiful act has moral worth:

A) under any circumstances.
B) if respect for duty was present and would have sufficed to produce the act by itself.
C) only if it is done from duty and no supporting inclinations would have sufficed to produce it.
D) under no circumstances whatsoever.

Question 13

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-According to the "battle citation" model of moral worth, a dutiful act has moral worth:

A) under any circumstances.
B) if respect for duty was present and would have sufficed to produce the act by itself.
C) only if it is done from duty and no supporting inclinations would have sufficed to produce it.
D) under no circumstances whatsoever.

Question 14

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Herman believes that Kant accepts:

A) the "battle citation" model of moral worth.
B) the "fitness report" model of moral worth.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 15

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Herman claims that in Kant's view, motives are best understood as:

A) reasons.
B) causes.
C) desires.
D) none of the above.

Question 16

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Herman claims that an action can have moral worth if it is overdetermined with respect to:

A) incentives, but not if it is overdetermined with respect to motives.
B) motives, but not if it is overdetermined with respect to incentives.
C) both motives or incentives.
D) none of the above.

Question 17

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-In Kant's view, moral worth is a property of:

A) agents.
B) actions.
C) states of affairs.
D) all of the above.

Question 18

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-As Kant sees it, moral deliberation characteristically begins with:

A) reflection on duty.
B) reflection on the good will.
C) a demand placed on us by others.
D) a nonmoral interest or motive.

Question 19

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Herman claims that when we are considering actions that are permissible but not obligatory, the motive of duty can serve as:

A) a primary motive to action.
B) an obstacle to behaving morally.
C) a limiting condition.
D) none of the above.

Question 20

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-According to Herman's interpretation of Kant, the only actions that can have moral worth are those that are:

A) permissible but not obligatory.
B) obligatory.
C) supererogatory.
D) motivated by sympathy.

Question 21

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Herman claims that if the motive of duty is effective and motivating, then the presence of a nonmoral inclination:

A) enhances the moral worth of the action.
B) diminishes, but does not extinguish, the moral worth of the action.
C) extinguishes the moral worth of an action.
D) has no effect on the action's moral worth.

Question 22

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Herman claims that in Kant's view, when we act from the motive of duty we are:

A) free.
B) only partially free.
C) wholly unfree.
D) devoid of all desire.

Question 23

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Kant claims that an act has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty.

Question 24

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-According to Kant, the good will is good because of the effects it produces.

Question 25

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-In Kant's shopkeeper example, Kant believes that the shopkeeper's action has moral worth.

Question 26

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Herman claims that nonmoral motives can produce moral dutiful actions only fortuitously.

Question 27

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-In Herman's view, for a motive to be a moral motive, it must provide the agent with an interest in the moral rightness of his or her action.

Question 28

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Herman claims that if an agent does not have an effective and motivating moral interest in an action, there remains a dependence on interests that compromises the agent's ability to act morally.

Question 29

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-According to Herman's interpretation of Kant, an action can be done from the motive of duty even if the agent has a nonmoral desire to perform it.

Question 30

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-According to Herman's interpretation of Kant, the mere presence of a nonmoral motivation is sufficient to indicate a lack of moral worth.

Question 31

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-Herman claims that for Kant, merely permissible actions cannot have moral worth.

Question 32

Barbara Herman: On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty
Herman's essay examines a controversial doctrine of Immanuel Kant's: that an action has moral worth if and only if it is done from the motive of duty alone - that is, done solely because it is the right thing to do. Many critics have found Kant's view implausible, because actions performed (for example) out of a desire to help people also seem to be morally worthy, even if they are not done from a motive of duty. Herman sets out to clarify and defend Kant's view.
Following Kant, Herman considers two defects of motives other than the motive of duty. The first is that nonmoral motives tend to be morally unreliable; even the desire to help others can motivate one to do immoral things. The second is that those who act from nonmoral motives seem to show a lack of concern for morality, for "while sympathy can give an interest in an action that is (as it happens) right, it cannot give an interest in its being right." For these reasons, Herman agrees that one must be motivated at least in part by a concern for duty for one's action to be morally worthy.
But what about actions that are preformed partly from a nonmoral desire (say, to help others) and partly from a motive of duty? Is Kant committed to saying that such actions have no moral worth? Herman claims that the key to answering this question lies in Kant's conception of motives. According to Herman, "Kantian motives are neither desires nor causes. An agent's motives reflect his reasons for acting." On such a view, one can have an inclination to help others, while still acting solely from the motive of duty. In such a case, Herman claims, one's action can have moral worth.
Herman also discusses how the motive of duty can serve as a limiting factor, not directly motivating actions but constraining the agent from performing impermissible actions. Even though merely permissible actions cannot be done from the motive of duty, Herman argues, the motive of duty can play a role in determining whether we perform them.
-According to Herman's interpretation of Kant, overdetermined actions can have moral worth.