Deck 29: Philippa Foot

Question 1

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-What is a hypothetical imperative, and what does Foot mean by saying that moral norms are hypothetical imperatives? Do you agree with her or not? Defend your answer.

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot claims that in describing moral judgments as categorical, Kant was "ascribing to them a special dignity and necessity." What particular feature was Kant ascribing to moral judgments, and why does Foot deny that moral judgments have this feature? Do you find her arguments convincing?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-What is rationality, according to Foot? What relationship does she think obtains between rationality and morality? Do you agree with her?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-How does Foot think we should view our own commitment to morality? What do you think is the strongest objection to this view? Do you think the objection succeeds?

Question 5

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-What is the difference between a categorical and a hypothetical imperative? Why do many people think that morality must be regarded as consisting of categorical imperatives?

Question 6

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-In what sense are the norms of etiquette nonhypothetical? Why does Foot deny that the norms of etiquette are categorical imperatives? Are moral norms relevantly different than the norms of etiquette?

Question 7

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-How does Foot respond to the objection that her view is "destructive of morality"? Do you find her response to this objection to be adequate? Why or why not?

Question 8

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-According to Foot, it is generally supposed that Kant established beyond doubt:

A) that duties can be derived from the mere form of law.
B) that we ought always to treat people as ends in themselves.
C) that moral judgments are categorical imperatives.
D) that morality does not depend on God.

Question 9

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-A categorical imperative is:

A) a command issued by a superior in a hierarchical institution.
B) a statement that presents an action as necessary without regard to any other end.
C) a statement that presents an action as necessary as a means to an end.
D) a method of organizing one's concepts.

Question 10

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-According to Foot's presentation of Kant, a hypothetical imperative states an action is good:

A) absolutely.
B) independent to any interest or desire.
C) as a means to achieving something else.
D) in itself.

Question 11

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot claims that in describing moral judgments as categorical, Kant was:

A) making a point about language.
B) expressing his own deep devotion to morality.
C) attributing to them a special dignity and necessity.
D) putting them into the same category as norms of etiquette.

Question 12

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-According to Foot, sentences enunciating the rules of etiquette are typically used:

A) hypothetically.
B) nonhypothetically.
C) sometimes hypothetically and sometimes nonhypothetically.
D) emotively.

Question 13

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot argues that the rules of etiquette are not genuine categorical imperatives because:

A) sentences expressing them are used hypothetically.
B) they are based on social conventions.
C) they do not apply to everyone.
D) they lack reason-giving force.

Question 14

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot claims that a person who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules is guilty of:

A) villainy, but not inconsistency.
B) villainy and inconsistency.
C) inconsistency, but not villainy.
D) neither inconsistency nor villainy.

Question 15

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot claims that the normative character of a moral judgment does not guarantee its:

A) desirability.
B) reason-giving force.
C) social acceptability.
D) none of the above.

Question 16

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot conceives of rationality as essentially involving:

A) identifying the means to one's ends.
B) responding to the needs of others.
C) responding to moral requirements.
D) all of the above.

Question 17

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot maintains modern philosophers take moral judgments to be:

A) conditional requirements.
B) objective truths.
C) expressions of our attitudes.
D) unconditional requirements.

Question 18

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot concludes that:

A) neither moral judgments nor statements about etiquette are categorical imperatives.
B) both moral judgments and statements about etiquette are categorical imperatives.
C) moral judgments are categorical imperatives, but statements about etiquette are not.
D) statements about etiquette are categorical imperatives, but moral judgments are not.

Question 19

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot claims it is usually assumed that moral considerations necessarily:

A) tied to agents' desires.
B) apply to everyone in similar circumstances.
C) give reasons to any person.
D) all of the above.

Question 20

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot claims that a person is just:

A) if he performs just actions, regardless of his motives.
B) if he performs just actions because he loves truth and liberty.
C) only if he performs just actions because they are just.
D) only if he performs justice in spite of his contrary inclinations.

Question 21

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot claims that those who insist that everyone has reason to care about morality:

A) are correct.
B) are making a linguistic error.
C) are relying on an illusion.
D) are incorrect, but are the only thing keeping morality from being subverted.

Question 22

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot recommends that we:

A) do our duty because it is our duty.
B) see ourselves as volunteers fighting for liberty and justice.
C) accept that moral requirements give us reasons independently of our desires and interests.
D) do away with moral talk altogether.

Question 23

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-According to Foot, people may follow either morality or etiquette without asking why they should do so, but equally well they may not.

Question 24

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot claims that we should think of imperatives as statements to the effect that something ought to be done or that it would be good to do it.

Question 25

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot asserts that common opinion agrees with Kant that one must accept the rules of morality whatever one's interests or desires.

Question 26

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-According to Foot, all categorical imperatives automatically supply reasons to anyone to whom they apply.

Question 27

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot claims that one can refute a claim about what one morally ought to do by pointing out that doing so would not serve one's interests or desires.

Question 28

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot argues that the rules of etiquette fail to apply to people who do not care about them.

Question 29

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-According to Foot, it is always irrational to act immorally.

Question 30

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot concludes that moral judgments have no better claim to be categorical imperatives than do statements about matters of etiquette.

Question 31

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-According to Foot, for an action to be truly moral it must be done for its own sake.

Question 32

Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives plays a key role in Kant's moral philosophy. Kant conceived of imperatives as statements about what one ought to do. Whereas hypothetical imperatives tell us we ought to act a certain way if we are to achieve a certain end that we desire, categorical imperatives state that we ought to do something regardless of whatever ends we happen to have. Kant held that moral requirements are categorical imperatives. On the face of it, common opinion seems to agree, for you cannot refute the claim that you morally ought to do something simply by pointing out that doing so would not satisfy your desires.
Foot argues that Kant was mistaken about this, and that moral requirements are in fact hypothetical imperatives. She begins by pointing out that as a matter of language, the imperatives of etiquette are also nonhypothetical - such norms do not fail to apply to people simply because they do not care about etiquette. Although the norms of etiquette apply to us regardless of our desires and interests, however, they cannot give us reasons to act independently of our desires and interests. Foot claims that we should think of moral requirements in the same way. In her view, those who reject morality are not necessarily behaving irrationally, for to act irrationally is to act in a way that defeats one's own purposes, and acting immorally need not involve any such self-defeat.
Foot realizes that some people will claim that her thesis is destructive of morality, and will argue that truly moral actions must be done "because they are right." Foot denies this view of morality, arguing that one can act morally simply out of a desire to helps one's fellow humans, or from a desire to be an honest and just person. Instead of seeing morality as demanding things of us independently of our aims, Foot recommends that we see ourselves as "volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression."
-Foot denies that the fact that one morally ought to have certain ends is a reason to adopt those ends.