Deck 31: Thomas Nagel

Question 1

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-What is the "control condition" on moral responsibility? Why might someone believe it to be true? Do you believe it? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Explain in detail one of the four kinds of moral luck that Nagel distinguishes, providing some examples to illustrate. Do you find the existence of this kind of moral luck problematic?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-What is Nagel's explanation of why we can't help but to morally judge others even in cases where we know that the control condition is not satisfied? Do you find his explanation compelling? Defend your answer.

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-What would it mean to deny that there are any genuine cases of moral luck? Is such a position defensible? Why or why not?

Question 5

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-What is moral luck? Why didn't Kant think that moral luck exists? Do you think there are genuine cases of moral luck? Why or why not?

Question 6

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-What four kinds of moral luck does Nagel distinguish? Do you agree that these all generate instances of moral luck?

Question 7

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-What is Nagel's explanation of why the phenomenon of moral luck arises? Do you find it convincing? Why or why not?

Question 8

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel claims that prior to reflection, it seems that people cannot be morally assessed for:

A) actions that affect only themselves.
B) their character.
C) what is due to factors beyond their control.
D) actions that do not violate anyone's rights.

Question 9

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Moral luck is when:

A) a morally good person is fortunate.
B) someone is morally responsible for something outside of his control.
C) one happens to have true moral views, but these views are not justified.
D) one happens to learn a valuable lesson from an unexpected event.

Question 10

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-The control condition claims:

A) it is morally wrong to ever lose control of oneself.
B) it is morally wrong to try to control the lives of (adult) others.
C) one cannot be morally assessed for what is due to factors outside one's control.
D) one cannot be morally blamed for taking control of one's own life.

Question 11

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel claims that if the control condition were consistently applied:

A) violent crime would decrease significantly.
B) we would not have to worry about oppression.
C) we would no longer be able to make most of the moral judgments we do make.
D) none of the above.

Question 12

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Resultant luck concerns:

A) the kind of person one is.
B) the kind of problems and situations one faces.
C) the way one's projects turn out.
D) the way one is determined by antecedent circumstances.

Question 13

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel compares the paradox of moral luck to the situation in another branch of philosophy:

A) theory of knowledge.
B) metaphysics.
C) logic.
D) philosophy of science.

Question 14

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel claims that most skeptical arguments:

A) are the result of applying arbitrarily stringent standards.
B) are based on linguistic confusions.
C) are logically self-refuting.
D) grow from the consistent application of ordinary standards.

Question 15

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Constitutive luck concerns:

A) the kind of person one is.
B) the kind of problems and situations one faces.
C) the way one's projects turn out.
D) the way one is determined by antecedent circumstances.

Question 16

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Circumstantial luck concerns:

A) the kind of person one is.
B) the kind of problems and situations one faces.
C) the way one's projects turn out.
D) the way one is determined by antecedent circumstances.

Question 17

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel claims that the primary object of moral judgment is:

A) a state of affairs.
B) an action.
C) a person.
D) none of the above.

Question 18

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-According to Nagel, the problem of moral luck arises because:

A) philosophers try to apply arbitrarily stringent standards to moral responsibility.
B) the self is threatened with dissolution by the absorption of its acts into the class of events.
C) our moral theories are hopelessly off track.
D) our theories of human action are hopelessly off track.

Question 19

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel claims that moral luck is a fundamental problem about moral responsibility to which we possess no satisfactory solution, because:

A) we are frail and stupid.
B) of clash of the objective and the subjective point of view.
C) of the clash of conflicting evidence.
D) we have insufficient scientific evidence concerning the truth of determinism.

Question 20

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel claims that the problem of moral luck is closely connected to the problem of:

A) the existence of God.
B) freedom of the will.
C) psychological egoism.
D) universals.

Question 21

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-According to Nagel, when it comes to the causes of an agent's actions:

A) all of the relevant factors are within the agent's control
B) most of the relevant factors are within the agent's control.
C) only a few of the relevant factors are within the agent's control.
D) none of the relevant factors are within the agent's control.

Question 22

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-One example of bad constitutive moral luck would be:

A) a person who is by nature envious and ungenerous.
B) a person who lived in Nazi Germany in 1940.
C) a person who drives drunk and hits a child.
D) all of the above.

Question 23

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Kant believed that luck, whether good or bad, should have no influence on the moral assessment of persons and actions.

Question 24

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-According to Nagel, we tend to feel that moral assessment is undermined when we discover that an action is not under a person's control.

Question 25

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel claims that almost nothing about what person does seems to be under his control.

Question 26

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel argues most believe that two people ought not to be assessed in morally different ways if the only differences between them are factors beyond their control.

Question 27

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-According to Nagel, our beliefs are always ultimately due to factors outside our control.

Question 28

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel claims that the actual results of an action do not affect one's culpability in performing it.

Question 29

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-According to Nagel, the American Revolution was a case of circumstantial luck.

Question 30

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel claims that we often morally judge people for what they would have done if circumstances were different.

Question 31

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-Nagel claims that the idea of agency is incompatible with actions being events.

Question 32

Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck
Intuitively, people should not be condemned for things that are due to factors beyond their control. Nagel argues, however, that there seem to be many instances of moral luck. Cases of moral luck occur when what someone does depends on factors beyond her control, yet we continue to treat her as the proper object of moral assessment. For example, we condemn the drunk driver who hits a pedestrian far more harshly than the one who merely drives off the road, even though the fact of whether a pedestrian is present is beyond the driver's control.
Nagel distinguishes among four different sources of moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns what kind of person one is, in terms of one's inclinations and temperament. Another category of luck - circumstantial luck - encompasses the circumstances one happens to be in, and the kinds of problems one faces. A third kind of luck - causal luck - concerns how one is determined by antecedent circumstances. And a final kind of luck - resultant luck - deals with the consequences of one's actions and projects, like the case of our drunk driver.
When we take all four of these types of luck into account, Nagel argues, "nothing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control." Yet, we continue morally judging people for their actions. Nagel argues that this paradox arises from our concepts of agency and events. On the one hand, the idea that we are agents is incompatible with the view that we are mere things, and that our actions are mere events. Yet, as we learn more about the causes of our actions and their consequences, we seem forced to accept the view that we are indeed things and our actions are events. Nonetheless, Nagel claims that we can't help but feel moral emotions like pride and guilt about our own actions. Ultimately, Nagel concludes, the problem of moral luck does not admit of a satisfactory solution; it is the irreconcilable clash of the objective and subjective points of view
-According to Nagel, we are unable to view ourselves simply through an external evaluative perspective.