Deck 34: G.E.M.Anscombe

Question 1

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-How does Anscombe respond to Hume's suggestion that it is impossible to infer an "ought" from an "is"? Do you find her response to this problem satisfactory? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe claims that the expression morally ought "no longer signifies a real concept at all." What reason does she give for thinking this? Do you think she is right? Defend your answer.

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-According to Anscombe, we will not be able to do moral philosophy profitably "until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." What would this involve? Do you agree that having an adequate philosophy of psychology is necessary to do moral philosophy well? Why or why not?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe claims that "the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance." What objection does she raise to all such theories? Do you find her objection compelling?

Question 5

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-What objection does Anscombe raise to the notion of moral obligation? Do you find her objection convincing? Why or why not?

Question 6

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Why does Anscombe claim that "it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy"? What does she think would be required before we would be able to do so?

Question 7

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe recommends that we stop using the notion of moral obligation. What does she recommend that we replace this concept with? What do you think would be the costs and benefits of making this revision to our moral thought?

Question 8

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-According to Anscombe, Aristotelian ethics contrasts with modern moral philosophy because Aristotle seems to lack a concept of:

A) moral conscience.
B) moral blame.
C) moral virtue.
D) all of the above.

Question 9

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-According to Anscombe, the concept of moral obligation:

A) is central to all ethical theories.
B) should be clarified.
C) was central to Aristotle's ethics, but has since declined.
D) ought to be jettisoned from our moral thought.

Question 10

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe criticizes as absurd Kant's idea of:

A) the thing in itself.
B) the categorical imperative.
C) the phenomenal self.
D) legislating for oneself.

Question 11

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-According to Anscombe, it would be a great improvement if we replaced "morally wrong" with:

A) concepts of virtue.
B) morally ought.
C) shouldn't be done.
D) none of the above.

Question 12

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe claims that an adequate moral psychology would include:

A) an answer to the mind-body problem.
B) analyses of concepts such as "action" and "intention."
C) an explanation of how free will is possible.
D) all of the above.

Question 13

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe claims that the ethics of Christianity is based on the idea of:

A) love.
B) fairness.
C) grace.
D) divine law.

Question 14

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-According to Anscombe, "moral obligation" currently signifies:

A) the norms of a society.
B) the feelings of an individual.
C) the commands of God.
D) no real concept at all.

Question 15

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe claims that consequentialism is:

A) correct.
B) shallow.
C) self-effacing.
D) the best view on offer.

Question 16

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe criticizes Sidgwick on the grounds that:

A) he does not distinguish between the foreseen and intended consequences of an action.
B) he endorses the divine law conception of ethics.
C) he claims that there is a "natural balance" to the universe.
D) all of the above.

Question 17

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-According to Anscombe, someone who thinks it might be permissible to execute an innocent person to bring about the greater good:

A) is particularly morally perceptive.
B) is mistaken and ought to be talked out of this position.
C) shows a corrupt mind and is not worth arguing with.
D) is not a consequentialist.

Question 18

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe claims that the notion of moral obligation is derived from the concept of:

A) preference.
B) maximizing utility.
C) positive law.
D) divine law.

Question 19

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Aristotle's ethics revolves around the idea of:

A) utility.
B) virtue.
C) obligation.
D) prima facie duty.

Question 20

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe criticizes Butler on the grounds that:

A) our consciences are fallible.
B) the notion of "legislating for oneself" is absurd.
C) we really can derive an "ought" from an "is."
D) the concept of "pleasure" is unclear.

Question 21

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe claims that in the absence of a law conception of ethics:

A) moral philosophy is impossible.
B) the notion of moral obligation remains coherent.
C) a moral theory based on the idea of virtue remains coherent.
D) the idea of justice is incoherent.

Question 22

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe claims that Aristotelian ethics deals with borderline cases:

A) by refusing to answer them.
B) with method of casuistry.
C) by looking to expected consequences.
D) none of the above.

Question 23

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe claims that punishing a man for what he is clearly understood not to have done is a paradigm case of injustice.

Question 24

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-According to Anscombe, the concept of moral obligation only makes sense within a law conception of ethics.

Question 25

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe argues that modern moral philosophers should look back to Aristotle to help elucidate the nature of moral obligation.

Question 26

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe maintains that Aristotle provides an adequate account of human flourishing.

Question 27

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-In Anscombe's terminology, the facts I ordered potatoes and you supplied them and sent me a bill are brute relative to the fact that I owe you money.

Question 28

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe argues that there are few if any important differences between the views of the various English moral philosophers that have written since Sidgwick.

Question 29

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-According to Anscombe, the expression "morally ought" no longer signifies a real concept.

Question 30

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe objects to consequentialism on the grounds that it does not absolutely prohibit certain actions, such as intentionally killing an innocent person.

Question 31

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-According to Anscombe, an adequate philosophy of psychology would include analyses of concepts such as action, intention, and virtue.

Question 32

G. E. M. Anscombe: Modern Moral Philosophy
Anscombe argues that the moral philosophy of the past several hundred years has rested on serious confusions, so much so that it is not currently profitable to do moral philosophy. She begins by providing brief critiques of a number of important moral philosophers, including Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham, and Mill. Although she raises different objections for each of these views, she claims that a common problem for all modern moral theories is that they invoke the concept of moral obligation. Anscombe points out that ancient philosophers such as Aristotle had no such concept, and argues that the concept is one we inherited from the divine law conception of ethics prevalent in Christianity. Anscombe notes that without this foundation (which is no longer endorsed by most moral philosophers), talk of moral obligations retains some psychological effect, but no longer picks out a coherent concept. Instead of basing our ethical theories on the notion of moral obligation, Anscombe recommends a return to the ancient approach of thinking about the virtues. Even in the absence of divine law, we can still sensibly describe actions as untruthful or unjust. This approach, however, must wait until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, which tells us what makes certain traits virtues, which itself will require analyzing related concepts such as action, intention, and pleasure.
Anscombe also criticizes the British moral philosophy of her time. She claims that every British moral philosopher since Sidgwick has denied that there are certain actions that can never be right, regardless of their consequences. Against this, Anscombe claims that it is always forbidden to kill an innocent person, even if doing so would bring about good consequences - e.g., by saving several others. The plausibility of absolutism thus gives us another good reason to adopt a virtue-based account of ethics: Although someone might claim that it is sometimes morally right to kill an innocent person, no one would deny that it is unjust to do so.
-Anscombe argues that our conscience is a reliable guide to our moral obligations.