Deck 39: J.L.Mackie

Question 1

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Explain Mackie's distinction between "first order" and "second order" moral questions. What relationship does Mackie think obtains between first order and second order moral questions? Which category does his "moral skepticism" fall into?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie claims that moral judgments contain a "claim to objectivity." Explain what he means by this. Why does he think that rival theories fail to capture this aspect of moral discourse? Do you think he is correct about this?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Critically examine one of Mackie's two main arguments against the existence of objective moral values. Describe the argument in detail, and then raise what you take to be the most serious objection to the argument. Do you think Mackie's argument succeeds? Defend your answer.

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-What does Mackie mean by "patterns of objectification"? What role do they play in Mackie's argument for his theory? Do you find his explanation of these patterns convincing?

Question 5

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-What different senses of "moral skepticism" does Mackie distinguish? Which one represents his position?

Question 6

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie contrasts his position with both noncognitivism and naturalism. What are each of these positions, and how does Mackie's position differ from them?

Question 7

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-What two arguments does Mackie give for his claim that there are no objective values? Do you find these arguments convincing? Why or why not?

Question 8

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-According to Mackie's use of the term, a "moral skeptic" is someone who:

A) rejects established morality.
B) denies the existence of objective values.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 9

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie intends for his moral skepticism to be:

A) a first order position.
B) a second order position.
C) both a first order and a second order position.
D) neither a first order nor a second order position.

Question 10

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie claims that subjectivism is:

A) a linguistic claim.
B) a conceptual claim.
C) a negative doctrine.
D) a positive doctrine.

Question 11

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie objects to noncognitivism on the grounds that:

A) it does not account for the claim to objectivity present in moral judgments.
B) it does not account for the categorically prescriptive nature of moral judgments.
C) it does not account for the fact that moral claims are literally meaningless.
D) none of the above.

Question 12

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie objects to moral naturalism on the grounds that:

A) it does not account for the claim to objectivity present in moral judgments.
B) it does not account for the categorically prescriptive nature of moral judgments.
C) it does not account for the fact that moral claims are literally meaningless.
D) none of the above.

Question 13

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie objects to error theory on the grounds that:

A) it does not account for the claim to objectivity present in moral judgments.
B) it does not account for the categorically prescriptive nature of moral judgments.
C) it does not account for the fact that moral claims are literally meaningless.
D) none of the above.

Question 14

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-According to Mackie, the idea that moral judgments are objective is present in:

A) the main tradition of European moral philosophy.
B) ordinary moral thought.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 15

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-The argument from relativity begins by pointing out:

A) Einstein's observations about time and space.
B) the variation among the moral codes of different societies.
C) the fact that we often care more about our families than about strangers.
D) the fact that we often do not live up to our own ethical standards.

Question 16

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-According to Mackie, the best explanation for the variation in the moral codes of different societies is that:

A) many people have distorted moral vision.
B) different things are morally required depending on the circumstances.
C) moral codes reflect ways of life rather than perceptions of objective values.
D) none of the above.

Question 17

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie claims that the assertion that there exist intrinsically prescriptive entities is:

A) true.
B) false.
C) meaningless.
D) contradictory.

Question 18

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-According to Mackie, non-cognitivism and naturalism can account for the fact that:

A) moral judgments are all false.
B) moral judgments are universalizable.
C) moral judgments are action-guiding.
D) all of the above

Question 19

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-"Companions in guilt" are often invoked:

A) to support the Argument from Relativity.
B) as an objection to the Argument from Relativity.
C) to support the Argument from Queerness.
D) as an objection to the Argument from Queerness.

Question 20

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie claims that if something were objectively good:

A) everyone in the world would seek it.
B) everyone who was acquainted with it would seek it.
C) whether people would seek it would depend on their desires.
D) no one would seek it.

Question 21

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie's "patterns of objectification" are an attempt to explain:

A) why values are not really objective.
B) why values are really objective.
C) why people think values are objective, even though they are not.
D) why people think values are not objective, even though they are.

Question 22

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-According to Mackie, we commit the pathetic fallacy when we:

A) won't accept a claim about human frailty.
B) won't accept a claim that is sad but true.
C) read our feelings on to their objects.
D) adjust our feelings to fit the feelings of others.

Question 23

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-According to Mackie, there is no objective difference between kind and cruel actions.

Question 24

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie's moral skepticism is a linguistic thesis about what moral statements mean.

Question 25

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie maintains that if there were objective values, they would be entities utterly different from anything else in the universe.

Question 26

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-According to Mackie, ordinary moral judgments are literally meaningless.

Question 27

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Although many moral philosophers have held that morality is objective, Mackie denies that this supposition is part of the meaning of moral claims.

Question 28

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie claims that noncognitivism and naturalism leave out the apparent authority of ethics.

Question 29

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-According to Mackie, the best explanation for why different cultures have different moral beliefs is that moral beliefs tend to reflect ways of life.

Question 30

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-The Argument from Queerness has two parts: one is metaphysical and the other is epistemological.

Question 31

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-According to Mackie, the fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty logically entails that the action is wrong.

Question 32

J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
Mackie's position, which he calls "moral skepticism" but has come to be more commonly known as "the error theory," involves two central claims. First, Mackie claims that ordinary moral discourse contains a "claim to objectivity." When someone makes a moral claim-e.g., that abortion is immoral-they do not mean to merely express their feelings or issue a command. Rather, they are seeking to describe an intrinsic feature of the action in question-in this case, that abortion is objectively the sort of thing that ought not to be done. Second, Mackie claims that objective moral values do not exist. It follows from these two theses that all moral claims are false.
Mackie gives two main arguments for his claim that objective values do not exist. The Argument from Relativity maintains that variation in moral judgments, both between individuals and between societies, is best explained by the hypothesis that moral judgments reflect ways of life rather than objective moral facts. If so, Mackie claims, there is good reason to believe that moral facts do not exist. The second argument, the Argument from Queerness, has two parts, one metaphysical and one epistemological. Metaphysically, if objective values did exist, they would be completely unlike anything else in the universe, in that they would give us reasons for action independently of what we happen to desire or aim at. Epistemologically, if such values existed, they would have to be known by some special faculty of intuition, completely different from our other ways of knowing about the world. Because it is implausible that such strange facts or faculties exist, Mackie claims, we should accept that no objective values exist. Mackie concludes with a brief discussion of how people could come to believe in objective values, despite their non-existence.
-Mackie claims that people believe that morality is objective in part because they want their moral judgments to be authoritative for other people as well as themselves.