Deck 40: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Question 1

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Identify the version of moral intuitionism that is the focus of Sinnott-Armstrong's attack. Why might moral intuitionism of this sort be attractive? Might any of these attractive features be used to fend off Sinnott-Armstrong's attack? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong cites a number of psychological studies. Examine closely one of these studies, and explain how it supports his thesis. Are there reasons to be suspicious of, say, studies that rely on the moral intuitions of undergraduates? Why or why not.

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong, a partial belief is a belief that affects your self-interest. Does a connection to self-interest always call into question the credibility of a belief such that it requires additional confirmation to be justified? Can you think of any counterexamples?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong admits that some moral beliefs might not be captured by his five principles. He maintains, nevertheless, that they still require confirmation. How does Sinnott-Armstrong argue for this claim? Do you find this argument plausible? Defend your answer.

Question 5

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong argues that disagreement over a moral claim suggests that the claim stands in need of confirmation. In what ways does he qualify this position? After these qualifications, do you find his position defensible? Why or why not?

Question 6

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong admits that even if some confirmation is needed, that does not show that any inference is needed. He maintains, nevertheless, that this does not blunt the force of his attack against moral intuitionism. Why does he think this? Do you find his response plausible? Defend your answer.

Question 7

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong cites a number of principles that, if applicable, indicate that our beliefs require further confirmation. His critics, Sinnott-Armstrong notes, argue that his position leads to moral skepticism. How does he respond? Do you find this response compelling. Why or why not?

Question 8

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong, Moore's critique of the naturalistic fallacy led many twentieth-century moral philosophers to:

A) embrace moral skepticism.
B) reject moral intuitionism.
C) reject empirical science as irrelevant to moral philosophy.
D) all of the above.

Question 9

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Moral intuitionists apply foundationalism to moral beliefs as a way to:

A) know certain moral truths.
B) stop the skeptical regress.
C) be sure that certain acts are the things to do.
D) put an end to challenges from their opponents.

Question 10

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong, to say that moral believers are justified independently of an inferential ability is:

A) to say they would be justified even if they were not able to infer those beliefs from any other beliefs.
B) to say they would be justified even if they were moral idiots.
C) to say they would be justified even if they were logically incompetent.
D) to say they would be justified even if they held all their other beliefs unjustifiably.

Question 11

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong claims that rational intuitionists see basic moral beliefs as analogous to:

A) beliefs about colors.
B) beliefs in logical axioms.
C) beliefs in mathematical axioms
D) none of the above.

Question 12

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-In Sinnott-Armstrong's view, we can deny moral intuitionism by:

A) showing that moral beliefs always depend on inferential ability.
B) showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 13

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation of beliefs is needed:

A) when the believer is partial.
B) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other.
C) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment.
D) all of the above.

Question 14

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong claims that the following principle explains why we do not view beliefs based on prejudice and stereotype as justified:

A) confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the believer is partial.
B) confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the believer is emotional.
C) confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the circumstances are conducive to illusion.
D) confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source.

Question 15

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong maintains that his list of "principles for when confirmation is needed" applies to:

A) beliefs about arithmetic and language.
B) beliefs about sound, size, and shape.
C) beliefs about morality and value.
D) all of the above.

Question 16

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong believers can be called partial whenever:

A) their beliefs affect their self-interest directly.
B) their beliefs affect their self-interest indirectly.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 17

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-When surveying 52 undergraduates at Dartmouth College, Sinnott-Armstrong found:

A) significant disagreement over what to do in the side-track and fat-man trolley cases.
B) moderate disagreement over what to do in the side-track and fat-man trolley cases.
C) minimal disagreement over what to do in the side-track and fat-man trolley cases.
D) consensus over what to do in the side-track and fat-man trolley cases.

Question 18

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Greene and Haidt, moral judgments are:

A) much like mathematical judgments.
B) much like aesthetic judgments.
C) much like religious judgments.
D) much like grammatical judgments.

Question 19

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Moll's group found that brain tissue associate with ____________ becomes activated when subjects think about simple sentences with moral content.

A) emotions.
B) critical thinking.
C) social reasoning.
D) hunger.

Question 20

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong argues that the following illusions might infect our moral beliefs:

A) illusions from context.
B) illusions from overgeneralization.
C) illusions from heuristics.
D) all of the above.

Question 21

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong, many of our moral beliefs:

A) come from social interaction.
B) are innate.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 22

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong claims that his five principles are:

A) overriding defeaters.
B) undermining defeaters.
C) rebutting defeaters.
D) all of the above.

Question 23

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong, reliabilists hold that any belief is justified if it results from a reliable process, regardless of whether that process has anything to do with any inference.

Question 24

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Unlike Moore, Sinnott-Armstrong argues that we can directly infer positive moral conclusions from descriptive premises in psychology or biology.

Question 25

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong maintains that moral intuitionism is about knowledge.

Question 26

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong, one infers a belief when she goes through a reasoning process of which the belief is the conclusion and other beliefs are premises.

Question 27

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong claims that moral sense theorists assimilate particular moral beliefs to perceptual beliefs, which are supposed to be justified independently of inference.

Question 28

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified when the circumstances are conducive to illusion.

Question 29

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-Sinnott-Armstrong claims confirmation is needed when either the believer or the belief is partial.

Question 30

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-According to Sinnott-Armstrong, any moral belief can affect my self-interest indirectly.

Question 31

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-At least some people, Sinnott-Armstrong maintains, can be justified in assuming that they are impartial moral believers.

Question 32

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology
Moral intuitionism is the view that some people are epistemically justified in holding certain moral beliefs independently of whether they are able to infer those moral beliefs from other beliefs - i.e., they would be justified even if they lacked inferential abilities. Sinnott-Armstrong, however, argues that recent developments in psychology and brain science raise doubts about moral intuitionism.
We can deny moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, by showing that moral believers are not justified in holding spontaneous moral beliefs. To this end, he posits five principles which indicate when confirmation for a belief is needed. According to Sinnott-Armstrong, confirmation is needed: (i) when the believer is partial; (ii) when people disagree with no independent reason to prefer one belief or believer to the other; (iii) when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment; (iv) when the circumstances are conducive to illusion; and (v) when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source. Consider, for example, partiality. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, it can be personally costly to believe that we are morally required to help the needy. Consequently, by principle (i), our beliefs concerning our obligations to the needy demand confirmation.
Unfortunately, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, a quick look at recent work on moral psychology suggests that most of our moral beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable by dubious sources. And, given that the vast majority of our moral beliefs are undermined, the one's we are left with also require confirmation. We can thus plausibly deny that any of our spontaneous moral beliefs are justified. Moral intuitionism, Sinnott-Armstrong concludes, should hence be rejected.
-The extent of moral disagreement, Sinnott-Armstrong claims, is obvious.