Deck 42: James Rachels

Question 1

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-What, according to Rachels, is ethical egoism? What are the merits of ethical egoism? Do you think a version of this position is immune to Rachels' charges? Explain your answer.

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. What might a psychological egoists argue in response? Do you think, once the genuine confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is a tenable position? Why or why not?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels claims that the rational egoist cannot advocate that egoism be universally adopted by everyone. What is Rachels argument for this claim? If Rachels is correct, does this pose a problem for ethical egoism? Defend your answer.

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-According to Rachels, a fundamental requirement of rational action is that reasons for action always depend on the prior existence of certain attitudes in the agent. What reasons does Rachels supply to defend this claim? Do you find this claim defensible? Why or why not?

Question 5

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-What, according to Rachels, is psychological egoism? What are the merits of psychological egoism? Do you think a version of this position is immune to Rachels' criticisms? Explain your answer.

Question 6

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-According to Rachels, the unselfish person is precisely the one who derives satisfaction from helping others. Why does Rachels believe that this poses problems for psychological egoism? Do you think he is correct about these problems? Why or why not?

Question 7

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-What would you do if you possessed Gyges ring? What should you do if you possessed Gyges ring? Defend your answer to both questions.

Question 8

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Psychological egoism is the view that:

A) all men ought to be selfish in everything they do.
B) all men are selfish in everything that they do
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 9

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels claims that moral skeptics attack the claim that:

A) we have an obligation to consider the welfare of other people when we decide what actions to perform.
B) we must respect others' rights and interests as well as our own.
C) people are not wholly selfish
D) all of the above.

Question 10

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Ethical egoism is the view that:

A) all men ought to be selfish in everything they do.
B) all men are selfish in everything that they do
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 11

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels argues that the following is an exception to the claim that people never voluntarily do anything except what they want to do:

A) actions which we may not want to do, but which we do anyway as a means to an end which we want to achieve.
B) actions that we do because we feel ourselves under an obligation to do them.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 12

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels argues that if we have a positive attitude toward the attainment of some goal:

A) we may derive satisfaction from attaining that goal.
B) the object of our attitude is the attainment of that goal.
C) we must want to attain the goal before we can find any satisfaction in it.
D) all of the above.

Question 13

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels calls ethical egoism:

A) a plausible doctrine.
B) a strange doctrine.
C) a radical doctrine.
D) a dangerous doctrine.

Question 14

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels claims the egoist's worry that decent society will collapse, if he does not honor the rules, is unfounded because:

A) the vast majority of people are not egoists.
B) the vast majority of people will not be converted to egoism by his example.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 15

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-According to Rachels, the rational egoist:

A) cannot advocate that egoism be universally adopted by everyone.
B) can advocate that egoism be universally adopted by everyone.
C) cannot live by his own doctrine.
D) can live by his own doctrine.

Question 16

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels argues that we should interpret the ethical egoist as:

A) urging the advancement of each person's self-interest.
B) preferring a world in which his own interests were maximized.
C) wanting to have certain character traits that lead to a flourishing life.
D) none of the above.

Question 17

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels maintains that advocating one thing but doing another is:

A) consistent.
B) inconsistent.
C) irrational.
D) immoral.

Question 18

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels holds that a fundamental requirement of rational action is:

A) that reasons for action always depend on the prior existence of certain attitudes in the agent.
B) that reasons for action need not depend on the prior existence of certain attitudes in the agent.
C) that reasons for action do not depend on the prior existence of certain attitudes in the agent.
D) none of the above.

Question 19

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels claims that the popular objection to ethical egoism - that it cannot be universalized - successfully refutes the doctrine.

Question 20

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-According to Rachels, all ethical egoists are psychological egoists.

Question 21

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels claims that if I promise to do something I do not want to do but do it anyway, then I actually wanted to keep my promise.

Question 22

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels notes that it is the object of a want that determines whether it is selfish or not.

Question 23

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels holds that unselfish actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent.

Question 24

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels claims that we regularly desire some sort of "pleasurable consciousness" and then try to figure out how to achieve it.

Question 25

James Rachels: Egoism and Moral Skepticism
Psychological Egoism states an empirical fact, namely, that persons ultimately aim at their own good. Ethical Egoism, by contrast, makes a normative claim: the right act is the act that produces the most good for the agent. Rachels examines psychological and ethical egoism, and finds both untenable.
Rachels argues that psychological egoism rests on a number of confusions. Psychological egoists often point out that we only act in ways that seem to serve our own self-interest. Rachels argues, however, that this mistakes the obvious claim that voluntary acts are mine, with the controversial claim that the object of my acts - i.e., what ends my actions aim at - is myself. Selfishness should not be confused with self-interest. Psychological egoists also attempt to support their view by claiming that unselfish-looking actions always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the agent. But this, Rachels claims, confuses feeling good after doing an action with doing the action because it feels good. Once these confusions are cleared up, psychological egoism is easy to resist.
Rachels notes that ethical egoism, properly interpreted, is a coherent position. Nevertheless, he argues, the rationale ethical egoism's supplies to reach moral verdicts is implausible. Is it really the case that the explanation for why I shouldn't set fire to the local department store is my own self-interest? Isn't the more reasonable answer, Rachels queries, that I shouldn't start the fire because people will be burned to death? Given that most of us intrinsically value other persons' welfare, and this is incompatible with ethical egoism, ethical egoism should be abandoned.
-Rachels argues that if someone desires the welfare and happiness of another person, this does not mean that this satisfaction is the object of his desire.