Deck 47: Peter Singer

Question 1

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-What two versions of his main moral principle does Singer distinguish? Which version does he think is correct? Which do you think is preferable, and why?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-According to Singer, what factors does his principle not take into account in determining what we should do? Is this an attractive feature of his principle, or not? Defend your answer.

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-What do you think is the strongest objection to Singer's argument? Do you think this objection can be overcome? Defend your answer.

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer claims that affluent people are morally required to give large amounts of money to famine relief. But if everyone were to give large amounts to famine relief, this would generate far more in contributions than necessary, and the results would be worse than if all were to give less. How does Singer deal with this apparent paradox? Do you find his response to be adequate?

Question 5

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-What moral principle does Singer invoke to support his argument? What grounds does he give in support of this principle? Do you find the principle to be a plausible one? Why or why not?

Question 6

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-What effect does Singer think that the acceptance of his principle would have on our moral conceptual scheme? What effects does he think this would have on society? Are these effects desirable? Defend your answer.

Question 7

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-What practical problems does Singer claim his argument faces? How does he respond to these problems? Is his response adequate?

Question 8

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer invokes the principle that we morally ought to prevent bad things from happening, if it is in our power and:

A) we do not thereby sacrifice anything of comparable moral importance.
B) we do not thereby sacrifice anything at all.
C) we do not thereby violate anyone's rights.
D) we do not thereby harm anyone.

Question 9

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-By "without sacrificing anything of comparable importance" Singer means:

A) without causing anything comparably bad to happen.
B) without doing something that is wrong in itself.
C) without failing to promote some moral good comparable in significance to the bad thing we can prevent.
D) all of the above.

Question 10

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer claims that his principle:

A) takes no account of proximity or distance.
B) makes no distinctions based on how many people could help.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 11

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer claims we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us, if:

A) we accept any principle of impartiality.
B) we accept any principle of universalizability.
C) we accept any principle of equality.
D) any of the above.

Question 12

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Giving up to marginal utility means:

A) by giving less, I would cause more suffering to myself.
B) by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself as I would relieve by my gift.
C) by giving more, I would cause less suffering to myself and would also relieve more suffering.
D) none of the above.

Question 13

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-One objection to Singer's theory that he considers is that it:

A) does not do enough to address suffering in other countries besides our own.
B) inappropriately makes proximity morally important.
C) does not account for the fact that we have stricter obligations to our loved ones than to strangers.
D) requires too drastic a revision to our moral scheme.

Question 14

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer claims that given the way our world is, it follows from his principle that:

A) we have no obligations to provide those outside of our local communities.
B) we have an obligation to give only a small portion of our income to famine relief.
C) we have an obligation to work full time to relieve the suffering caused by famine.
D) we have much stronger obligations to those close to us than those who are far away.

Question 15

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer claims that he introduces the weak version of his principle:

A) because people are usually more persuaded by it.
B) because it is correct.
C) in order to show that even on this undeniable principle a great change in our way of life is required.
D) because accepting it leads to acceptance of the stronger principle.

Question 16

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-According to Singer, governments:

A) bear the sole responsibility for giving money to famine relief.
B) should give much more to famine relief, but individuals are morally required to do so as well.
C) are not responsible for giving money to famine relief, but have other responsibilities.
D) have no responsibilities whatsoever-only individuals can have responsibilities.

Question 17

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-In response to the argument that famine relief is counterproductive because it leads to overpopulation, Singer claims that:

A) this has empirically been shown to be false.
B) this is true, but should not be of moral concern to us.
C) this is a reason to give money to population control efforts.
D) there is no such thing as "overpopulation."

Question 18

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer claims that we are required to give money to famine relief:

A) only if we desire to do so.
B) until doing so requires some sacrifice on our part.
C) until doing so requires us to sacrifice anything morally significant.
D) until we have reduced ourselves to the level of marginal utility.

Question 19

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-According to Singer, compliance with his principle requires:

A) modest changes to our personal habits, but not to our society as a whole.
B) modest changes to our personal habits, as well as to society.
C) drastic changes to our personal habits, but not to our society.
D) drastic changes to both our personal habits and to our society.

Question 20

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer argues that the correct, strong version of his principle requires giving up our recourses to the point of marginal utility.

Question 21

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer claims that proximity does not make any moral difference.

Question 22

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-According to Singer, the result of everyone doing what he ought to do can be worse than the result of everyone doing less than he ought to do.

Question 23

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer argues that charitable actions are supererogatory.

Question 24

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer argues that we all ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance.

Question 25

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer claims that his principle is unprecedented in the history of Western philosophy.

Question 26

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-Singer argues that population control efforts are immoral.

Question 27

Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence, and Morality
Every year, natural and human disasters leave millions of people in dire need of help. Many people regard providing assistance to the victims of these disasters as an act of charity-something that is good to do, but that it is not wrong to refrain from doing. Singer argues that this is mistaken, and that nearly all of us are obligated to do far more to alleviate suffering around the globe. Singer's argument begins with two simple assumptions. The first is that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. The second is the moral principle that "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it." From these two assumptions, Singer claims, it follows that nearly all of us should be giving far more of our money to famine relief, and that spending this money on morally insignificant purchases (such as new clothes) is immoral.
Singer addresses several objections to his view. The first objection is this: because the suffering caused by famine would be alleviated if all affluent people were to contribute a relatively small amount, no single person can be required to contribute more than a modest sum. Singer allows that if everyone were to contribute to famine relief, no one would be obligated to contribute large sums of money. Because this is almost certain not to happen, however, Singer insists that we ought to do what we can to prevent suffering, provided that doing so will not involve sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. The second objection maintains that Singer's view requires a substantial revision to our moral scheme, and requires us to make large sacrifices in our own well-being. Singer admits these consequences, but denies that they constitute legitimate objections. It might simply be the case that morality is very demanding. Further, Singer argues that his conclusion follows from the simple assumptions from which he begins; so, unless one has reason to doubt his assumptions or the soundness of his reasoning, one must accept his conclusion.
-According to Singer, governments as well as individuals should be giving much more money to famine relief.