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Deck 56: Judith Jarvis Thomson

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-According to Thomson, part of what distinguishes Bystander at the Switch from Transplant is a "distributive exemption." What does she argue this exemption amounts to? Do you find her argument for this exemption plausible? Defend your answer.

Use Space or

to flip the card.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Do you agree with Thomson that pushing the Fat Man is impermissible? If so, do you agree for the same reasons? What is the strongest objection to your position?

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson asserts that the doing v. allowing distinction is too blunt to help with the Trolley Problem. What is her argument for this assertion? Do you think her argument is sound? Why or why not?

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson claims that the stringency of the right helps distinguish the Fat Man case from certain variants of Bystander at the Switch. What is Thomson's argument for relying on the stringency of the rights in question? Do you find this argument sustainable? Explain your answer.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-According to Thomson, part of what distinguishes Bystander at the Switch from Transplant is the means by which the saving is accomplished. What difference in the means taken does Thompson point to? Do you think that this difference makes a moral difference? Defend your answer.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson asserts that using someone as a means only cannot help with the Trolley Problem. What is her argument for this assertion? Do you agree with her? Why or why not?

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson often claims that "rights trump utilities." What do she mean by this metaphor? Do you find this to be a compelling picture of rights? Explain your answer.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson reports that when confronted with the Trolley Driver case, where the driver can turn the trolley onto the track with one to save the five:

A) everybody thinks it is morally permissible to turn.
B) some people think it is morally required to turn.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson reports that when confronted with Transplant, where the surgeon can cut up one to save the five:

A) some think it is morally permissible to cut.
B) everyone thinks it is morally impermissible to cut.
C) some think that cutting is morally required.
D) none of the above.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson reports that when confronted with Fat Man, where one can push the one to save the five:

A) some think it is morally permissible to push.
B) everyone thinks it is morally impermissible to push.
C) some think that pushing is morally required.
D) none of the above.

Question

A) it is permissible to throw the switch.
B) it is impermissible to throw the switch.
C) throwing the switch is required.
D) throwing the switch is supererogatory.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson claims that it is not obvious that if in order to get the switch thrown, the bystander must use a sharply pointed tool, and the only available sharply pointed tool is a nailfile that belongs to the one:

A) it is permissible to throw the switch.
B) it is impermissible to throw the switch.
C) throwing the switch is required.
D) throwing the switch is supererogatory.

Question

A) killing one is worse than letting five die.
B) killing five is worse than killing one.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson claims that we can solve the trolley problem by:

A) relying on the distinction between "killing" and "letting die."
B) relying on the notion of using someone as a "mere means."
C) relying on the concept of a "right."
D) none of the above

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson argues that killing one is worse than letting five die is:

A) plausible.
B) implausible.
C) true.
D) false.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-According to Thomson, one way to test if we are using someone, X, as a mere means is by asking:

A) If X had gone out of existence would I be able to perform the act?
B) If X had not consented would I be able to perform the act?
C) If X could not consent would I be able to perform the act?
D) If X could not rationally consent would I be able to perform the act?

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson argues that the following fact explains the moral difference between the bystander and the surgeon:

A) the bystander saves his five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one.
B) the bystander does not flip the switch by means which themselves constitute an infringement of any right of the one's.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson maintains that if one would infringe a right by acting:

A) it is sufficient justification for acting that one would thereby maximize utility.
B) it is not sufficient justification for acting that one would thereby maximize utility.
C) it is necessary justification for acting that one would thereby maximize utility.
D) it is not necessary justification for acting that one would thereby maximize utility.

Question

A) infringes a right of the one track workman.
B) does not infringe a right of the one track workman.
C) violates a right of the one track workman.
D) does not violate a right of the one track workman.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson notes that the bystander does not make something be a threat to people which would otherwise not be a threat to anyone; rather:

A) he makes be a threat to fewer what is already a threat to more.
B) he makes be a threat to more what was a threat to a few.
C) he introduces a new threat to fewer to prevent an existing threat to many.
D) he introduces a new threat to many to prevent an existing threat to a few.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson argues that the difference between Bystander at the Switch and Fat Man is:

A) that in Fat Man, but not Bystander at the Switch, the agent makes something which threatens the five threaten the one.
B) that in Fat Man, but not Bystander at the Switch, the agent does not make something which threatens the five threaten the one.
C) that in Fat Man, but not Bystander at the Switch, the agent makes something which threatens the five threaten the one by means which themselves constitute an infringement of a right of the one's.
D) that in Fat Man, but not Bystander at the Switch, the agent does not make something which threatens the five threaten the one but not by means which themselves constitute an infringement of a right of the one's.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-According to Thomson, the right to not be toppled off a footbridge onto a trolley track is:

A) illusory.
B) a weak right.
C) a moderately strong right.
D) a stringent right.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson argues that killing one person is morally worse than letting five people die.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson thinks that in the Bystander at the Switch trolley case it is permissible to flip the switch.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson thinks that in the Bystander at the Switch trolley case it is obligatory to flip the switch.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson claims that we can solve the trolley problem by turning to the notion of using someone as a mere means.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson believes that in the "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch the extra track makes a major moral difference.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson endorses Dworkin's metaphor that "rights trump utilities."

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-According to Thomson, any plausible theory of rights must make sense of the idea of waiving a right.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson argues that, by flipping the switch, bystander does not infringe any rights of the one track workman.

Question

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson notes that if the surgeon proceeds in Transplant he saves his five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one.

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Deck 56: Judith Jarvis Thomson

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Do you agree with Thomson that pushing the Fat Man is impermissible? If so, do you agree for the same reasons? What is the strongest objection to your position?

No Answer

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson asserts that the doing v. allowing distinction is too blunt to help with the Trolley Problem. What is her argument for this assertion? Do you think her argument is sound? Why or why not?

No Answer

Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson claims that the stringency of the right helps distinguish the Fat Man case from certain variants of Bystander at the Switch. What is Thomson's argument for relying on the stringency of the rights in question? Do you find this argument sustainable? Explain your answer.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-According to Thomson, part of what distinguishes Bystander at the Switch from Transplant is the means by which the saving is accomplished. What difference in the means taken does Thompson point to? Do you think that this difference makes a moral difference? Defend your answer.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson asserts that using someone as a means only cannot help with the Trolley Problem. What is her argument for this assertion? Do you agree with her? Why or why not?

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson often claims that "rights trump utilities." What do she mean by this metaphor? Do you find this to be a compelling picture of rights? Explain your answer.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson reports that when confronted with the Trolley Driver case, where the driver can turn the trolley onto the track with one to save the five:

A) everybody thinks it is morally permissible to turn.
B) some people think it is morally required to turn.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson reports that when confronted with Transplant, where the surgeon can cut up one to save the five:

A) some think it is morally permissible to cut.
B) everyone thinks it is morally impermissible to cut.
C) some think that cutting is morally required.
D) none of the above.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson reports that when confronted with Fat Man, where one can push the one to save the five:

A) some think it is morally permissible to push.
B) everyone thinks it is morally impermissible to push.
C) some think that pushing is morally required.
D) none of the above.

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A) it is permissible to throw the switch.
B) it is impermissible to throw the switch.
C) throwing the switch is required.
D) throwing the switch is supererogatory.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson claims that it is not obvious that if in order to get the switch thrown, the bystander must use a sharply pointed tool, and the only available sharply pointed tool is a nailfile that belongs to the one:

A) it is permissible to throw the switch.
B) it is impermissible to throw the switch.
C) throwing the switch is required.
D) throwing the switch is supererogatory.

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A) killing one is worse than letting five die.
B) killing five is worse than killing one.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson claims that we can solve the trolley problem by:

A) relying on the distinction between "killing" and "letting die."
B) relying on the notion of using someone as a "mere means."
C) relying on the concept of a "right."
D) none of the above

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson argues that killing one is worse than letting five die is:

A) plausible.
B) implausible.
C) true.
D) false.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-According to Thomson, one way to test if we are using someone, X, as a mere means is by asking:

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson argues that the following fact explains the moral difference between the bystander and the surgeon:

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson maintains that if one would infringe a right by acting:

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson notes that the bystander does not make something be a threat to people which would otherwise not be a threat to anyone; rather:

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson argues that the difference between Bystander at the Switch and Fat Man is:

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-According to Thomson, the right to not be toppled off a footbridge onto a trolley track is:

A) illusory.
B) a weak right.
C) a moderately strong right.
D) a stringent right.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson argues that killing one person is morally worse than letting five people die.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson thinks that in the Bystander at the Switch trolley case it is permissible to flip the switch.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson thinks that in the Bystander at the Switch trolley case it is obligatory to flip the switch.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson claims that we can solve the trolley problem by turning to the notion of using someone as a mere means.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson believes that in the "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch the extra track makes a major moral difference.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson endorses Dworkin's metaphor that "rights trump utilities."

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-According to Thomson, any plausible theory of rights must make sense of the idea of waiving a right.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson argues that, by flipping the switch, bystander does not infringe any rights of the one track workman.

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Judith Jarvis Thomson: The Trolley Problem
Consider the following case: A bystander can pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. Call this case Bystander at the Switch. Now consider a different case: A surgeon can kill one of his perfectly healthy patients and use his organs to save five other dying patients. Call this case Transplant. In both of these cases, the agent is presented with an opportunity to save five lives for the cost of one. Yet most people believe that, while it is permissible to turn the trolley in Bystander at the Switch, it is impermissible to operate in Transplant. But what explains these different verdicts?
To answer this question, Thomson examines three proposals: killing v. letting die, using someone as a mere means, and the concept of rights. She argues against the first two proposals and in favor of the third. Killing v. letting die, Thomson claims, is too blunt an instrument to distinguish between these cases. Indeed, those endorsing the killing v. letting die distinction should, since bystander would be killing someone by flipping the switch, find bystander's act impermissible. But that, she argues, looks like the wrong verdict. Thomson insists that relying on using someone as a mere means also will not do the required work. Consider a "loop variant" of Bystander at the Switch, where the tracks do not diverge but circle back. Imagine that the five on the straight track are thin, but thick enough so that although all five will be killed if the trolley goes straight, the bodies of the five will stop it. and it will hence not reach the one. On the other hand, the one on the right-hand track is fat. so fat that his body will by itself stop the trolley, and the trolley will hence not reach the five. The loop variant ensures that Bystander must use the one as a means only, but adding the loop hardly seems to make a moral difference - even with the loop, Bystander acts permissibly by flipping the switch. This leaves the concept of rights.
Thomson argues that we can explain the different verdicts in Bystander at the Switch and Transplant by the following two features. First, the bystander saves the five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one. Second, the bystander does not do this saving by means which infringe any of the one's rights. These two features, Thomson concludes, allows us to justify our different intuitions in these two cases (and other difficult cases).
-Thomson notes that if the surgeon proceeds in Transplant he saves his five by making something that threatens them instead threaten one.

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