Deck 4: Reality

Question 1

What is the significance of the piece of wax? What conclusion does Descartes draw from this example?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Do you agree with Descartes that you are not identified with your body? Explain.

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Descartes argues that he does not exist.

Answer 3

False

Question 4

Descartes claims that he clearly and distinctly perceives the nature of the piece of wax by imagination.

Question 5

The method of doubt

A) involves accepting as true anything plausible.
B) involves withholding assent to anything whatsoever.
C) involves withholding assent to any possible falsehood.
D) involves dreaming.

Question 6

What is a category mistake? Explain by first providing an example of your own and then by comparing it with an example of Ryle's. Be sure to explain the essential features they share.

Question 7

What is the "official doctrine"? Explain its main elements.

Question 8

The "official doctrine" began with Descartes.

Question 9

A category mistake involves mistaking the logical category of a concept.

Question 10

The "dogma of the Ghost in the Machine" refers to

A) the view that a human being has an immortal soul.
B) the view that young children do not have minds.
C) the view that Oxford is not a university.
D) the view that a human being has both a body and a mind.

Question 11

What is epiphenomenalism? Explain the argument that Churchland sketches for epiphenomenalism, as well as his objection to that argument. Is his objection decisive? Why or why not?

Question 12

Are there mental phenomena that can never be reproduced by a computer? If so, which ones are they and why can't be they be reproduced? If not, why not?

Question 13

Explain Churchland's argument from evolutionary history. Give at least one objection to that argument, and explain how Churchland might reply to your objection.

Question 14

Dualism is the view that, in addition to physical substances like bodies and brains, there are mental substances or mental properties.

Question 15

According to Churchland, if "popular dualism" is true, it follows that the soul survives the death of the body.

Question 16

One way for property dualists to avoid the tension between claiming that mental properties are emergent and claiming that they are irreducible is to give up the claim that they are irreducible.

Question 17

Churchland claims that the religious argument for dualism is weak because previous attempts to deduce scientific truths from religious orthodoxies have often failed.

Question 18

According to Churchland, Ockham's Razor provides a decisive refutation of dualism.

Question 19

According to Churchland, the materialist can already provide much better explanations of mental phenomena than the dualist can.

Question 20

Churchland argues that an evolutionary account of the mind counts against both substance dualism and property dualism.

Question 21

Churchland argues that you should reject dualism because most contemporary philosophers and scientists reject it.

Question 22

According to René Descartes' version of substance dualism, the two kinds of substances are

A) matter, which has extension and position in space, and mind, which has neither.
B) matter, which has extension and position in space, and mind, which has position but not extension.
C) matter, of which all lower animals are composed, and mind, of which humans are composed.
D) matter, of which all human beings are composed, and mind, of which angels and God are composed.

Question 23

One objection that Churchland raises against Cartesian dualism is that

A) Descartes' theory of the interaction of mind and matter conflicts with Einstein's theory of gravity.
B) science has proven that there is no such thing as the "animal spirits" that Descartes proposed.
C) it is unclear how immaterial mind-substance could possibly interact with matter.
D) contrary to Descartes' view, we are essentially embodied creatures, rather than thinking substances.

Question 24

According to epiphenomenalism, mental phenomena are

A) events occurring in an immaterial substance located inside the head.
B) events that are caused by physical phenomena but have no effect on the physical world.
C) events that affect the physical world but cannot be affected by it.
D) events that are identical with events in the physical world, despite appearances to the contrary.

Question 25

Property dualism is the view that

A) brains have special mental properties, despite being entirely physical systems.
B) some substances have the property of being physical while others have the property of being mental.
C) mental properties are fundamental features of the world, like electromagnetic properties.
D) each person's mental states are completely private, making it that person's own property.

Question 26

Which of the following does Churchland not cite as an argument for dualism?

A) Dualism is true because religion tells us that the soul is immaterial.
B) Dualism is true because when we reflect on our experience, we perceive sensations, thoughts, etc., that simply could not be physical phenomena.
C) Dualism is true because psychic abilities (such as the ability to foretell the future) cannot possibly be explained in terms of physical systems.
D) Dualism is true because neuroscience has proven that our thoughts are irreducible to the activity of our neurons.

Question 27

According to Churchland, the "argument from irreducibility" has less force than it appears because

A) many supposedly irreducible features, such as the capacity for math or language, seem to be reproducible by purely physical computers.
B) despite some modest successes, such as electronic calculators, computers have not yet managed to reproduce the irreducible features of mental life.
C) despite plenty of anecdotes and bit of serious research, there is no convincing evidence for the existence of psychic powers such as telepathy.
D) neuroscientists have managed to understand the qualitative experience of other animals, such as bats, by looking at the structure of the animals' brains.

Question 28

According to Churchland, the most decisive argument against substance dualism is that

A) Ockham's razor tells us to prefer the simpler explanation, which is materialism.
B) neuroscience has shown that movement, perception, and learning occur in the brain.
C) even hard-to-explain mental phenomena such as emotion and reasoning can be affected by physical or chemical changes in the brain.
D) although substance dualism predicts the existence of psychic abilities, there is no good evidence that anyone has such abilities.

Question 29

According to Churchland, humans' evolutionary history counts against dualism because

A) there is neither need nor room in the evolutionary account of our origins for non-physical substances or properties.
B) our evolutionary relationship to dolphins, mice, and even houseflies entails that if we have the ability to reason, all other animals do, too.
C) dualism depends on religious explanations of the mind and the theory of evolution undermines all such religious explanations.
D) it means we cannot explain why we have emotions and conscious experiences but very complicated computers do not.

Question 30

Churchland's main goal in this chapter is

A) to prove that evolution explains the existence of the mind.
B) to show that the arguments against dualism are stronger than the arguments for it.
C) to prove that epiphenomenalism is the only plausible form of dualism.
D) to explain how neuroscience has replaced philosophy in explaining the mind.

Question 31

Why did Nagel choose to illustrate his point with the example of bats? Be sure to explain both his main point and how the example illustrates it.

Question 32

Do you agree with Nagel's claim that there may be facts that are not intelligible in terms of human concepts? Explain.

Question 33

Does Nagel's discussion raise a problem for materialism? Explain.

Question 34

Human beings do not have experiences.

Question 35

According to Nagel, human beings are the only organisms with experiences.

Question 36

We can understand what it is like to be a bat in terms of concepts we apply to understand the experience of other human beings.

Question 37

We cannot capture everything about what it is like to be a bat in a purely physical description.

Question 38

Bats are the only example that works for Nagel's argument.

Question 39

A conscious organism

A) is one that has a mind and no body.
B) is alien.
C) is one that there is something it is like to be.
D) must be a bat.

Question 40

Human concepts

A) are the only possible concepts.
B) are what we use to understand each other's experiences.
C) are the material for our imagination.
D) Both b and c

Question 41

Explain the Fred and Mary thought experiments. What is each of these thought experiments supposed to demonstrate?

Question 42

What is qualia? How does qualia feature in Jackson's argument?

Question 43

Explain the basic tenets of physicalism. What is Jackson's argument against physicalism? Is the argument compelling? Why or why not?

Question 44

Jackson gives a thought experiment in which Fred can make an extra color discrimination.

Question 45

Jackson gives a thought experiment in which Mary is forced to investigate the world through a color television monitor.

Question 46

Jackson argues that physicalism is false.

Question 47

According to Jackson, physicalism does not include qualia.

Question 48

According to Jackson, physical information is all there is to knowledge.

Question 49

According to Jackson, Mary wouldn't learn anything if she left the black-and-white room.

Question 50

According to Jackson, Mary would learn something if she experienced color.

Question 51

According to Jackson, there is something Mary doesn't know from within the black-and-white room.

Question 52

According to Jackson, qualia can be understood through physical information alone.

Question 53

According to Jackson, one can have all the physical information without having all the information there is to have.

Question 54

According to Jackson, the physical information is __________ to understand what it is like for Fred to make the extra color discrimination.

A) sufficient
B) necessary and sufficient
C) not sufficient
D) None of the above

Question 55

According to Jackson, when Mary experiences color for the first time she will

A) learn something.
B) learn nothing.
C) realize that she is not capable of experiencing qualia.
D) know what it is like for Fred to see the extra color.

Question 56

Physicalism is the view that

A) physics is the only true science.
B) everything is physical.
C) almost everything is physical.
D) None of the above

Question 57

Jackson argues that physicalism is

A) false.
B) true.
C) the best way of understanding the world.
D) Both b and c

Question 58

According to Jackson, the physical information

A) is all the information there is to have.
B) includes qualia.
C) does not include qualia.
D) is unimportant.

Question 59

What is qualia?

A) physical information.
B) material information.
C) felt qualities of experience.
D) objective qualities of experience.

Question 60

Experience of color is a kind of

A) physical knowledge.
B) qualia.
C) material.
D) Both a and c

Question 61

According to Jackson, the "style of Knowledge argument" he gives

A) is specific to claims about color.
B) can be also deployed for senses other than sight.
C) is specific to bodily senses.
D) cannot be deployed for touch.

Question 62

Jackson argues that if we were to implant Fred's optical system into someone else's body

A) we would not learn anything, which would show that physical is true.
B) we would learn something, which would show the inadequacy of physicalism.
C) we would learn something, which would show the adequacy of physicalism.
D) we would be uninterested in the results.

Question 63

In the H. G. Wells story Jackson mentions, the sighted person

A) is a skeptic about physicalism.
B) is unwilling to make the sacrifice that is expected of him.
C) is unable to explain the nature of sightedness to the community in which he finds himself.
D) Both a and c

Question 64

What is Turing's "imitation game"? Do you think that the imitation game offers a decisive test of whether a machine can think? Why or why not?

Question 65

What is the argument from consciousness? Why does Turing take issue with it?

Question 66

Does Turing think that machines can make mistakes? Do you agree? Why or why not?

Question 67

Turing claims that the interrogator in the imitation game would never mistake a machine for a man.

Question 68

According to Turing, the argument from consciousness leads to solipsism.

Question 69

According to Turing, we must fully understand the nature of consciousness in order to determine whether machines can think.

Question 70

Turing claims that a machine could never enjoy a strawberry.

Question 71

Turing claims that there is no sense in which a machine can make a mistake.

Question 72

According to Turing, the arguments from various disabilities are mostly founded on the principle of scientific induction.

Question 73

According to Turing, the works and customs of mankind are suitable material to which to apply scientific induction.

Question 74

Turing distinguishes between "errors of functioning" and "errors of conclusion."

Question 75

"Errors of conclusion" are always the result of mechanical errors.

Question 76

Turing proposes the "imitation game" as a method of answering the question:

A) Can machines fall in love?
B) Can machines make mistakes?
C) Can machines think?
D) Can machines introspect?

Question 77

The interrogator in the imitation game must decide which of the other two players is

A) human.
B) conscious.
C) capable of mistakes.
D) Both a and b

Question 78

According to Turing, the argument from consciousness leads to

A) objectivism.
B) subjectivism.
C) scientific induction.
D) solipsism.

Question 79

According to Turing, the arguments from various disabilities are mostly founded on

A) objectivism.
B) subjectivism.
C) scientific induction.
D) solipsism.

Question 80

Machines make errors of conclusion when

A) there is a mechanical fault.
B) there is an electrical fault.
C) a false proposition is typed by the machine.
D) a true proposition is typed by the machine.