Deck 11: Abortion in the Typical Case

Question 1

Which of the following views is targeted by Judith Thomson's objection that, just as an acorn does not have the same properties as an oak tree, a human fetus need not have the same properties that a mature human adult has?

A) The Interests View
B) The Developmental Continuity Argument
C) The Potentiality Argument
D) The Future-Like-Ours Argument

Answer 1

C

Question 2

Which of the following positions is committed to claiming that the fetus has a right to life from conception?

A) Kind Essentialism
B) Warren's personhood argument
C) Tooley's Self-Consciousness Requirement
D) All of the above

Answer 2

A

Question 3

The possibility of twining before fourteen days of human gestation creates problems for which of the following views?

A) Warren's personhood argument
B) The Future-Like-Ours Argument
C) The Good Samaritan Argument
D) All of the above

Answer 3

B

Question 4

According to the early-brain-activity argument, abortion is morally forbidden

A) Once there is organized electrical activity in the brain's cortex
B) Once there is electrical activity in any part of the brain
C) Once there is activity in the brain indicative of sentience
D) None of the above

Question 5

According to Engaging Bioethics, which of the following positions makes the claim that there is no particular point of development when a human being acquires the right to life if it hasn't already acquired it at conception?

A) Kind Essentialism
B) The Potentiality Argument
C) The conservative Sanctity-of-Life doctrine
D) None of the above

Question 6

Which position on the moral permissibility of abortion rests on the premise that the property whose loss at life's end implies the loss of a right to life must be the same as the property that confers that right at life's beginning?

A) The Developmental Continuity Argument
B) The early-brain-activity argument
C) The Good Samaritan Argument
D) None of the above

Question 7

Which of the following best expresses Mary Anne Warren's view on the moral permissibility of abortion? Abortion becomes morally impermissible

A) With the onset of organized electrical activity in the brain's cortex
B) With the onset of electrical activity in the brain
C) With the onset of brain activity associated with sentience
D) None of the above

Question 8

The argument "It is wrong to kill actual Xs; therefore, it is wrong to kill potential Xs" faces which objection?

A) It is inaccurate
B) It is invalid
C) It is under-inclusive
D) None of the above

Question 9

Why is abortion forbidden given Don Marquis's Future-Like-Ours Argument? Because

A) The fetus is a person with a right to life
B) At some developmental point the fetus becomes sentient
C) Abortion deprives the fetus of a future of value
D) None of the above

Question 10

What sort of problem would the Interest View face if it were to say that sentience is necessary for moral standing?

A) The under-inclusiveness problem
B) The over-inclusiveness problem
C) Speciesism
D) All of the above

Question 11

State the early-brain-activity argument, and raise an objection to it.

Question 12

According to an argument against the moral permissibility of abortion, beings of the species Homo sapiens are rational in the sense of having the capacity or disposition to reason. Identify the positon that advances this argument and evaluate the main objection to it.

Question 13

Identify the position subscribing to the following argument and point out a main problem for it: there is no significant difference between a late human fetus and a newborn. Thus if the former doesn't have a right to life, neither does the latter. But, for the same reason, if the newborn doesn't have it, neither does the infant, or the toddler, or the child… or the mature adult. But since this is preposterous, a human organism has the right to life from conception.

Question 14

Explain how Michael Tooley's argument for the moral permissibility of abortion makes use of this claim: "An entity cannot be the sort of thing that can desire that a subject of experiences and other mental states exists unless it possess the concept of such a subject. Moreover, an entity cannot desire that it itself continue existing as a subject of experiences unless it believes that it is now such a subject" (1972: 47).

Question 15

What role, if any, do criteria of personhood play in Judith Thomson's Good Samaritan Argument? And what about the Plugged-In Violinist example?