Deck 8: Public Sector Demand
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Deck 8: Public Sector Demand
1
When a single candidate is chosen by majority vote in a democracy,the political systems _____.
A)tend to become corrupted
B)tend to be two-party systems
C)tend to be one-party systems
D)tend to be three-party systems
A)tend to become corrupted
B)tend to be two-party systems
C)tend to be one-party systems
D)tend to be three-party systems
B
2
Third parties generally cannot win elections under a majority vote system because _____.
A)the original two parties make it illegal for third parties to exist
B)the original two parties are able to use the power of incumbency to raise the large amount of money necessary to run a winnable election
C)the original two parties will have already split the voting population by placing their platforms on either side of the median voter
D)the original two parties have already "locked-in" most eligible voters as members of their parties
A)the original two parties make it illegal for third parties to exist
B)the original two parties are able to use the power of incumbency to raise the large amount of money necessary to run a winnable election
C)the original two parties will have already split the voting population by placing their platforms on either side of the median voter
D)the original two parties have already "locked-in" most eligible voters as members of their parties
C
3
If voters prefer alternatives closer to their most preferred outcome to alternatives farther away from their most preferred outcome,we can say that voters have _____.
A)single-peaked preferences
B)double-peaked preferences
C)rational preferences
D)irrational preferences
A)single-peaked preferences
B)double-peaked preferences
C)rational preferences
D)irrational preferences
A
4
In general,the medium voter model can be described as a powerful model for _____.
A)analyzing demand for public goods
B)analyzing the dynamics of business cycles
C)analyzing demand aggregation in a democracy
D)analyzing the supply of politicians
A)analyzing demand for public goods
B)analyzing the dynamics of business cycles
C)analyzing demand aggregation in a democracy
D)analyzing the supply of politicians
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5
Which of the following is an assumption of the median voter model?
A)Voters are assumed to have heterogeneous preferences.
B)Voters are assumed to be able to place all possible election outcomes within a one-dimensional continuum.
C)Voters are assumed to have homogenous preferences.
D)Voters are assumed to be able to compare current election outcomes with past election outcome with perfect recall.
A)Voters are assumed to have heterogeneous preferences.
B)Voters are assumed to be able to place all possible election outcomes within a one-dimensional continuum.
C)Voters are assumed to have homogenous preferences.
D)Voters are assumed to be able to compare current election outcomes with past election outcome with perfect recall.
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6
The median voter model examines the outcome of majority rule decisions and _____.
A)concludes that the outcome will be the one preferred by the median voter
B)assumes that the outcome will be determined by the median voter
C)uses the median voter to analyze the decision-making of bureaucrats
D)found that the median voter has no role in political decision-making
A)concludes that the outcome will be the one preferred by the median voter
B)assumes that the outcome will be determined by the median voter
C)uses the median voter to analyze the decision-making of bureaucrats
D)found that the median voter has no role in political decision-making
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7
Which of the following statements does not follow from the median voter model?
A)Party platforms tend to converge to the median.
B)The farther a candidate is away from the median voter,the more support she will have.
C)Third parties generally cannot win elections.
D)Political candidates tend to be quite similar to one another.
A)Party platforms tend to converge to the median.
B)The farther a candidate is away from the median voter,the more support she will have.
C)Third parties generally cannot win elections.
D)Political candidates tend to be quite similar to one another.
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8
Cyclical majorities can occur when _____.
A)voters have single-peaked preferences
B)voters are rationally ignorant
C)voters are irrationally ignorant
D)voters do not have single-peaked preferences
A)voters have single-peaked preferences
B)voters are rationally ignorant
C)voters are irrationally ignorant
D)voters do not have single-peaked preferences
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9
The median voter model explanation for the landside victory of Ronald Reagan over Walter Mondale is that _____.
A)Reagan was far closer to the median voter than Mondale
B)Reagan was far more charismatic than Mondale
C)Reagan was able to use the power of incumbency to overwhelm Mondale
D)Reagan was able to be more extreme than Mondale and still win
A)Reagan was far closer to the median voter than Mondale
B)Reagan was far more charismatic than Mondale
C)Reagan was able to use the power of incumbency to overwhelm Mondale
D)Reagan was able to be more extreme than Mondale and still win
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10
Which of the following is not an assumption of the medium voter model?
A)Voters can place all election alternatives along a one-dimensional continuum.
B)Voters always vote their true preference.
C)Voters prefer alternative closer to their preferred outcome.
D)Voters engage in preference falsification.
A)Voters can place all election alternatives along a one-dimensional continuum.
B)Voters always vote their true preference.
C)Voters prefer alternative closer to their preferred outcome.
D)Voters engage in preference falsification.
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11
The conclusion of the median voter model is that_____.
A)private sector demands of the median voter influences their demand for public goods
B)the median voter is omniscient
C)public sector demand will be the demand of the median voter
D)decision-making costs will be high if the median voter is rationally ignorant
A)private sector demands of the median voter influences their demand for public goods
B)the median voter is omniscient
C)public sector demand will be the demand of the median voter
D)decision-making costs will be high if the median voter is rationally ignorant
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12
The _____ allows voters to vote on a series of marginally smaller quantities of a good.
A)committee version of the medium voter model
B)representative democracy version of the medium voter model
C)referendum version of the medium voter model
D)cyclical majority
A)committee version of the medium voter model
B)representative democracy version of the medium voter model
C)referendum version of the medium voter model
D)cyclical majority
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13
The median voter model predicts that in a representative democracy _____.
A)party platforms will converge to one preferred by the median voter
B)successful politicians will emulate the median voter
C)third parties will not exist
D)successful politicians come from the median political party
A)party platforms will converge to one preferred by the median voter
B)successful politicians will emulate the median voter
C)third parties will not exist
D)successful politicians come from the median political party
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14
Political competition between candidates,especially attempts to paint one's opponent as being extreme,shows that _____.
A)the way to be a successful politician is to fight dirty
B)cyclical majorities will never exist
C)there is an opportunity for third parties
D)politicians implicitly accept the validity of the median voter model
A)the way to be a successful politician is to fight dirty
B)cyclical majorities will never exist
C)there is an opportunity for third parties
D)politicians implicitly accept the validity of the median voter model
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15
The median voter model suggests that _____.
A)extreme candidates are unlikely to change positions over time
B)extreme candidates have an easier time winning election because of the fervor of their supporters
C)extreme candidates will have a difficult time winning election
D)extreme candidates will be able to move a party's platform to better fit their positions
A)extreme candidates are unlikely to change positions over time
B)extreme candidates have an easier time winning election because of the fervor of their supporters
C)extreme candidates will have a difficult time winning election
D)extreme candidates will be able to move a party's platform to better fit their positions
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16
The referendum version of the median voter model concludes that _____.
A)by decreasing output slowly,the median voter will adjust her preferences to those of the ballot organizer
B)by increasing output slowly,the median voter will adjust her preferences to those of the ballot organizer
C)the outcome preferred by the median voter will be chosen by unanimity
D)the outcome preferred by the median voter will be chosen by majority rule
A)by decreasing output slowly,the median voter will adjust her preferences to those of the ballot organizer
B)by increasing output slowly,the median voter will adjust her preferences to those of the ballot organizer
C)the outcome preferred by the median voter will be chosen by unanimity
D)the outcome preferred by the median voter will be chosen by majority rule
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17
When applied to committees,the median voter model concludes that _____.
A)becomes irrelevant as committees will be unable to select a clear outcome
B)the committee selects the outcome preferred by the median voter
C)when preferences are double peaked,the committee meets the demand of the median voter
D)a cyclical majority will emerge,if voters are irrational
A)becomes irrelevant as committees will be unable to select a clear outcome
B)the committee selects the outcome preferred by the median voter
C)when preferences are double peaked,the committee meets the demand of the median voter
D)a cyclical majority will emerge,if voters are irrational
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18
Nathan does not vote because he feels as he does not have a real choice.To him,"all politicians are exactly the same." Which of the following statements might lend some credence to Nathan's observation?
A)In a representative democracy,politicians must appeal to the median voter if they hope to be successful.
B)In a representative democracy,politicians are uniformly graduates of Ivy League schools.
C)In a representative democracy,politicians exclusively come from wealthy families.
D)In most representative democracies,individuals similar to Nathan do not vote and thus are not represented in the political process.
A)In a representative democracy,politicians must appeal to the median voter if they hope to be successful.
B)In a representative democracy,politicians are uniformly graduates of Ivy League schools.
C)In a representative democracy,politicians exclusively come from wealthy families.
D)In most representative democracies,individuals similar to Nathan do not vote and thus are not represented in the political process.
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19
Political candidates tend to be very similar in a representative democracy because _____.
A)most candidates are wealthy
B)the average voter demands conformity
C)of cyclical majorities
D)party platforms converge toward the median voter
A)most candidates are wealthy
B)the average voter demands conformity
C)of cyclical majorities
D)party platforms converge toward the median voter
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20
A process of _____ among candidates in a representative democracy leads to the outcome preferred by the median voter.
A)cheating
B)political competition
C)bargaining
D)log-rolling
A)cheating
B)political competition
C)bargaining
D)log-rolling
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21
The referendum version of the median voter model allows voters to vote on a series of marginally increasing quantities of a good.
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22
In a committee,any outcome preferred by any member can win.
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23
Even when preferences are _____,the _____ will produce a single winner.
A)not single peaked;equilibrium
B)single peaked;log-rolling
C)cyclical;majority rule system
D)cyclical;primary system
A)not single peaked;equilibrium
B)single peaked;log-rolling
C)cyclical;majority rule system
D)cyclical;primary system
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24
Economists call the fact that the general public has little incentive to become informed about most political issues _____.
A)rational ignorance
B)irrational voting
C)a diminishing political marketplace
D)cyclical political institutions
A)rational ignorance
B)irrational voting
C)a diminishing political marketplace
D)cyclical political institutions
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25
A _____ is when no one outcome can defeat all others by majority rule.
A)cyclical majority
B)single-peaked preference
C)political business cycle
D)political institution
A)cyclical majority
B)single-peaked preference
C)political business cycle
D)political institution
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26
Politicians face strong incentives to favor _____ over _____.
A)the rich;the middle class
B)special interests;the public interest
C)the rationally ignorant;special interests
D)the future;the present
A)the rich;the middle class
B)special interests;the public interest
C)the rationally ignorant;special interests
D)the future;the present
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27
Consider a policy proposal that aims to save small dairy farms by providing an annual lump sum subsidy to dairy farms with fewer than two hundred dairy cows.Why might this proposal pass,even if it benefits a few dairy farmers at the expense of the majority of voters?
A)The program might only cost each voter a few pennies and yet benefit small dairy farmers immensely.
B)The American people value the small dairy farm highly and want to see it preserved.
C)A cyclical majority makes it possible for the proposal to pass although it is not generally preferred.
D)Voters think it will result in cheap milk.
A)The program might only cost each voter a few pennies and yet benefit small dairy farmers immensely.
B)The American people value the small dairy farm highly and want to see it preserved.
C)A cyclical majority makes it possible for the proposal to pass although it is not generally preferred.
D)Voters think it will result in cheap milk.
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28
In order to survive in political office,politicians must be steadfast in their convictions and be unwilling to change their political platforms.
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29
Politicians have an incentive to favor short-run policies because _____
A)because voters suffer from myopia
B)of special interests
C)they may be voted out of office before long-run policies bear fruit
D)of rational ignorance
A)because voters suffer from myopia
B)of special interests
C)they may be voted out of office before long-run policies bear fruit
D)of rational ignorance
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30
The median voter model assumes that voters have single-peaked preferences.
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31
It is often said that if we could get more individuals to study the issues and vote we could have significant change through the ballot box.While true in a technical sense,which of the following statements best explains why this outcome is ?not likely to occur?
A)Individuals have double-peaked preferences and thus cyclical majorities will be prevalent.
B)Individuals are rationally ignorant and free ride off of the politically informed.
C)Individuals form special interest groups to suppress those attempting to effect change.
D)The electoral college stifles grassroots movements at all levels.
A)Individuals have double-peaked preferences and thus cyclical majorities will be prevalent.
B)Individuals are rationally ignorant and free ride off of the politically informed.
C)Individuals form special interest groups to suppress those attempting to effect change.
D)The electoral college stifles grassroots movements at all levels.
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32
If each voter pays taxes in proportion to her demand,then _____.
A)the median voter's most preferred outcome will definitely occur
B)the condition for economic efficiency is satisfied
C)special interests will have no power
D)political institutions are optimal
A)the median voter's most preferred outcome will definitely occur
B)the condition for economic efficiency is satisfied
C)special interests will have no power
D)political institutions are optimal
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33
Voters who do not have single-peaked preferences _____.
A)prefer outcomes closer to their most preferred outcome to outcomes further away
B)do not necessarily prefer outcomes closer to their most preferred outcome to outcomes farther away
C)prefer all outcomes the same
D)are unable to weigh one outcome against another outcome,regardless of where the outcome is along a one-dimensional continuum
A)prefer outcomes closer to their most preferred outcome to outcomes further away
B)do not necessarily prefer outcomes closer to their most preferred outcome to outcomes farther away
C)prefer all outcomes the same
D)are unable to weigh one outcome against another outcome,regardless of where the outcome is along a one-dimensional continuum
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34
Efficiency of the median voter model outcome occurs when _____.
A)Lindahl pricing is employed.
B)a head tax is used to finance the policy
C)progressive taxation is used to finance government
D)special interests are non-existent
A)Lindahl pricing is employed.
B)a head tax is used to finance the policy
C)progressive taxation is used to finance government
D)special interests are non-existent
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35
Elections tend to be closer when one candidate is extremely to the right or left.
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36
Special interests are _____ on political issues where they may receive concentrated benefits.
A)stable
B)cyclical
C)rationally ignorant
D)not rationally ignorant
A)stable
B)cyclical
C)rationally ignorant
D)not rationally ignorant
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37
Voters have an incentive to be rationally ignorant of most political issues because _____.
A)all candidates target the median voter
B)political information is costly
C)they are likely to be canceled out by another uninformed voter
D)their vote is highly unlikely to change the outcome
A)all candidates target the median voter
B)political information is costly
C)they are likely to be canceled out by another uninformed voter
D)their vote is highly unlikely to change the outcome
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38
Assuming that the median voter model accurately explains how public sector decision are made,resources will be allocated efficiently if _____.
A)preferences are single-peaked and individuals prefer outcomes closer to their preferred outcome rather than outcomes farther away
B)rational ignorance and cyclical majorities are not present
C)resources were already allocated efficiently in the private sector
D)the median voter's demand is the same fraction of total demand as his tax share is of total taxes
A)preferences are single-peaked and individuals prefer outcomes closer to their preferred outcome rather than outcomes farther away
B)rational ignorance and cyclical majorities are not present
C)resources were already allocated efficiently in the private sector
D)the median voter's demand is the same fraction of total demand as his tax share is of total taxes
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39
While cyclical majorities can lead to unstable outcomes,they generally do not because of _____.
A)rational ignorance
B)double-peaked preferences
C)political institutions
D)majority rule
A)rational ignorance
B)double-peaked preferences
C)political institutions
D)majority rule
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40
If issues can be ranked along a one-dimensional continuum,a successful political candidate will be an individual who is best able to align her political platform to the positions of the median voter.
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41
A gasoline tax to finance highways is a fairly good example of democratic decision-making resulting in the efficient level of output.
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42
Under what conditions might the median voter's preferred outcome not be selected through majority rule?
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43
Third parties do not elect large numbers of candidates in democratic countries with majority rule elections.
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44
In economic models of the public sector,the median voter model presents an extreme view of the way that the public sector allocates resources.
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45
Can the median voter model help explain why third parties have generally not been successful in the United States? Explain why or why not.
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46
When cyclical majorities arise,the winner of an election will be determined by the order in which the choices are presented to the voters.
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47
If voters do not have single-peaked preferences then a cyclical majority will arise.
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48
Draw a median voter model of a representative democracy with two candidates,one on the political right and one on the political left.Use your graph to help you explain why politicians are likely to have similar stances on issues.
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49
The likelihood of an individual's vote being significant in a Presidential election is fairly high,especially if they live in a swing state.
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50
List and describe two issues regarding incentives and information that explain why the median voter model might not accurately describe democratic decision-making.
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51
Assuming that the two key restrictions on preferences fundamental to the median voter model hold,list the condition that must be satisfied for the outcome preferred by median voter to be considered economically efficient.List one real world example that comes close to this condition.
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52
Voters have an incentive to become informed about political issues because the individual's vote is likely to affect the outcome.
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53
What is the primary prediction of the median voter model? List the two key assumptions of the median voter model regarding the preferences of voters.
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54
The simple median voter model is unbiased with respect to special interests.
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