It can be rational to play tit-for-tat in a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma game:
A) only if the game is played an infinite number of times.
B) if the game is played an infinite number of times, or if it is uncertain how many times it will be played.
C) only if the game is played a finite number of times, and that number is known by all the players in advance.
D) for n-1 of the n periods it will be played, if n is known in advance.
E) at no time; tit-for-tat is an irrational strategy in this situation.

Question

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

Tit-for-tat is a rational strategy in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma game if the game is played an infinite number of times, or if it is uncertain how many times it will be played. This is because in a repeated game, the players have the opportunity to punish each other for non-cooperation in future rounds. Therefore, if one player defects in one round, the other player can respond by defecting in the next round. However, if the game is played a finite number of times and that number is known by all players in advance, non-cooperation may still be the dominant strategy. Similarly, if n is known in advance, tit-for-tat may not be the best strategy. Therefore, option B is the only appropriate answer.

It Can Be Rational to Play Tit-For-Tat in a Repeated