Consider the following game that represents the payoffs from different advertising campaigns (low, medium, and high spending) for two political candidates that are running for a particular office. The values in the payoff matrix represent the share of the popular vote earned by each candidate: Under the version of the game in which Candidate A moves first, what is the Nash equilibrium?
A) The Nash equilibrium occurs where both candidates use medium advertising campaigns.
B) Candidate A's strategy is low, and Candidate B responded with a high advertising campaign.
C) The Nash equilibrium for the sequential and simultaneous versions of the game are identical.
D) There is no Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) for this sequential game.

Question

Consider the following game that represents the payoffs from different advertising campaigns (low, medium, and high spending) for two political candidates that are running for a particular office. The values in the payoff matrix represent the share of the popular vote earned by each candidate:  Under the version of the game in which Candidate A moves first, what is the Nash equilibrium?
A) The Nash equilibrium occurs where both candidates use medium advertising campaigns. 
B) Candidate A's strategy is low, and Candidate B responded with a high advertising campaign. 
C) The Nash equilibrium for the sequential and simultaneous versions of the game are identical. 
D) There is no Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) for this sequential game.

Quizplus · Accepted Answer

The Answer of Consider the following game that represents the payoffs from different advertising campaigns (low, medium, and high spending) for two political candidates that are running for a particular office. The values in the payoff matrix represent the share of the popular vote earned by each candidate:  Under the version of the game in which Candidate A moves first, what is the Nash equilibrium?
A) The Nash equilibrium occurs where both candidates use medium advertising campaigns. 
B) Candidate A's strategy is low, and Candidate B responded with a high advertising campaign. 
C) The Nash equilibrium for the sequential and simultaneous versions of the game are identical. 
D) There is no Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) for this sequential game.

Consider the Following Game That Represents the Payoffs from Different