A standard efficiency wage model pays workers higher wages in order to increase worker efficiency. As a result, firm profits increase and there is a pool of involuntarily unemployed workers. In this model, if the firm's cost of monitoring effort falls,
A) the efficiency wage will fall.
B) the number of shirking workers will fall.
C) firm profits will fall.
D) the firm will monitor less.
E) the pool of involuntarily unemployed workers will increase.
Correct Answer:
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